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if new shared mappings of files/devices/shared memory can be made
between the time a robust mutex is unlocked and its subsequent removal
from the pending slot in the robustlist header, the kernel can
inadvertently corrupt data in the newly-mapped pages when the process
terminates. i am fixing the bug by using the same global vm lock
mechanism that was used to fix the race condition with unmapping
barriers after pthread_barrier_wait returns.
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there is no need to send a wake when the lock count does not hit zero,
but when it does, all waiters must be woken (since all with the same
sign are eligible to obtain the lock).
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eliminate the sequence number field and instead use the counter as the
futex because of the way the lock is held, sequence numbers are
completely useless, and this frees up a field in the barrier structure
to be used as a waiter count for the count futex, which lets us avoid
some syscalls in the best case.
as of now, self-synchronized destruction and unmapping should be fully
safe. before any thread can return from the barrier, all threads in
the barrier have obtained the vm lock, and each holds a shared lock on
the barrier. the barrier memory is not inspected after the shared lock
count reaches 0, nor after the vm lock is released.
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i think this works, but it can be simplified. (next step)
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i set the return value but then never used it... oops!
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this implementation is rather heavy-weight, but it's the first
solution i've found that's actually correct. all waiters actually wait
twice at the barrier so that they can synchronize exit, and they hold
a "vm lock" that prevents changes to virtual memory mappings (and
blocks pthread_barrier_destroy) until all waiters are finished
inspecting the barrier.
thus, it is safe for any thread to destroy and/or unmap the barrier's
memory as soon as pthread_barrier_wait returns, without further
synchronization.
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the previous implementation had at least 2 problems:
1. the case where additional threads reached the barrier before the
first wave was finished leaving the barrier was untested and seemed
not to be working.
2. threads leaving the barrier continued to access memory within the
barrier object after other threads had successfully returned from
pthread_barrier_wait. this could lead to memory corruption or crashes
if the barrier object had automatic storage in one of the waiting
threads and went out of scope before all threads finished returning,
or if one thread unmapped the memory in which the barrier object
lived.
the new implementation avoids both problems by making the barrier
state essentially local to the first thread which enters the barrier
wait, and forces that thread to be the last to return.
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this allows sys/types.h to provide the pthread types, as required by
POSIX. this design also facilitates forcing ABI-compatible sizes in
the arch-specific alltypes.h, while eliminating the need for
developers changing the internals of the pthread types to poke around
with arch-specific headers they may not be able to test.
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