diff options
author | A. Wilcox <awilcox@wilcox-tech.com> | 2019-08-04 22:53:11 +0000 |
---|---|---|
committer | A. Wilcox <awilcox@wilcox-tech.com> | 2019-08-04 22:53:11 +0000 |
commit | 2d76f59134fc1cbd5ea3704b6d79761ffa50d6a9 (patch) | |
tree | c99a2ff0b1366a5f6bb2d61b13916acb3012cea6 /user/libvncserver/CVE-2018-15127.patch | |
parent | 8410df6cbcf43832292026f4487ca2642be5cf15 (diff) | |
parent | 3c0917832c46ca76601c4e2e7388c4570bfbcb86 (diff) | |
download | packages-2d76f59134fc1cbd5ea3704b6d79761ffa50d6a9.tar.gz packages-2d76f59134fc1cbd5ea3704b6d79761ffa50d6a9.tar.bz2 packages-2d76f59134fc1cbd5ea3704b6d79761ffa50d6a9.tar.xz packages-2d76f59134fc1cbd5ea3704b6d79761ffa50d6a9.zip |
Merge branch 'cves' into 'master'
CVE catch up, part one
See merge request adelie/packages!307
Diffstat (limited to 'user/libvncserver/CVE-2018-15127.patch')
-rw-r--r-- | user/libvncserver/CVE-2018-15127.patch | 44 |
1 files changed, 44 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/user/libvncserver/CVE-2018-15127.patch b/user/libvncserver/CVE-2018-15127.patch new file mode 100644 index 000000000..146243670 --- /dev/null +++ b/user/libvncserver/CVE-2018-15127.patch @@ -0,0 +1,44 @@ +From 09e8fc02f59f16e2583b34fe1a270c238bd9ffec Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: =?UTF-8?q?Petr=20P=C3=ADsa=C5=99?= <ppisar@redhat.com> +Date: Mon, 7 Jan 2019 10:40:01 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH] Limit lenght to INT_MAX bytes in + rfbProcessFileTransferReadBuffer() + +This ammends 15bb719c03cc70f14c36a843dcb16ed69b405707 fix for a heap +out-of-bound write access in rfbProcessFileTransferReadBuffer() when +reading a transfered file content in a server. The former fix did not +work on platforms with a 32-bit int type (expected by rfbReadExact()). + +CVE-2018-15127 +<https://github.com/LibVNC/libvncserver/issues/243> +<https://github.com/LibVNC/libvncserver/issues/273> +--- + libvncserver/rfbserver.c | 7 ++++++- + 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) + +diff --git a/libvncserver/rfbserver.c b/libvncserver/rfbserver.c +index 7af84906..f2edbeea 100644 +--- a/libvncserver/rfbserver.c ++++ b/libvncserver/rfbserver.c +@@ -88,6 +88,8 @@ + #include <errno.h> + /* strftime() */ + #include <time.h> ++/* INT_MAX */ ++#include <limits.h> + + #ifdef LIBVNCSERVER_WITH_WEBSOCKETS + #include "rfbssl.h" +@@ -1472,8 +1474,11 @@ char *rfbProcessFileTransferReadBuffer(rfbClientPtr cl, uint32_t length) + 0XFFFFFFFF, i.e. SIZE_MAX for 32-bit systems. On 64-bit systems, a length of 0XFFFFFFFF + will safely be allocated since this check will never trigger and malloc() can digest length+1 + without problems as length is a uint32_t. ++ We also later pass length to rfbReadExact() that expects a signed int type and ++ that might wrap on platforms with a 32-bit int type if length is bigger ++ than 0X7FFFFFFF. + */ +- if(length == SIZE_MAX) { ++ if(length == SIZE_MAX || length > INT_MAX) { + rfbErr("rfbProcessFileTransferReadBuffer: too big file transfer length requested: %u", (unsigned int)length); + rfbCloseClient(cl); + return NULL; |