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authorA. Wilcox <AWilcox@Wilcox-Tech.com>2020-06-17 19:26:12 +0000
committerA. Wilcox <AWilcox@Wilcox-Tech.com>2020-06-17 19:26:12 +0000
commite2dfc543558de6162625aefe7869af0a6e85dec0 (patch)
treea9415c1c59f989ae1195943b702e7a18119e9476 /user/libvncserver/CVE-2018-15127.patch
parent7ebfc934b4fe0a8745317121d1f88468213654a4 (diff)
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user/libvncserver: [CVE] Update to 0.9.13
Diffstat (limited to 'user/libvncserver/CVE-2018-15127.patch')
-rw-r--r--user/libvncserver/CVE-2018-15127.patch44
1 files changed, 0 insertions, 44 deletions
diff --git a/user/libvncserver/CVE-2018-15127.patch b/user/libvncserver/CVE-2018-15127.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 146243670..000000000
--- a/user/libvncserver/CVE-2018-15127.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,44 +0,0 @@
-From 09e8fc02f59f16e2583b34fe1a270c238bd9ffec Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: =?UTF-8?q?Petr=20P=C3=ADsa=C5=99?= <ppisar@redhat.com>
-Date: Mon, 7 Jan 2019 10:40:01 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH] Limit lenght to INT_MAX bytes in
- rfbProcessFileTransferReadBuffer()
-
-This ammends 15bb719c03cc70f14c36a843dcb16ed69b405707 fix for a heap
-out-of-bound write access in rfbProcessFileTransferReadBuffer() when
-reading a transfered file content in a server. The former fix did not
-work on platforms with a 32-bit int type (expected by rfbReadExact()).
-
-CVE-2018-15127
-<https://github.com/LibVNC/libvncserver/issues/243>
-<https://github.com/LibVNC/libvncserver/issues/273>
----
- libvncserver/rfbserver.c | 7 ++++++-
- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
-
-diff --git a/libvncserver/rfbserver.c b/libvncserver/rfbserver.c
-index 7af84906..f2edbeea 100644
---- a/libvncserver/rfbserver.c
-+++ b/libvncserver/rfbserver.c
-@@ -88,6 +88,8 @@
- #include <errno.h>
- /* strftime() */
- #include <time.h>
-+/* INT_MAX */
-+#include <limits.h>
-
- #ifdef LIBVNCSERVER_WITH_WEBSOCKETS
- #include "rfbssl.h"
-@@ -1472,8 +1474,11 @@ char *rfbProcessFileTransferReadBuffer(rfbClientPtr cl, uint32_t length)
- 0XFFFFFFFF, i.e. SIZE_MAX for 32-bit systems. On 64-bit systems, a length of 0XFFFFFFFF
- will safely be allocated since this check will never trigger and malloc() can digest length+1
- without problems as length is a uint32_t.
-+ We also later pass length to rfbReadExact() that expects a signed int type and
-+ that might wrap on platforms with a 32-bit int type if length is bigger
-+ than 0X7FFFFFFF.
- */
-- if(length == SIZE_MAX) {
-+ if(length == SIZE_MAX || length > INT_MAX) {
- rfbErr("rfbProcessFileTransferReadBuffer: too big file transfer length requested: %u", (unsigned int)length);
- rfbCloseClient(cl);
- return NULL;