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authorA. Wilcox <awilcox@wilcox-tech.com>2019-07-22 17:30:53 +0000
committerA. Wilcox <awilcox@wilcox-tech.com>2019-07-22 17:30:53 +0000
commit1f9a6f192063887a7ae030ac663c98e8a7aa04ab (patch)
treea1a78c7e77c4cc716437cf15ac311340b463607d /system
parentb5b40a0c7ccbc4e0270d9e2de4b35db09710be72 (diff)
parent3f61500d4b0548ba68ab65add809e3fa3f5cbdf9 (diff)
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Merge branch 'cve.20190722' into 'master'
system/patch: patch(!) for CVE-2018-6952, 2019-13636, 2019-13638 See merge request adelie/packages!294
Diffstat (limited to 'system')
-rw-r--r--system/patch/APKBUILD18
-rw-r--r--system/patch/CVE-2018-6952.patch30
-rw-r--r--system/patch/CVE-2019-13636.patch108
-rw-r--r--system/patch/CVE-2019-13638.patch38
4 files changed, 190 insertions, 4 deletions
diff --git a/system/patch/APKBUILD b/system/patch/APKBUILD
index 175bb7a67..292076831 100644
--- a/system/patch/APKBUILD
+++ b/system/patch/APKBUILD
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
# Maintainer: Kiyoshi Aman <kiyoshi.aman+adelie@gmail.com>
pkgname=patch
pkgver=2.7.6
-pkgrel=3
+pkgrel=4
pkgdesc="Utility to apply diffs to files"
url="https://www.gnu.org/software/patch/patch.html"
arch="all"
@@ -12,9 +12,12 @@ checkdepends="bash ed"
install=""
subpackages="$pkgname-doc"
source="https://ftp.gnu.org/gnu/$pkgname/$pkgname-$pkgver.tar.xz
- CVE-2018-6951.patch
allow-missing.patch
CVE-2018-1000156.patch
+ CVE-2018-6951.patch
+ CVE-2018-6952.patch
+ CVE-2019-13636.patch
+ CVE-2019-13638.patch
"
builddir="$srcdir"/$pkgname-$pkgver
@@ -23,6 +26,10 @@ builddir="$srcdir"/$pkgname-$pkgver
# - CVE-2018-6951
# 2.7.6-r3:
# - CVE-2018-1000156.patc
+# 2.7.6-r4:
+# - CVE-2018-6952
+# - CVE-2019-13636
+# - CVE-2019-13638
build() {
cd "$builddir"
@@ -51,6 +58,9 @@ package() {
}
sha512sums="fcca87bdb67a88685a8a25597f9e015f5e60197b9a269fa350ae35a7991ed8da553939b4bbc7f7d3cfd863c67142af403b04165633acbce4339056a905e87fbd patch-2.7.6.tar.xz
-db51d0b791d38dd4f1b373621ee18620ae339b172f58a79420fdaa4a4b1b1d9df239cf61bbddc4e6a4896b28b8cffc7c99161eb5e2facaec8df86a1bf7755bc0 CVE-2018-6951.patch
317c922c3adcf347024a9ffd2374a1827b19cc1f275a90e195e070cbcf16fb47788b14ffd18365ae5e1f867ed650e6f9aed6acf287bfc427107f3ed8bcd2b3af allow-missing.patch
-93414b33413b493eaa15027dfbe39c00eb1c556acf9f30af4c0ca113303867c5e7ad441c2596a7f9d060b8b67735a2a1c8be5db3c779ea47302f616ef8530d5d CVE-2018-1000156.patch"
+93414b33413b493eaa15027dfbe39c00eb1c556acf9f30af4c0ca113303867c5e7ad441c2596a7f9d060b8b67735a2a1c8be5db3c779ea47302f616ef8530d5d CVE-2018-1000156.patch
+db51d0b791d38dd4f1b373621ee18620ae339b172f58a79420fdaa4a4b1b1d9df239cf61bbddc4e6a4896b28b8cffc7c99161eb5e2facaec8df86a1bf7755bc0 CVE-2018-6951.patch
+99df964d826d400f87e9b82bf2600d8663c59bb8f9bf4aec082adc8cf6261744f37d416e15492d6e883202ade521d4436cb41c91f516085c3e6ce8e01a8956fb CVE-2018-6952.patch
+cecb80d8d48dfe66bc13c22a5ed0eb52157cc85a1b74d03d4a8ea1ebcfe5d59bae975aec34ac685adc71129dcdb794579fee0e221144412a7c1fa71c460f63c1 CVE-2019-13636.patch
+d60f8c2364fca9b73aa73b5914cfd6571d11528d13fa7703ccfa93730cbdf8a6e4c9ca04cb7d02a40d33c38075890790b490052d5217e728b0948991da937980 CVE-2019-13638.patch"
diff --git a/system/patch/CVE-2018-6952.patch b/system/patch/CVE-2018-6952.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..d9ad374a2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/system/patch/CVE-2018-6952.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
+From 9c986353e420ead6e706262bf204d6e03322c300 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruen@gnu.org>
+Date: Fri, 17 Aug 2018 13:35:40 +0200
+Subject: Fix swapping fake lines in pch_swap
+
+* src/pch.c (pch_swap): Fix swapping p_bfake and p_efake when there is a
+blank line in the middle of a context-diff hunk: that empty line stays
+in the middle of the hunk and isn't swapped.
