system/python3: bump to 3.6.10 and patch CVE-2019-18348 (#232)

4 files changed, 156 insertions, 217 deletions

diff --git a/system/python3/APKBUILD b/system/python3/APKBUILD
index b8c72f3a7..e875d3941 100644
--- a/system/python3/APKBUILD
+++ b/system/python3/APKBUILD
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 # Contributor: Kiyoshi Aman <adelie@aerdan.vulpine.house>
 # Maintainer: A. Wilcox <awilfox@adelielinux.org>
 pkgname=python3
-pkgver=3.6.9
+pkgver=3.6.10
 _basever="${pkgver%.*}"
 pkgrel=2
 pkgdesc="A high-level scripting language"
@@ -40,8 +40,7 @@ makedepends="expat-dev openssl-dev zlib-dev ncurses-dev bzip2-dev xz-dev
 source="https://www.python.org/ftp/python/$pkgver/Python-$pkgver.tar.xz
 	musl-find_library.patch
 	fix-xattrs-glibc.patch
-	CVE-2019-16056.patch
-	CVE-2019-16935.patch
+	CVE-2019-18348.patch
 	"
 builddir="$srcdir/Python-$pkgver"
 
@@ -63,6 +62,8 @@ builddir="$srcdir/Python-$pkgver"
 #     - CVE-2019-16056
 #   3.6.9-r2:
 #     - CVE-2019-16935
+#   3.6.10-r0:
+#     - CVE-2019-18348
 
 prepare() {
 	default_prepare
@@ -153,11 +154,14 @@ EOF
 }
 
 package() {
+	export XDG_CACHE_HOME="$(mktemp -d)"
 	make -j1 DESTDIR="$pkgdir" EXTRA_CFLAGS="$CFLAGS" install maninstall
 	install -Dm644 LICENSE "$pkgdir"/usr/share/licenses/$pkgname/LICENSE
 	# those are provided by python3-tkinter
 	rm -r "$pkgdir"/usr/bin/idle* "$pkgdir"/usr/lib/python*/idlelib \
 		"$pkgdir"/usr/lib/python*/tkinter
+
+	rm -rf "$XDG_CACHE_HOME"
 }
 
 dev() {
@@ -189,8 +193,7 @@ wininst() {
 		"$subpkgdir"/usr/lib/python$_basever/distutils/command
 }
 
-sha512sums="05de9c6f44d96a52bfce10ede4312de892573edaf8bece65926d19973a3a800d65eed7a857af945f69efcfb25efa3788e7a54016b03d80b611eb51c3ea074819  Python-3.6.9.tar.xz
+sha512sums="26147099e1f1a0ffc85febad26e18e991f019599a150887ea0b925e34663fad8e03b3c2a941e2770c1a63960695e173ef32709572c9361e7f2cb862ccf75b28a  Python-3.6.10.tar.xz
 ab8eaa2858d5109049b1f9f553198d40e0ef8d78211ad6455f7b491af525bffb16738fed60fc84e960c4889568d25753b9e4a1494834fea48291b33f07000ec2  musl-find_library.patch
 37b6ee5d0d5de43799316aa111423ba5a666c17dc7f81b04c330f59c1d1565540eac4c585abe2199bbed52ebe7426001edb1c53bd0a17486a2a8e052d0f494ad  fix-xattrs-glibc.patch
-1f1eb61355eb7832bef8e9c3915895cc3b2966a30c809371430b4416260452cd39c48ba593b2259574867bd1e8fea98efbc45c4b0bd95aeb0690c8514b380ea0  CVE-2019-16056.patch
-7f94d887c81f79d90afd4a9621547c13cbdd0232250f62a686b26a63160a4d286a6db9b342d06b9b63af64f994835b489c37bab499a2093c3c2585dc7a04d8a1  CVE-2019-16935.patch"
+7a15409165feb60358455b711f978b7b1c4dea9ad53aa7b5be07c1f70262988e592e7a630f83125f37051bbed14d14b66d2acd775234a163ff5b048621b9a59c  CVE-2019-18348.patch"
diff --git a/system/python3/CVE-2019-16056.patch b/system/python3/CVE-2019-16056.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index b2f5ce826..000000000
--- a/system/python3/CVE-2019-16056.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,131 +0,0 @@
-From 13a19139b5e76175bc95294d54afc9425e4f36c9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: "Miss Islington (bot)"
