system/python3: bump { 3.6.10 --> 3.10.1 }. fixes #232, 450.

1 files changed, 0 insertions, 147 deletions

diff --git a/system/python3/CVE-2019-18348.patch b/system/python3/CVE-2019-18348.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 9ebb963a8..000000000
--- a/system/python3/CVE-2019-18348.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,147 +0,0 @@
-From 83fc70159b24f5b11a5ef87c9b05c2cf4c7faeba Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: "Miss Islington (bot)"
- <31488909+miss-islington@users.noreply.github.com>
-Date: Sat, 14 Mar 2020 15:35:52 -0700
-Subject: [PATCH] bpo-38576: Disallow control characters in hostnames in
- http.client (GH-18995) (GH-19002)
-
-Add host validation for control characters for more CVE-2019-18348 protection.
-(cherry picked from commit 9165addc22d05e776a54319a8531ebd0b2fe01ef)
-
-Co-authored-by: Ashwin Ramaswami <aramaswamis@gmail.com>
----
- Lib/http/client.py                            | 10 ++++++
- Lib/test/test_httplib.py                      | 13 ++++++-
- Lib/test/test_urllib.py                       | 36 +++++++++++++++++--
- .../2020-03-14-14-57-44.bpo-38576.OowwQn.rst  |  1 +
- 4 files changed, 57 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
- create mode 100644 Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2020-03-14-14-57-44.bpo-38576.OowwQn.rst
-
-diff --git a/Lib/http/client.py b/Lib/http/client.py
-index d4821f1a96e07..c0ac7db6f40a0 100644
---- a/Lib/http/client.py
-+++ b/Lib/http/client.py
-@@ -858,6 +858,8 @@ def __init__(self, host, port=None, timeout=socket._GLOBAL_DEFAULT_TIMEOUT,
- 
-         (self.host, self.port) = self._get_hostport(host, port)
- 
-+        self._validate_host(self.host)
-+
-         # This is stored as an instance variable to allow unit
-         # tests to replace it with a suitable mockup
-         self._create_connection = socket.create_connection
-@@ -1215,6 +1217,14 @@ def _validate_path(self, url):
-             raise InvalidURL(f"URL can't contain control characters. {url!r} "
-                              f"(found at least {match.group()!r})")
- 
-+    def _validate_host(self, host):
-+        """Validate a host so it doesn't contain control characters."""
-+        # Prevent CVE-2019-18348.
-+        match = _contains_disallowed_url_pchar_re.search(host)
-+        if match:
-+            raise InvalidURL(f"URL can't contain control characters. {host!r} "
-+                             f"(found at least {match.group()!r})")
-+
-     def putheader(self, header, *values):
-         """Send a request header line to the server.
- 
-diff --git a/Lib/test/test_httplib.py b/Lib/test/test_httplib.py
-index 14d42d483773c..fcd9231666ede 100644
---- a/Lib/test/test_httplib.py
-+++ b/Lib/test/test_httplib.py
-@@ -1132,7 +1132,7 @@ def run_server():
-         thread.join()
-         self.assertEqual(result, b"proxied data\n")
- 
--    def test_putrequest_override_validation(self):
-+    def test_putrequest_override_domain_validation(self):
-         """
-         It should be possible to override the default validation
-         behavior in putrequest (bpo-38216).
