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authorA. Wilcox <awilcox@wilcox-tech.com>2019-08-04 22:53:11 +0000
committerA. Wilcox <awilcox@wilcox-tech.com>2019-08-04 22:53:11 +0000
commit2d76f59134fc1cbd5ea3704b6d79761ffa50d6a9 (patch)
treec99a2ff0b1366a5f6bb2d61b13916acb3012cea6 /user/libvncserver/CVE-2018-15127.patch
parent8410df6cbcf43832292026f4487ca2642be5cf15 (diff)
parent3c0917832c46ca76601c4e2e7388c4570bfbcb86 (diff)
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Merge branch 'cves' into 'master'
CVE catch up, part one See merge request adelie/packages!307
Diffstat (limited to 'user/libvncserver/CVE-2018-15127.patch')
-rw-r--r--user/libvncserver/CVE-2018-15127.patch44
1 files changed, 44 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/user/libvncserver/CVE-2018-15127.patch b/user/libvncserver/CVE-2018-15127.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..146243670
--- /dev/null
+++ b/user/libvncserver/CVE-2018-15127.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,44 @@
+From 09e8fc02f59f16e2583b34fe1a270c238bd9ffec Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: =?UTF-8?q?Petr=20P=C3=ADsa=C5=99?= <ppisar@redhat.com>
+Date: Mon, 7 Jan 2019 10:40:01 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] Limit lenght to INT_MAX bytes in
+ rfbProcessFileTransferReadBuffer()
+
+This ammends 15bb719c03cc70f14c36a843dcb16ed69b405707 fix for a heap
+out-of-bound write access in rfbProcessFileTransferReadBuffer() when
+reading a transfered file content in a server. The former fix did not
+work on platforms with a 32-bit int type (expected by rfbReadExact()).
+
+CVE-2018-15127
+<https://github.com/LibVNC/libvncserver/issues/243>
+<https://github.com/LibVNC/libvncserver/issues/273>
+---
+ libvncserver/rfbserver.c | 7 ++++++-
+ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/libvncserver/rfbserver.c b/libvncserver/rfbserver.c
+index 7af84906..f2edbeea 100644
+--- a/libvncserver/rfbserver.c
++++ b/libvncserver/rfbserver.c
+@@ -88,6 +88,8 @@
+ #include <errno.h>
+ /* strftime() */
+ #include <time.h>
++/* INT_MAX */
++#include <limits.h>
+
+ #ifdef LIBVNCSERVER_WITH_WEBSOCKETS
+ #include "rfbssl.h"
+@@ -1472,8 +1474,11 @@ char *rfbProcessFileTransferReadBuffer(rfbClientPtr cl, uint32_t length)
+ 0XFFFFFFFF, i.e. SIZE_MAX for 32-bit systems. On 64-bit systems, a length of 0XFFFFFFFF
+ will safely be allocated since this check will never trigger and malloc() can digest length+1
+ without problems as length is a uint32_t.
++ We also later pass length to rfbReadExact() that expects a signed int type and
++ that might wrap on platforms with a 32-bit int type if length is bigger
++ than 0X7FFFFFFF.
+ */
+- if(length == SIZE_MAX) {
++ if(length == SIZE_MAX || length > INT_MAX) {
+ rfbErr("rfbProcessFileTransferReadBuffer: too big file transfer length requested: %u", (unsigned int)length);
+ rfbCloseClient(cl);
+ return NULL;