From e57fee0540a6a586ccd7c66fedc94752a7f06b59 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Max Rees Date: Mon, 2 Mar 2020 18:29:06 -0600 Subject: user/openjpeg: patch CVE-2020-6851 and CVE-2020-8112 (#235) --- user/openjpeg/APKBUILD | 14 ++++++++++--- user/openjpeg/CVE-2020-6851.patch | 29 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++ user/openjpeg/CVE-2020-8112.patch | 43 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 3 files changed, 83 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) create mode 100644 user/openjpeg/CVE-2020-6851.patch create mode 100644 user/openjpeg/CVE-2020-8112.patch (limited to 'user/openjpeg') diff --git a/user/openjpeg/APKBUILD b/user/openjpeg/APKBUILD index 680e1c8c2..54f9811ea 100644 --- a/user/openjpeg/APKBUILD +++ b/user/openjpeg/APKBUILD @@ -2,7 +2,7 @@ # Maintainer: A. Wilcox pkgname=openjpeg pkgver=2.3.1 -pkgrel=2 +pkgrel=3 pkgdesc="Open-source implementation of JPEG 2000 image codec" url="http://www.openjpeg.org/" arch="all" @@ -13,9 +13,15 @@ depends_dev="$pkgname-tools" makedepends="libpng-dev tiff-dev lcms2-dev doxygen cmake" subpackages="$pkgname-dev $pkgname-tools" source="$pkgname-$pkgver.tar.gz::https://github.com/uclouvain/openjpeg/archive/v$pkgver.tar.gz - CVE-2019-12973.patch" + CVE-2019-12973.patch + CVE-2020-6851.patch + CVE-2020-8112.patch + " # secfixes: +# 2.3.1-r3: +# - CVE-2020-6851 +# - CVE-2020-8112 # 2.3.1-r2: # - CVE-2019-12973 # 2.3.0-r0: @@ -52,4 +58,6 @@ tools() { } sha512sums="339fbc899bddf2393d214df71ed5d6070a3a76b933b1e75576c8a0ae9dfcc4adec40bdc544f599e4b8d0bc173e4e9e7352408497b5b3c9356985605830c26c03 openjpeg-2.3.1.tar.gz -472deba1d521553f9c7af805ba3d0c4fc31564fd36e37c598646f468b7d05bf5f81d2320fd6fadf8c0e3344ebce7bc0d04cece55a1b3cec2ef693a6e65bd2516 CVE-2019-12973.patch" +472deba1d521553f9c7af805ba3d0c4fc31564fd36e37c598646f468b7d05bf5f81d2320fd6fadf8c0e3344ebce7bc0d04cece55a1b3cec2ef693a6e65bd2516 CVE-2019-12973.patch +c8ffc926d91392b38250fd4e00fff5f93fbf5e17487d0e4a0184c9bd191aa2233c5c5dcf097dd62824714097bba2d8cc865bed31193d1a072aa954f216011297 CVE-2020-6851.patch +9659e04087e0d80bf53555e9807aae59205adef2d49d7a49e05bf250c484a2e92132d471ec6076e57ca69b5ce98fd81462a6a8c01205ca7096781eec06e401cc CVE-2020-8112.patch" diff --git a/user/openjpeg/CVE-2020-6851.patch b/user/openjpeg/CVE-2020-6851.patch new file mode 100644 index 000000000..9a70291f5 --- /dev/null +++ b/user/openjpeg/CVE-2020-6851.patch @@ -0,0 +1,29 @@ +From 024b8407392cb0b82b04b58ed256094ed5799e04 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Even Rouault +Date: Sat, 11 Jan 2020 01:51:19 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH] opj_j2k_update_image_dimensions(): reject images whose + coordinates are beyond INT_MAX (fixes #1228) + +--- + src/lib/openjp2/j2k.c | 8 ++++++++ + 