user/openjpeg: bump { 2.3.1 --> 2.5.0 }. fixes #329.

4 files changed, 5 insertions, 236 deletions

diff --git a/user/openjpeg/APKBUILD b/user/openjpeg/APKBUILD
index 54f9811ea..33057bade 100644
--- a/user/openjpeg/APKBUILD
+++ b/user/openjpeg/APKBUILD
@@ -1,10 +1,10 @@
 # Contributor: William Pitcock <nenolod@dereferenced.org>
 # Maintainer: A. Wilcox <awilfox@adelielinux.org>
 pkgname=openjpeg
-pkgver=2.3.1
-pkgrel=3
+pkgver=2.5.0
+pkgrel=0
 pkgdesc="Open-source implementation of JPEG 2000 image codec"
-url="http://www.openjpeg.org/"
+url="https://www.openjpeg.org/"
 arch="all"
 options="!check"  # No test suite.
 license="BSD-2-Clause-NetBSD"
@@ -12,11 +12,7 @@ depends=""
 depends_dev="$pkgname-tools"
 makedepends="libpng-dev tiff-dev lcms2-dev doxygen cmake"
 subpackages="$pkgname-dev $pkgname-tools"
-source="$pkgname-$pkgver.tar.gz::https://github.com/uclouvain/openjpeg/archive/v$pkgver.tar.gz
-	CVE-2019-12973.patch
-	CVE-2020-6851.patch
-	CVE-2020-8112.patch
-	"
+source="$pkgname-$pkgver.tar.gz::https://github.com/uclouvain/openjpeg/archive/v$pkgver.tar.gz"
 
 # secfixes:
 #   2.3.1-r3:
@@ -57,7 +53,4 @@ tools() {
 	mv "$pkgdir"/usr/bin "$subpkgdir"/usr/
 }
 
-sha512sums="339fbc899bddf2393d214df71ed5d6070a3a76b933b1e75576c8a0ae9dfcc4adec40bdc544f599e4b8d0bc173e4e9e7352408497b5b3c9356985605830c26c03  openjpeg-2.3.1.tar.gz
-472deba1d521553f9c7af805ba3d0c4fc31564fd36e37c598646f468b7d05bf5f81d2320fd6fadf8c0e3344ebce7bc0d04cece55a1b3cec2ef693a6e65bd2516  CVE-2019-12973.patch
-c8ffc926d91392b38250fd4e00fff5f93fbf5e17487d0e4a0184c9bd191aa2233c5c5dcf097dd62824714097bba2d8cc865bed31193d1a072aa954f216011297  CVE-2020-6851.patch
-9659e04087e0d80bf53555e9807aae59205adef2d49d7a49e05bf250c484a2e92132d471ec6076e57ca69b5ce98fd81462a6a8c01205ca7096781eec06e401cc  CVE-2020-8112.patch"
+sha512sums="08975a2dd79f1e29fd1824249a5fbe66026640ed787b3a3aa8807c2c69f994240ff33e2132f8bf15bbc2202bef7001f98e42d487231d4eebc8e503538658049a  openjpeg-2.5.0.tar.gz"
diff --git a/user/openjpeg/CVE-2019-12973.patch b/user/openjpeg/CVE-2019-12973.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 0d330ae6d..000000000
--- a/user/openjpeg/CVE-2019-12973.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,152 +0,0 @@
-From 21399f6b7d318fcdf4406d5e88723c4922202aa3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Young Xiao <YangX92@hotmail.com>
-Date: Sat, 16 Mar 2019 19:57:27 +0800
-Subject: [PATCH 1/2] convertbmp: detect invalid file dimensions early
-
-width/length dimensions read from bmp headers are not necessarily
-valid. For instance they may have been maliciously set to very large
-values with the intention to cause DoS (large memory allocation, stack
-overflow). In these cases we want to detect the invalid size as early
-as possible.
-
-This commit introduces a counter which verifies that the number of
-written bytes corresponds to the advertized width/length.
-
-See commit 8ee335227bbc for details.
