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authorA. Wilcox <AWilcox@Wilcox-Tech.com>2019-01-27 20:22:33 +0000
committerA. Wilcox <AWilcox@Wilcox-Tech.com>2019-01-27 20:22:33 +0000
commit4c44387cdae423c79339dafa044980fd77ec422a (patch)
treeacf8cb1a89b828249823bab65b44c1519541d857 /system/openssh/CVE-2018-20685.patch
parent35cf1156baad094ddcf9ef26ad26e71fe5df1a97 (diff)
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system/openssh: CVE-2018-20685
Diffstat (limited to 'system/openssh/CVE-2018-20685.patch')
-rw-r--r--system/openssh/CVE-2018-20685.patch33
1 files changed, 33 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/system/openssh/CVE-2018-20685.patch b/system/openssh/CVE-2018-20685.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..f2f1ecfc5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/system/openssh/CVE-2018-20685.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
+From 6010c0303a422a9c5fa8860c061bf7105eb7f8b2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: "djm@openbsd.org" <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri, 16 Nov 2018 03:03:10 +0000
+Subject: [PATCH] upstream: disallow empty incoming filename or ones that refer
+ to the
+
+current directory; based on report/patch from Harry Sintonen
+
+OpenBSD-Commit-ID: f27651b30eaee2df49540ab68d030865c04f6de9
+---
+ scp.c | 5 +++--
+ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/scp.c b/scp.c
+index 60682c687..4f3fdcd3d 100644
+--- a/scp.c
++++ b/scp.c
+@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
+-/* $OpenBSD: scp.c,v 1.197 2018/06/01 04:31:48 dtucker Exp $ */
++/* $OpenBSD: scp.c,v 1.198 2018/11/16 03:03:10 djm Exp $ */
+ /*
+ * scp - secure remote copy. This is basically patched BSD rcp which
+ * uses ssh to do the data transfer (instead of using rcmd).
+@@ -1106,7 +1106,8 @@ sink(int argc, char **argv)
+ SCREWUP("size out of range");
+ size = (off_t)ull;
+
+- if ((strchr(cp, '/') != NULL) || (strcmp(cp, "..") == 0)) {
++ if (*cp == '\0' || strchr(cp, '/') != NULL ||
++ strcmp(cp, ".") == 0 || strcmp(cp, "..") == 0) {
+ run_err("error: unexpected filename: %s", cp);
+ exit(1);
+ }