+
+Fixes: https://savannah.gnu.org/bugs/index.php?53133
+---
+ src/pch.c | 2 +-
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/pch.c b/src/pch.c
+index e92bc64..a500ad9 100644
+--- a/src/pch.c
++++ b/src/pch.c
+@@ -2122,7 +2122,7 @@ pch_swap (void)
+ }
+ if (p_efake >= 0) { /* fix non-freeable ptr range */
+ if (p_efake <= i)
+- n = p_end - i + 1;
++ n = p_end - p_ptrn_lines;
+ else
+ n = -i;
+ p_efake += n;
+--
+cgit v1.0-41-gc330
+
diff --git a/system/patch/CVE-2019-13636.patch b/system/patch/CVE-2019-13636.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..e62c3d417
--- /dev/null
+++ b/system/patch/CVE-2019-13636.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,108 @@
+From dce4683cbbe107a95f1f0d45fabc304acfb5d71a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruen@gnu.org>
+Date: Mon, 15 Jul 2019 16:21:48 +0200
+Subject: Don't follow symlinks unless --follow-symlinks is given
+
+* src/inp.c (plan_a, plan_b), src/util.c (copy_to_fd, copy_file,
+append_to_file): Unless the --follow-symlinks option is given, open files with
+the O_NOFOLLOW flag to avoid following symlinks. So far, we were only doing
+that consistently for input files.
+* src/util.c (create_backup): When creating empty backup files, (re)create them
+with O_CREAT | O_EXCL to avoid following symlinks in that case as well.
+---
+ src/inp.c | 12 ++++++++++--
+ src/util.c | 14 +++++++++++---
+ 2 files changed, 21 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/inp.c b/src/inp.c
+index 32d0919..22d7473 100644
+--- a/src/inp.c
++++ b/src/inp.c
+@@ -238,8 +238,13 @@ plan_a (char const *filename)
+ {
+ if (S_ISREG (instat.st_mode))
+ {
+- int ifd = safe_open (filename, O_RDONLY|binary_transput, 0);
++ int flags = O_RDONLY | binary_transput;
+ size_t buffered = 0, n;
++ int ifd;
++
++ if (! follow_symlinks)
++ flags |= O_NOFOLLOW;
++ ifd = safe_open (filename, flags, 0);
+ if (ifd < 0)
+ pfatal ("can't open file %s", quotearg (filename));
+
+@@ -340,6 +345,7 @@ plan_a (char const *filename)
+ static void
+ plan_b (char const *filename)
+ {
++ int flags = O_RDONLY | binary_transput;
+ int ifd;
+ FILE *ifp;
+ int c;
+@@ -353,7 +359,9 @@ plan_b (char const *filename)
+
+ if (instat.st_size == 0)
+ filename = NULL_DEVICE;
+- if ((ifd = safe_open (filename, O_RDONLY | binary_transput, 0)) < 0
++ if (! follow_symlinks)
++ flags |= O_NOFOLLOW;
++ if ((ifd = safe_open (filename, flags, 0)) < 0
+ || ! (ifp = fdopen (ifd, binary_transput ? "rb" : "r")))
+ pfatal ("Can't open file %s", quotearg (filename));
+ if (TMPINNAME_needs_removal)
+diff --git a/src/util.c b/src/util.c
+index 1cc08ba..fb38307 100644
+--- a/src/util.c
++++ b/src/util.c
+@@ -388,7 +388,7 @@ create_backup (char const *to, const struct stat *to_st, bool leave_original)
+
+ try_makedirs_errno = ENOENT;
+ safe_unlink (bakname);
+- while ((fd = safe_open (bakname, O_CREAT | O_WRONLY | O_TRUNC, 0666)) < 0)