-
-Signed-off-by: Young Xiao <YangX92@hotmail.com>
----
- src/bin/jp2/convertbmp.c | 10 ++++++++--
- 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/src/bin/jp2/convertbmp.c b/src/bin/jp2/convertbmp.c
-index 0af52f816..ec34f535b 100644
---- a/src/bin/jp2/convertbmp.c
-+++ b/src/bin/jp2/convertbmp.c
-@@ -622,13 +622,13 @@ static OPJ_BOOL bmp_read_rle8_data(FILE* IN, OPJ_UINT8* pData,
- static OPJ_BOOL bmp_read_rle4_data(FILE* IN, OPJ_UINT8* pData,
-                                    OPJ_UINT32 stride, OPJ_UINT32 width, OPJ_UINT32 height)
- {
--    OPJ_UINT32 x, y;
-+    OPJ_UINT32 x, y, written;
-     OPJ_UINT8 *pix;
-     const OPJ_UINT8 *beyond;
- 
-     beyond = pData + stride * height;
-     pix = pData;
--    x = y = 0U;
-+    x = y = written = 0U;
-     while (y < height) {
-         int c = getc(IN);
-         if (c == EOF) {
-@@ -642,6 +642,7 @@ static OPJ_BOOL bmp_read_rle4_data(FILE* IN, OPJ_UINT8* pData,
-             for (j = 0; (j < c) && (x < width) &&
-                     ((OPJ_SIZE_T)pix < (OPJ_SIZE_T)beyond); j++, x++, pix++) {
-                 *pix = (OPJ_UINT8)((j & 1) ? (c1 & 0x0fU) : ((c1 >> 4) & 0x0fU));
-+                written++;
-             }
-         } else { /* absolute mode */
-             c = getc(IN);
-@@ -671,6 +672,7 @@ static OPJ_BOOL bmp_read_rle4_data(FILE* IN, OPJ_UINT8* pData,
-                         c1 = (OPJ_UINT8)getc(IN);
-                     }
-                     *pix = (OPJ_UINT8)((j & 1) ? (c1 & 0x0fU) : ((c1 >> 4) & 0x0fU));
-+                    written++;
-                 }
-                 if (((c & 3) == 1) || ((c & 3) == 2)) { /* skip padding byte */
-                     getc(IN);
-@@ -678,6 +680,10 @@ static OPJ_BOOL bmp_read_rle4_data(FILE* IN, OPJ_UINT8* pData,
-             }
-         }
-     }  /* while(y < height) */
-+    if (written != width * height) {
-+        fprintf(stderr, "warning, image's actual size does not match advertized one\n");
-+        return OPJ_FALSE;
-+    }
-     return OPJ_TRUE;
- }
- 
-
-From 3aef207f90e937d4931daf6d411e092f76d82e66 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Young Xiao <YangX92@hotmail.com>
-Date: Sat, 16 Mar 2019 20:09:59 +0800
-Subject: [PATCH 2/2] bmp_read_rle4_data(): avoid potential infinite loop
-
----
- src/bin/jp2/convertbmp.c | 32 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++------
- 1 file changed, 26 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/src/bin/jp2/convertbmp.c b/src/bin/jp2/convertbmp.c
-index ec34f535b..2fc4e9bc4 100644
---- a/src/bin/jp2/convertbmp.c
-+++ b/src/bin/jp2/convertbmp.c
-@@ -632,12 +632,18 @@ static OPJ_BOOL bmp_read_rle4_data(FILE* IN, OPJ_UINT8* pData,
-     while (y < height) {
-         int c = getc(IN);
-         if (c == EOF) {
--            break;
-+            return OPJ_FALSE;
-         }
- 
-         if (c) { /* encoded mode */
--            int j;
--            OPJ_UINT8 c1 = (OPJ_UINT8)getc(IN);
-+            int j, c1_int;
-+            OPJ_UINT8 c1;
-+
-+            c1_int = getc(IN);
-+            if (c1_int == EOF) {
-+                return OPJ_FALSE;
-+            }
-+            c1 = (OPJ_UINT8)c1_int;
- 
-             for (j = 0; (j < c) && (x < width) &&
-                     ((OPJ_SIZE_T)pix < (OPJ_SIZE_T)beyond); j++, x++, pix++) {
-@@ -647,7 +653,7 @@ static OPJ_BOOL bmp_read_rle4_data(FILE* IN, OPJ_UINT8* pData,
-         } else { /* absolute mode */
-             c = getc(IN);
-             if (c == EOF) {
--                break;
-+                return OPJ_FALSE;
-             }
- 
-             if (c == 0x00) { /* EOL */
-@@ -658,8 +664,14 @@ static OPJ_BOOL bmp_read_rle4_data(FILE* IN, OPJ_UINT8* pData,