- <31488909+miss-islington@users.noreply.github.com>
-Date: Fri, 9 Aug 2019 08:22:19 -0700
-Subject: [PATCH] bpo-34155: Dont parse domains containing @ (GH-13079)
- (GH-14826)
-
-Before:
-
-        >>> email.message_from_string('From: a@malicious.org@important.com', policy=email.policy.default)['from'].addresses
-        (Address(display_name='', username='a', domain='malicious.org'),)
-
-        >>> parseaddr('a@malicious.org@important.com')
-        ('', 'a@malicious.org')
-
-    After:
-
-        >>> email.message_from_string('From: a@malicious.org@important.com', policy=email.policy.default)['from'].addresses
-        (Address(display_name='', username='', domain=''),)
-
-        >>> parseaddr('a@malicious.org@important.com')
-        ('', 'a@')
-
-https://bugs.python.org/issue34155
-(cherry picked from commit 8cb65d1381b027f0b09ee36bfed7f35bb4dec9a9)
-
-Co-authored-by: jpic <jpic@users.noreply.github.com>
----
- Lib/email/_header_value_parser.py                  |  2 ++
- Lib/email/_parseaddr.py                            | 11 ++++++++++-
- Lib/test/test_email/test__header_value_parser.py   | 10 ++++++++++
- Lib/test/test_email/test_email.py                  | 14 ++++++++++++++
- .../2019-05-04-13-33-37.bpo-34155.MJll68.rst       |  1 +
- 5 files changed, 37 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
- create mode 100644 Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2019-05-04-13-33-37.bpo-34155.MJll68.rst
-
-diff --git a/Lib/email/_header_value_parser.py b/Lib/email/_header_value_parser.py
-index 737951e4b1b1..bc9c9b6241d4 100644
---- a/Lib/email/_header_value_parser.py
-+++ b/Lib/email/_header_value_parser.py
-@@ -1561,6 +1561,8 @@ def get_domain(value):
-         token, value = get_dot_atom(value)
-     except errors.HeaderParseError:
-         token, value = get_atom(value)
-+    if value and value[0] == '@':
-+        raise errors.HeaderParseError('Invalid Domain')
-     if leader is not None:
-         token[:0] = [leader]
-     domain.append(token)
-diff --git a/Lib/email/_parseaddr.py b/Lib/email/_parseaddr.py
-index cdfa3729adc7..41ff6f8c000d 100644
---- a/Lib/email/_parseaddr.py
-+++ b/Lib/email/_parseaddr.py
-@@ -379,7 +379,12 @@ def getaddrspec(self):
-         aslist.append('@')
-         self.pos += 1
-         self.gotonext()
--        return EMPTYSTRING.join(aslist) + self.getdomain()
-+        domain = self.getdomain()
-+        if not domain:
-+            # Invalid domain, return an empty address instead of returning a
-+            # local part to denote failed parsing.
-+            return EMPTYSTRING
-+        return EMPTYSTRING.join(aslist) + domain
- 
-     def getdomain(self):
-         """Get the complete domain name from an address."""
-@@ -394,6 +399,10 @@ def getdomain(self):
-             elif self.field[self.pos] == '.':
-                 self.pos += 1
-                 sdlist.append('.')
-+            elif self.field[self.pos] == '@':
-+                # bpo-34155: Don't parse domains with two `@` like
-+                # `a@malicious.org@important.com`.