++ while ((fd = safe_open (bakname, O_CREAT | O_EXCL | O_WRONLY | O_TRUNC, 0666)) < 0)
+ {
+ if (errno != try_makedirs_errno)
+ pfatal ("Can't create file %s", quotearg (bakname));
+@@ -579,10 +579,13 @@ create_file (char const *file, int open_flags, mode_t mode,
+ static void
+ copy_to_fd (const char *from, int tofd)
+ {
++ int from_flags = O_RDONLY | O_BINARY;
+ int fromfd;
+ ssize_t i;
+
+- if ((fromfd = safe_open (from, O_RDONLY | O_BINARY, 0)) < 0)
++ if (! follow_symlinks)
++ from_flags |= O_NOFOLLOW;
++ if ((fromfd = safe_open (from, from_flags, 0)) < 0)
+ pfatal ("Can't reopen file %s", quotearg (from));
+ while ((i = read (fromfd, buf, bufsize)) != 0)
+ {
+@@ -625,6 +628,8 @@ copy_file (char const *from, char const *to, struct stat *tost,
+ else
+ {
+ assert (S_ISREG (mode));
++ if (! follow_symlinks)
++ to_flags |= O_NOFOLLOW;
+ tofd = create_file (to, O_WRONLY | O_BINARY | to_flags, mode,
+ to_dir_known_to_exist);
+ copy_to_fd (from, tofd);
+@@ -640,9 +645,12 @@ copy_file (char const *from, char const *to, struct stat *tost,
+ void
+ append_to_file (char const *from, char const *to)
+ {
++ int to_flags = O_WRONLY | O_APPEND | O_BINARY;
+ int tofd;
+
+- if ((tofd = safe_open (to, O_WRONLY | O_BINARY | O_APPEND, 0)) < 0)
++ if (! follow_symlinks)
++ to_flags |= O_NOFOLLOW;
++ if ((tofd = safe_open (to, to_flags, 0)) < 0)
+ pfatal ("Can't reopen file %s", quotearg (to));
+ copy_to_fd (from, tofd);
+ if (close (tofd) != 0)
+--
+cgit v1.0-41-gc330
+
diff --git a/system/patch/CVE-2019-13638.patch b/system/patch/CVE-2019-13638.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..38caff628
--- /dev/null
+++ b/system/patch/CVE-2019-13638.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
+From 3fcd042d26d70856e826a42b5f93dc4854d80bf0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruen@gnu.org>
+Date: Fri, 6 Apr 2018 19:36:15 +0200
+Subject: Invoke ed directly instead of using the shell
+
+* src/pch.c (do_ed_script): Invoke ed directly instead of using a shell
+command to avoid quoting vulnerabilities.
+---
+ src/pch.c | 6 ++----
+ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/pch.c b/src/pch.c
+index 4fd5a05..16e001a 100644
+--- a/src/pch.c
++++ b/src/pch.c
+@@ -2459,9 +2459,6 @@ do_ed_script (char const *inname, char const *outname,
+ *outname_needs_removal = true;
+ copy_file (inname, outname, 0, exclusive, instat.st_mode, true);
+ }
+- sprintf (buf, "%s %s%s", editor_program,
+- verbosity == VERBOSE ? "" : "- ",
+- outname);
+ fflush (stdout);
+
+ pid = fork();
+@@ -2470,7 +2467,8 @@ do_ed_script (char const *inname, char const *outname,
+ else if (pid == 0)
+ {
+ dup2 (tmpfd, 0);
+- execl ("/bin/sh", "sh", "-c", buf, (char *) 0);
++ assert (outname[0] != '!' && outname[0] != '-');
++ execlp (editor_program, editor_program, "-", outname, (char *) NULL);
+ _exit (2);
+ }
+ else
+--
+cgit v1.0-41-gc330
+