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/src/lib/openjp2/j2k.c b/src/lib/openjp2/j2k.c +index 14f6ff41a..922550eb1 100644 +--- a/src/lib/openjp2/j2k.c ++++ b/src/lib/openjp2/j2k.c +@@ -9221,6 +9221,14 @@ static OPJ_BOOL opj_j2k_update_image_dimensions(opj_image_t* p_image, + l_img_comp = p_image->comps; + for (it_comp = 0; it_comp < p_image->numcomps; ++it_comp) { + OPJ_INT32 l_h, l_w; ++ if (p_image->x0 > (OPJ_UINT32)INT_MAX || ++ p_image->y0 > (OPJ_UINT32)INT_MAX || ++ p_image->x1 > (OPJ_UINT32)INT_MAX || ++ p_image->y1 > (OPJ_UINT32)INT_MAX) { ++ opj_event_msg(p_manager, EVT_ERROR, ++ "Image coordinates above INT_MAX are not supported\n"); ++ return OPJ_FALSE; ++ } + + l_img_comp->x0 = (OPJ_UINT32)opj_int_ceildiv((OPJ_INT32)p_image->x0, + (OPJ_INT32)l_img_comp->dx); diff --git a/user/openjpeg/CVE-2020-8112.patch b/user/openjpeg/CVE-2020-8112.patch new file mode 100644 index 000000000..95cb8095f --- /dev/null +++ b/user/openjpeg/CVE-2020-8112.patch @@ -0,0 +1,43 @@ +From 05f9b91e60debda0e83977e5e63b2e66486f7074 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Even Rouault +Date: Thu, 30 Jan 2020 00:59:57 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH] opj_tcd_init_tile(): avoid integer overflow + +That could lead to later assertion failures. + +Fixes #1231 / CVE-2020-8112 +--- + src/lib/openjp2/tcd.c | 20 ++++++++++++++++++-- + 1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/src/lib/openjp2/tcd.c b/src/lib/openjp2/tcd.c +index deecc4dff..aa419030a 100644 +--- a/src/lib/openjp2/tcd.c ++++ b/src/lib/openjp2/tcd.c +@@ -905,8 +905,24 @@ static INLINE OPJ_BOOL opj_tcd_init_tile(opj_tcd_t *p_tcd, OPJ_UINT32 p_tile_no, + /* p. 64, B.6, ISO/IEC FDIS15444-1 : 2000 (18 august 2000) */ + l_tl_prc_x_start = opj_int_floordivpow2(l_res->x0, (OPJ_INT32)l_pdx) << l_pdx; + l_tl_prc_y_start = opj_int_floordivpow2(l_res->y0, (OPJ_INT32)l_pdy) << l_pdy; +- l_br_prc_x_end = opj_int_ceildivpow2(l_res->x1, (OPJ_INT32)l_pdx) << l_pdx; +- l_br_prc_y_end = opj_int_ceildivpow2(l_res->y1, (OPJ_INT32)l_pdy) << l_pdy; ++ { ++ OPJ_UINT32 tmp = ((OPJ_UINT32)opj_int_ceildivpow2(l_res->x1, ++ (OPJ_INT32)l_pdx)) << l_pdx; ++ if (tmp > (OPJ_UINT32)INT_MAX) { ++ opj_event_msg(manager, EVT_ERROR, "Integer overflow\n"); ++ return OPJ_FALSE; ++ } ++ l_br_prc_x_end = (OPJ_INT32)tmp; ++ } ++ { ++ OPJ_UINT32 tmp = ((OPJ_UINT32)opj_int_ceildivpow2(l_res->y1, ++ (OPJ_INT32)l_pdy)) << l_pdy; ++ if (tmp > (OPJ_UINT32)INT_MAX) { ++ opj_event_msg(manager, EVT_ERROR, "Integer overflow\n"); ++ return OPJ_FALSE; ++ } ++ l_br_prc_y_end = (OPJ_INT32)tmp; ++ } + /*fprintf(stderr, "\t\t\tprc_x_start=%d, prc_y_start=%d, br_prc_x_end=%d, br_prc_y_end=%d \n", l_tl_prc_x_start, l_tl_prc_y_start, l_br_prc_x_end ,l_br_prc_y_end );*/ + + l_res->pw = (l_res->x0 == l_res->x1) ? 0U : (OPJ_UINT32)(( -- cgit v1.2.3-60-g2f50