-+                return EMPTYSTRING
-             elif self.field[self.pos] in self.atomends:
-                 break
-             else:
-diff --git a/Lib/test/test_email/test__header_value_parser.py b/Lib/test/test_email/test__header_value_parser.py
-index a2c900fa7fd2..02ef3e1006c6 100644
---- a/Lib/test/test_email/test__header_value_parser.py
-+++ b/Lib/test/test_email/test__header_value_parser.py
-@@ -1418,6 +1418,16 @@ def test_get_addr_spec_dot_atom(self):
-         self.assertEqual(addr_spec.domain, 'example.com')
-         self.assertEqual(addr_spec.addr_spec, 'star.a.star@example.com')
- 
-+    def test_get_addr_spec_multiple_domains(self):
-+        with self.assertRaises(errors.HeaderParseError):
-+            parser.get_addr_spec('star@a.star@example.com')
-+
-+        with self.assertRaises(errors.HeaderParseError):
-+            parser.get_addr_spec('star@a@example.com')
-+
-+        with self.assertRaises(errors.HeaderParseError):
-+            parser.get_addr_spec('star@172.17.0.1@example.com')
-+
-     # get_obs_route
- 
-     def test_get_obs_route_simple(self):
-diff --git a/Lib/test/test_email/test_email.py b/Lib/test/test_email/test_email.py
-index f97ccc6711cc..68d052279987 100644
---- a/Lib/test/test_email/test_email.py
-+++ b/Lib/test/test_email/test_email.py
-@@ -3035,6 +3035,20 @@ def test_parseaddr_empty(self):
-         self.assertEqual(utils.parseaddr('<>'), ('', ''))
-         self.assertEqual(utils.formataddr(utils.parseaddr('<>')), '')
- 
-+    def test_parseaddr_multiple_domains(self):
-+        self.assertEqual(
-+            utils.parseaddr('a@b@c'),
-+            ('', '')
-+        )
-+        self.assertEqual(
-+            utils.parseaddr('a@b.c@c'),
-+            ('', '')
-+        )
-+        self.assertEqual(
-+            utils.parseaddr('a@172.17.0.1@c'),
-+            ('', '')
-+        )
-+
-     def test_noquote_dump(self):
-         self.assertEqual(
-             utils.formataddr(('A Silly Person', 'person@dom.ain')),
-diff --git a/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2019-05-04-13-33-37.bpo-34155.MJll68.rst b/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2019-05-04-13-33-37.bpo-34155.MJll68.rst
-new file mode 100644
-index 000000000000..50292e29ed1d
---- /dev/null
-+++ b/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2019-05-04-13-33-37.bpo-34155.MJll68.rst
-@@ -0,0 +1 @@
-+Fix parsing of invalid email addresses with more than one ``@`` (e.g. a@b@c.com.) to not return the part before 2nd ``@`` as valid email address. Patch by maxking & jpic.
diff --git a/system/python3/CVE-2019-16935.patch b/system/python3/CVE-2019-16935.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 567eb90fc..000000000
--- a/system/python3/CVE-2019-16935.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,80 +0,0 @@
-From 1698cacfb924d1df452e78d11a4bf81ae7777389 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Victor Stinner <vstinner@redhat.com>
-Date: Sat, 28 Sep 2019 09:33:00 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH] bpo-38243, xmlrpc.server: Escape the server_title (GH-16373)
- (GH-16441)
-
-Escape the server title of xmlrpc.server.DocXMLRPCServer
-when rendering the document page as HTML.
-
-(cherry picked from commit e8650a4f8c7fb76f570d4ca9c1fbe44e91c8dfaa)
----
- Lib/test/test_docxmlrpc.py                       | 16 ++++++++++++++++
- Lib/xmlrpc/server.py                             |  3 ++-
- .../2019-09-25-13-21-09.bpo-38243.1pfz24.rst     |  3 +++
- 3 files changed, 21 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
- create mode 100644 Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2019-09-25-13-21-09.bpo-38243.1pfz24.rst
-
-diff --git a/Lib/test/test_docxmlrpc.py b/Lib/test/test_docxmlrpc.py
-index 00903337c07c2..d2adb21af0fb3 100644
---- a/Lib/test/test_docxmlrpc.py
-+++ b/Lib/test/test_docxmlrpc.py
-@@ -1,5 +1,6 @@
- from xmlrpc.server import DocXMLRPCServer
- import http.client
-+import re
- import sys
- from test import support
- threading = support.import_module('threading')
-@@ -193,6 +194,21 @@ def test_annotations(self):
-              b'method_annotation</strong></a>(x: bytes)</dt></dl>'),
-             response.read())
- 
-+    def test_server_title_escape(self):
-+        # bpo-38243: Ensure that the server title and documentation
-+        # are escaped for HTML.
-+        self.serv.set_server_title('test_title<script>')
-+        self.serv.set_server_documentation('test_documentation<script>')
-+        self.assertEqual('test_title<script>', self.serv.server_title)
-+        self.assertEqual('test_documentation<script>',
-+                self.serv.server_documentation)
-+
-+        generated = self.serv.generate_html_documentation()
-+        title = re.search(r'<title>(.+?)</title>', generated).group()
-+        documentation = re.search(r'<p><tt>(.+?)</tt></p>', generated).group()
-+        self.assertEqual('<title>Python: test_title&lt;script&gt;</title>', title)
-+        self.assertEqual('<p><tt>test_documentation&lt;script&gt;</tt></p>', documentation)
-+
- 
- if __name__ == '__main__':
-     unittest.main()
-diff --git a/Lib/xmlrpc/server.py b/Lib/xmlrpc/server.py
-index 3e0dca027f068..efe593748968c 100644
---- a/Lib/xmlrpc/server.py
-+++ b/Lib/xmlrpc/server.py
-@@ -106,6 +106,7 @@ def export_add(self, x, y):
- 
- from xmlrpc.client import Fault, dumps, loads, gzip_encode, gzip_decode
- from http.server import BaseHTTPRequestHandler
-+import html
- import http.server
- import socketserver
- import sys
-@@ -904,7 +905,7 @@ def generate_html_documentation(self):
-                                 methods
-                             )
- 
--        return documenter.page(self.server_title, documentation)
-+        return documenter.page(html.escape(self.server_title), documentation)
- 
- class DocXMLRPCRequestHandler(SimpleXMLRPCRequestHandler):
-     """XML-RPC and documentation request handler class.
