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the adjustment made is entirely a function of TLS_ABOVE_TP and
TP_OFFSET. aside from avoiding repetition of the TP_OFFSET value and
arithmetic, this change makes pthread_arch.h independent of the
definition of struct __pthread from pthread_impl.h. this in turn will
allow inclusion of pthread_arch.h to be moved to the top of
pthread_impl.h so that it can influence the definition of the
structure.
previously, arch files were very inconsistent about the type used for
the thread pointer. this change unifies the new __get_tp interface to
always use uintptr_t, which is the most correct when performing
arithmetic that may involve addresses outside the actual pointed-to
object (due to TP_OFFSET).
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the only part of TP_ADJ that was not uniquely determined by
TLS_ABOVE_TP was the 0x7000 adjustment used mainly on mips and powerpc
variants.
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this will allow the compiler to cache and reuse the result, meaning we
no longer have to take care not to load it more than once for the sake
of archs where the load may be expensive.
depends on commit 1c84c99913bf1cd47b866ed31e665848a0da84a2 for
correctness, since otherwise the compiler could hoist loads during
stage 3 of dynamic linking before the initial thread-pointer setup.
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using the actual mcontext_t definition rather than an overlaid pointer
array both improves correctness/readability and eliminates some ugly
hacks for archs with 64-bit registers bit 32-bit program counter.
also fix UB due to comparison of pointers not in a common array
object.
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despite documentation that makes it sound a lot different, the only
ABI-constraint difference between TLS variants II and I seems to be
that variant II stores the initial TLS segment immediately below the
thread pointer (i.e. the thread pointer points to the end of it) and
variant I stores the initial TLS segment above the thread pointer,
requiring the thread descriptor to be stored below. the actual value
stored in the thread pointer register also tends to have per-arch
random offsets applied to it for silly micro-optimization purposes.
with these changes applied, TLS should be basically working on all
supported archs except microblaze. I'm still working on getting the
necessary information and a working toolchain that can build TLS
binaries for microblaze, but in theory, static-linked programs with
TLS and dynamic-linked programs where only the main executable uses
TLS should already work on microblaze.
alignment constraints have not yet been heavily tested, so it's
possible that this code does not always align TLS segments correctly
on archs that need TLS variant I.
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if gcc decided to move this across a conditional that checks validity
of the thread register, an invalid thread-register-based read could be
performed and raise sigsegv.
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this patch improves the correctness, simplicity, and size of
cancellation-related code. modulo any small errors, it should now be
completely conformant, safe, and resource-leak free.
the notion of entering and exiting cancellation-point context has been
completely eliminated and replaced with alternative syscall assembly
code for cancellable syscalls. the assembly is responsible for setting
up execution context information (stack pointer and address of the
syscall instruction) which the cancellation signal handler can use to
determine whether the interrupted code was in a cancellable state.
these changes eliminate race conditions in the previous generation of
cancellation handling code (whereby a cancellation request received
just prior to the syscall would not be processed, leaving the syscall
to block, potentially indefinitely), and remedy an issue where
non-cancellable syscalls made from signal handlers became cancellable
if the signal handler interrupted a cancellation point.
x86_64 asm is untested and may need a second try to get it right.
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this commit addresses two issues:
1. a race condition, whereby a cancellation request occurring after a
syscall returned from kernelspace but before the subsequent
CANCELPT_END would cause cancellable resource-allocating syscalls
(like open) to leak resources.
2. signal handlers invoked while the thread was blocked at a
cancellation point behaved as if asynchronous cancellation mode wer in
effect, resulting in potentially dangerous state corruption if a
cancellation request occurs.
the glibc/nptl implementation of threads shares both of these issues.
with this commit, both are fixed. however, cancellation points
encountered in a signal handler will not be acted upon if the signal
was received while the thread was already at a cancellation point.
they will of course be acted upon after the signal handler returns, so
in real-world usage where signal handlers quickly return, it should
not be a problem. it's possible to solve this problem too by having
sigaction() wrap all signal handlers with a function that uses a
pthread_cleanup handler to catch cancellation, patch up the saved
context, and return into the cancellable function that will catch and
act upon the cancellation. however that would be a lot of complexity
for minimal if any benefit...
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