Merge branch 'master' into zfs

1 files changed, 147 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/system/python3/CVE-2019-18348.patch b/system/python3/CVE-2019-18348.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..9ebb963a8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/system/python3/CVE-2019-18348.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,147 @@
+From 83fc70159b24f5b11a5ef87c9b05c2cf4c7faeba Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: "Miss Islington (bot)"
+ <31488909+miss-islington@users.noreply.github.com>
+Date: Sat, 14 Mar 2020 15:35:52 -0700
+Subject: [PATCH] bpo-38576: Disallow control characters in hostnames in
+ http.client (GH-18995) (GH-19002)
+
+Add host validation for control characters for more CVE-2019-18348 protection.
+(cherry picked from commit 9165addc22d05e776a54319a8531ebd0b2fe01ef)
+
+Co-authored-by: Ashwin Ramaswami <aramaswamis@gmail.com>
+---
+ Lib/http/client.py                            | 10 ++++++
+ Lib/test/test_httplib.py                      | 13 ++++++-
+ Lib/test/test_urllib.py                       | 36 +++++++++++++++++--
+ .../2020-03-14-14-57-44.bpo-38576.OowwQn.rst  |  1 +
+ 4 files changed, 57 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
+ create mode 100644 Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2020-03-14-14-57-44.bpo-38576.OowwQn.rst
+
+diff --git a/Lib/http/client.py b/Lib/http/client.py
+index d4821f1a96e07..c0ac7db6f40a0 100644
+--- a/Lib/http/client.py
++++ b/Lib/http/client.py
+@@ -858,6 +858,8 @@ def __init__(self, host, port=None, timeout=socket._GLOBAL_DEFAULT_TIMEOUT,
+ 
+         (self.host, self.port) = self._get_hostport(host, port)
+ 
++        self._validate_host(self.host)
++
+         # This is stored as an instance variable to allow unit
+         # tests to replace it with a suitable mockup
+         self._create_connection = socket.create_connection
+@@ -1215,6 +1217,14 @@ def _validate_path(self, url):
+             raise InvalidURL(f"URL can't contain control characters. {url!r} "
+                              f"(found at least {match.group()!r})")
+ 
++    def _validate_host(self, host):
++        """Validate a host so it doesn't contain control characters."""
++        # Prevent CVE-2019-18348.
++        match = _contains_disallowed_url_pchar_re.search(host)
++        if match:
++            raise InvalidURL(f"URL can't contain control characters. {host!r} "
++                             f"(found at least {match.group()!r})")
++
+     def putheader(self, header, *values):
+         """Send a request header line to the server.
+ 
+diff --git a/Lib/test/test_httplib.py b/Lib/test/test_httplib.py
+index 14d42d483773c..fcd9231666ede 100644
+--- a/Lib/test/test_httplib.py
++++ b/Lib/test/test_httplib.py
+@@ -1132,7 +1132,7 @@ def run_server():
+         thread.join()
+         self.assertEqual(result, b"proxied data\n")
+ 
+-    def test_putrequest_override_validation(self):
++    def test_putrequest_override_domain_validation(self):
+         """
+         It should be possible to override the default validation
+         behavior in putrequest (bpo-38216).
+@@ -1145,6 +1145,17 @@ def _validate_path(self, url):
+         conn.sock = FakeSocket('')
+         conn.putrequest('GET', '/\x00')
+ 
++    def test_putrequest_override_host_validation(self):
++        class UnsafeHTTPConnection(client.HTTPConnection):
++            def _validate_host(self, url):
++                pass
++
++        conn = UnsafeHTTPConnection('example.com\r\n')
++        conn.sock = FakeSocket('')
++        # set skip_host so a ValueError is not raised upon adding the
++        # invalid URL as the value of the "Host:" header
++        conn.putrequest('GET', '/', skip_host=1)
++
+     def test_putrequest_override_encoding(self):
+         """
+         It should be possible to override the default encoding
+diff --git a/Lib/test/test_urllib.py b/Lib/test/test_urllib.py
+index 0061a5297cb35..ddf425fd8d4b5 100644
+--- a/Lib/test/test_urllib.py
++++ b/Lib/test/test_urllib.py
+@@ -331,7 +331,7 @@ def test_willclose(self):
+             self.unfakehttp()
+ 
+     @unittest.skipUnless(ssl, "ssl module required")
+-    def test_url_with_control_char_rejected(self):
++    def test_url_path_with_control_char_rejected(self):
+         for char_no in list(range(0, 0x21)) + [0x7f]:
+             char = chr(char_no)
+             schemeless_url = f"//localhost:7777/test{char}/"
+@@ -358,7 +358,7 @@ def test_url_with_control_char_rejected(self):
+                 self.unfakehttp()
+ 
+     @unittest.skipUnless(ssl, "ssl module required")
+-    def test_url_with_newline_header_injection_rejected(self):
++    def test_url_path_with_newline_header_injection_rejected(self):
+         self.fakehttp(b"HTTP/1.1 200 OK\r\n\r\nHello.")
+         host = "localhost:7777?a=1 HTTP/1.1\r\nX-injected: header\r\nTEST: 123"
+         schemeless_url = "//" + host + ":8080/test/?test=a"
+@@ -383,6 +383,38 @@ def test_url_with_newline_header_injection_rejected(self):
+         finally:
+             self.unfakehttp()
+ 
++    @unittest.skipUnless(ssl, "ssl module required")
++    def test_url_host_with_control_char_rejected(self):
++        for char_no in list(range(0, 0x21)) + [0x7f]:
++            char = chr(char_no)
++            schemeless_url = f"//localhost{char}/test/"
++            self.fakehttp(b"HTTP/1.1 200 OK\r\n\r\nHello.")
++            try:
++                escaped_char_repr = repr(char).replace('\\', r'\\')
++                InvalidURL = http.client.InvalidURL
++                with self.assertRaisesRegex(
++                    InvalidURL, f"contain control.*{escaped_char_repr}"):
++                    urlopen(f"http:{schemeless_url}")
++                with self.assertRaisesRegex(InvalidURL, f"contain control.*{escaped_char_repr}"):
++                    urlopen(f"https:{schemeless_url}")
++            finally:
++                self.unfakehttp()
++
++    @unittest.skipUnless(ssl, "ssl module required")
++    def test_url_host_with_newline_header_injection_rejected(self):
++        self.fakehttp(b"HTTP/1.1 200 OK\r\n\r\nHello.")
++        host = "localhost\r\nX-injected: header\r\n"
++        schemeless_url = "//" + host + ":8080/test/?test=a"
++        try:
++            InvalidURL = http.client.InvalidURL
++            with self.assertRaisesRegex(
++                InvalidURL, r"contain control.*\\r"):
++                urlopen(f"http:{schemeless_url}")
++            with self.assertRaisesRegex(InvalidURL, r"contain control.*\\n"):
++                urlopen(f"https:{schemeless_url}")
++        finally:
++            self.unfakehttp()
++
+     def test_read_0_9(self):
+         # "0.9" response accepted (but not "simple responses" without
+         # a status line)
+diff --git a/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2020-03-14-14-57-44.bpo-38576.OowwQn.rst b/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2020-03-14-14-57-44.bpo-38576.OowwQn.rst
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000000000..34b8af28988fa
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2020-03-14-14-57-44.bpo-38576.OowwQn.rst
+@@ -0,0 +1 @@
++Disallow control characters in hostnames in http.client, addressing CVE-2019-18348. Such potentially malicious header injection URLs now cause a InvalidURL to be raised.
+\ No newline at end of file