-diff --git a/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2019-09-25-13-21-09.bpo-38243.1pfz24.rst b/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2019-09-25-13-21-09.bpo-38243.1pfz24.rst
-new file mode 100644
-index 0000000000000..98d7be129573a
---- /dev/null
-+++ b/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2019-09-25-13-21-09.bpo-38243.1pfz24.rst
-@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
-+Escape the server title of :class:`xmlrpc.server.DocXMLRPCServer`
-+when rendering the document page as HTML.
-+(Contributed by Dong-hee Na in :issue:`38243`.)
diff --git a/system/python3/CVE-2019-18348.patch b/system/python3/CVE-2019-18348.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..9ebb963a8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/system/python3/CVE-2019-18348.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,147 @@
+From 83fc70159b24f5b11a5ef87c9b05c2cf4c7faeba Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: "Miss Islington (bot)"
+ <31488909+miss-islington@users.noreply.github.com>
+Date: Sat, 14 Mar 2020 15:35:52 -0700
+Subject: [PATCH] bpo-38576: Disallow control characters in hostnames in
+ http.client (GH-18995) (GH-19002)
+
+Add host validation for control characters for more CVE-2019-18348 protection.
+(cherry picked from commit 9165addc22d05e776a54319a8531ebd0b2fe01ef)
+
+Co-authored-by: Ashwin Ramaswami <aramaswamis@gmail.com>
+---
+ Lib/http/client.py                            | 10 ++++++
+ Lib/test/test_httplib.py                      | 13 ++++++-
+ Lib/test/test_urllib.py                       | 36 +++++++++++++++++--
+ .../2020-03-14-14-57-44.bpo-38576.OowwQn.rst  |  1 +
+ 4 files changed, 57 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
+ create mode 100644 Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2020-03-14-14-57-44.bpo-38576.OowwQn.rst
+
+diff --git a/Lib/http/client.py b/Lib/http/client.py
+index d4821f1a96e07..c0ac7db6f40a0 100644
+--- a/Lib/http/client.py
++++ b/Lib/http/client.py
+@@ -858,6 +858,8 @@ def __init__(self, host, port=None, timeout=socket._GLOBAL_DEFAULT_TIMEOUT,
+ 
+         (self.host, self.port) = self._get_hostport(host, port)
+ 
++        self._validate_host(self.host)
++
+         # This is stored as an instance variable to allow unit
+         # tests to replace it with a suitable mockup
+         self._create_connection = socket.create_connection
+@@ -1215,6 +1217,14 @@ def _validate_path(self, url):
+             raise InvalidURL(f"URL can't contain control characters. {url!r} "
+                              f"(found at least {match.group()!r})")
+ 
++    def _validate_host(self, host):
++        """Validate a host so it doesn't contain control characters."""
++        # Prevent CVE-2019-18348.
++        match = _contains_disallowed_url_pchar_re.search(host)
++        if match:
++            raise InvalidURL(f"URL can't contain control characters. {host!r} "
++                             f"(found at least {match.group()!r})")
++
+     def putheader(self, header, *values):
+         """Send a request header line to the server.
+ 
+diff --git a/Lib/test/test_httplib.py b/Lib/test/test_httplib.py
+index 14d42d483773c..fcd9231666ede 100644
+--- a/Lib/test/test_httplib.py
++++ b/Lib/test/test_httplib.py
+@@ -1132,7 +1132,7 @@ def run_server():
+         thread.join()
+         self.assertEqual(result, b"proxied data\n")
+ 
+-    def test_putrequest_override_validation(self):
++    def test_putrequest_override_domain_validation(self):
+         """
+         It should be possible to override the default validation
+         behavior in putrequest (bpo-38216).