-@@ -1145,6 +1145,17 @@ def _validate_path(self, url):
-         conn.sock = FakeSocket('')
-         conn.putrequest('GET', '/\x00')
- 
-+    def test_putrequest_override_host_validation(self):
-+        class UnsafeHTTPConnection(client.HTTPConnection):
-+            def _validate_host(self, url):
-+                pass
-+
-+        conn = UnsafeHTTPConnection('example.com\r\n')
-+        conn.sock = FakeSocket('')
-+        # set skip_host so a ValueError is not raised upon adding the
-+        # invalid URL as the value of the "Host:" header
-+        conn.putrequest('GET', '/', skip_host=1)
-+
-     def test_putrequest_override_encoding(self):
-         """
-         It should be possible to override the default encoding
-diff --git a/Lib/test/test_urllib.py b/Lib/test/test_urllib.py
-index 0061a5297cb35..ddf425fd8d4b5 100644
---- a/Lib/test/test_urllib.py
-+++ b/Lib/test/test_urllib.py
-@@ -331,7 +331,7 @@ def test_willclose(self):
-             self.unfakehttp()
- 
-     @unittest.skipUnless(ssl, "ssl module required")
--    def test_url_with_control_char_rejected(self):
-+    def test_url_path_with_control_char_rejected(self):
-         for char_no in list(range(0, 0x21)) + [0x7f]:
-             char = chr(char_no)
-             schemeless_url = f"//localhost:7777/test{char}/"
-@@ -358,7 +358,7 @@ def test_url_with_control_char_rejected(self):
-                 self.unfakehttp()
- 
-     @unittest.skipUnless(ssl, "ssl module required")
--    def test_url_with_newline_header_injection_rejected(self):
-+    def test_url_path_with_newline_header_injection_rejected(self):
-         self.fakehttp(b"HTTP/1.1 200 OK\r\n\r\nHello.")
-         host = "localhost:7777?a=1 HTTP/1.1\r\nX-injected: header\r\nTEST: 123"
-         schemeless_url = "//" + host + ":8080/test/?test=a"
-@@ -383,6 +383,38 @@ def test_url_with_newline_header_injection_rejected(self):
-         finally:
-             self.unfakehttp()
- 
-+    @unittest.skipUnless(ssl, "ssl module required")
-+    def test_url_host_with_control_char_rejected(self):
-+        for char_no in list(range(0, 0x21)) + [0x7f]:
-+            char = chr(char_no)
-+            schemeless_url = f"//localhost{char}/test/"
-+            self.fakehttp(b"HTTP/1.1 200 OK\r\n\r\nHello.")
-+            try:
-+                escaped_char_repr = repr(char).replace('\\', r'\\')
-+                InvalidURL = http.client.InvalidURL
-+                with self.assertRaisesRegex(
-+                    InvalidURL, f"contain control.*{escaped_char_repr}"):
-+                    urlopen(f"http:{schemeless_url}")
-+                with self.assertRaisesRegex(InvalidURL, f"contain control.*{escaped_char_repr}"):
-+                    urlopen(f"https:{schemeless_url}")
-+            finally:
-+                self.unfakehttp()
-+
-+    @unittest.skipUnless(ssl, "ssl module required")
-+    def test_url_host_with_newline_header_injection_rejected(self):
-+        self.fakehttp(b"HTTP/1.1 200 OK\r\n\r\nHello.")
-+        host = "localhost\r\nX-injected: header\r\n"
-+        schemeless_url = "//" + host + ":8080/test/?test=a"
-+        try:
-+            InvalidURL = http.client.InvalidURL
-+            with self.assertRaisesRegex(
-+                InvalidURL, r"contain control.*\\r"):
-+                urlopen(f"http:{schemeless_url}")
-+            with self.assertRaisesRegex(InvalidURL, r"contain control.*\\n"):
-+                urlopen(f"https:{schemeless_url}")
-+        finally:
-+            self.unfakehttp()
-+
-     def test_read_0_9(self):
-         # "0.9" response accepted (but not "simple responses" without
-         # a status line)
-diff --git a/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2020-03-14-14-57-44.bpo-38576.OowwQn.rst b/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2020-03-14-14-57-44.bpo-38576.OowwQn.rst
-new file mode 100644
-index 0000000000000..34b8af28988fa
---- /dev/null
-+++ b/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2020-03-14-14-57-44.bpo-38576.OowwQn.rst
-@@ -0,0 +1 @@
-+Disallow control characters in hostnames in http.client, addressing CVE-2019-18348. Such potentially malicious header injection URLs now cause a InvalidURL to be raised.
-\ No newline at end of file