+@@ -1145,6 +1145,17 @@ def _validate_path(self, url):
+         conn.sock = FakeSocket('')
+         conn.putrequest('GET', '/\x00')
+ 
++    def test_putrequest_override_host_validation(self):
++        class UnsafeHTTPConnection(client.HTTPConnection):
++            def _validate_host(self, url):
++                pass
++
++        conn = UnsafeHTTPConnection('example.com\r\n')
++        conn.sock = FakeSocket('')
++        # set skip_host so a ValueError is not raised upon adding the
++        # invalid URL as the value of the "Host:" header
++        conn.putrequest('GET', '/', skip_host=1)
++
+     def test_putrequest_override_encoding(self):
+         """
+         It should be possible to override the default encoding
+diff --git a/Lib/test/test_urllib.py b/Lib/test/test_urllib.py
+index 0061a5297cb35..ddf425fd8d4b5 100644
+--- a/Lib/test/test_urllib.py
++++ b/Lib/test/test_urllib.py
+@@ -331,7 +331,7 @@ def test_willclose(self):
+             self.unfakehttp()
+ 
+     @unittest.skipUnless(ssl, "ssl module required")
+-    def test_url_with_control_char_rejected(self):
++    def test_url_path_with_control_char_rejected(self):
+         for char_no in list(range(0, 0x21)) + [0x7f]:
+             char = chr(char_no)
+             schemeless_url = f"//localhost:7777/test{char}/"
+@@ -358,7 +358,7 @@ def test_url_with_control_char_rejected(self):
+                 self.unfakehttp()
+ 
+     @unittest.skipUnless(ssl, "ssl module required")
+-    def test_url_with_newline_header_injection_rejected(self):
++    def test_url_path_with_newline_header_injection_rejected(self):
+         self.fakehttp(b"HTTP/1.1 200 OK\r\n\r\nHello.")
+         host = "localhost:7777?a=1 HTTP/1.1\r\nX-injected: header\r\nTEST: 123"
+         schemeless_url = "//" + host + ":8080/test/?test=a"
+@@ -383,6 +383,38 @@ def test_url_with_newline_header_injection_rejected(self):
+         finally:
+             self.unfakehttp()
+ 
++    @unittest.skipUnless(ssl, "ssl module required")
++    def test_url_host_with_control_char_rejected(self):
++        for char_no in list(range(0, 0x21)) + [0x7f]:
++            char = chr(char_no)
++            schemeless_url = f"//localhost{char}/test/"
++            self.fakehttp(b"HTTP/1.1 200 OK\r\n\r\nHello.")
++            try:
++                escaped_char_repr = repr(char).replace('\\', r'\\')
++                InvalidURL = http.client.InvalidURL
++                with self.assertRaisesRegex(
++                    InvalidURL, f"contain control.*{escaped_char_repr}"):
++                    urlopen(f"http:{schemeless_url}")
++                with self.assertRaisesRegex(InvalidURL, f"contain control.*{escaped_char_repr}"):
++                    urlopen(f"https:{schemeless_url}")
++            finally:
++                self.unfakehttp()
++
++    @unittest.skipUnless(ssl, "ssl module required")
++    def test_url_host_with_newline_header_injection_rejected(self):
++        self.fakehttp(b"HTTP/1.1 200 OK\r\n\r\nHello.")
++        host = "localhost\r\nX-injected: header\r\n"
++        schemeless_url = "//" + host + ":8080/test/?test=a"
++        try:
++            InvalidURL = http.client.InvalidURL
++            with self.assertRaisesRegex(
++                InvalidURL, r"contain control.*\\r"):
++                urlopen(f"http:{schemeless_url}")
++            with self.assertRaisesRegex(InvalidURL, r"contain control.*\\n"):
++                urlopen(f"https:{schemeless_url}")
++        finally:
++            self.unfakehttp()
++
+     def test_read_0_9(self):
+         # "0.9" response accepted (but not "simple responses" without
+         # a status line)
+diff --git a/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2020-03-14-14-57-44.bpo-38576.OowwQn.rst b/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2020-03-14-14-57-44.bpo-38576.OowwQn.rst
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000000000..34b8af28988fa
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2020-03-14-14-57-44.bpo-38576.OowwQn.rst
+@@ -0,0 +1 @@
++Disallow control characters in hostnames in http.client, addressing CVE-2019-18348. Such potentially malicious header injection URLs now cause a InvalidURL to be raised.
+\ No newline at end of file