-                 break;
-             } else if (c == 0x02) { /* MOVE by dxdy */
-                 c = getc(IN);
-+                if (c == EOF) {
-+                    return OPJ_FALSE;
-+                }
-                 x += (OPJ_UINT32)c;
-                 c = getc(IN);
-+                if (c == EOF) {
-+                    return OPJ_FALSE;
-+                }
-                 y += (OPJ_UINT32)c;
-                 pix = pData + y * stride + x;
-             } else { /* 03 .. 255 : absolute mode */
-@@ -669,13 +681,21 @@ static OPJ_BOOL bmp_read_rle4_data(FILE* IN, OPJ_UINT8* pData,
-                 for (j = 0; (j < c) && (x < width) &&
-                         ((OPJ_SIZE_T)pix < (OPJ_SIZE_T)beyond); j++, x++, pix++) {
-                     if ((j & 1) == 0) {
--                        c1 = (OPJ_UINT8)getc(IN);
-+                        int c1_int;
-+                        c1_int = getc(IN);
-+                        if (c1_int == EOF) {
-+                            return OPJ_FALSE;
-+                        }
-+                        c1 = (OPJ_UINT8)c1_int;
-                     }
-                     *pix = (OPJ_UINT8)((j & 1) ? (c1 & 0x0fU) : ((c1 >> 4) & 0x0fU));
-                     written++;
-                 }
-                 if (((c & 3) == 1) || ((c & 3) == 2)) { /* skip padding byte */
--                    getc(IN);
-+                    c = getc(IN);
-+                    if (c == EOF) {
-+                        return OPJ_FALSE;
-+                    }
-                 }
-             }
-         }
diff --git a/user/openjpeg/CVE-2020-6851.patch b/user/openjpeg/CVE-2020-6851.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 9a70291f5..000000000
--- a/user/openjpeg/CVE-2020-6851.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,29 +0,0 @@
-From 024b8407392cb0b82b04b58ed256094ed5799e04 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Even Rouault <even.rouault@spatialys.com>
-Date: Sat, 11 Jan 2020 01:51:19 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH] opj_j2k_update_image_dimensions(): reject images whose
- coordinates are beyond INT_MAX (fixes #1228)
-
----
- src/lib/openjp2/j2k.c | 8 ++++++++
- 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+)
-
-diff --git a/src/lib/openjp2/j2k.c b/src/lib/openjp2/j2k.c
-index 14f6ff41a..922550eb1 100644
---- a/src/lib/openjp2/j2k.c
-+++ b/src/lib/openjp2/j2k.c
-@@ -9221,6 +9221,14 @@ static OPJ_BOOL opj_j2k_update_image_dimensions(opj_image_t* p_image,
-     l_img_comp = p_image->comps;
-     for (it_comp = 0; it_comp < p_image->numcomps; ++it_comp) {
-         OPJ_INT32 l_h, l_w;
-+        if (p_image->x0 > (OPJ_UINT32)INT_MAX ||
-+                p_image->y0 > (OPJ_UINT32)INT_MAX ||
-+                p_image->x1 > (OPJ_UINT32)INT_MAX ||
-+                p_image->y1 > (OPJ_UINT32)INT_MAX) {
-+            opj_event_msg(p_manager, EVT_ERROR,
-+                          "Image coordinates above INT_MAX are not supported\n");
-+            return OPJ_FALSE;
-+        }
- 
-         l_img_comp->x0 = (OPJ_UINT32)opj_int_ceildiv((OPJ_INT32)p_image->x0,
-                          (OPJ_INT32)l_img_comp->dx);
diff --git a/user/openjpeg/CVE-2020-8112.patch b/user/openjpeg/CVE-2020-8112.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 95cb8095f..000000000
--- a/user/openjpeg/CVE-2020-8112.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,43 +0,0 @@
-From 05f9b91e60debda0e83977e5e63b2e66486f7074 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Even Rouault <even.rouault@spatialys.com>
-Date: Thu, 30 Jan 2020 00:59:57 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH] opj_tcd_init_tile(): avoid integer overflow
-
-That could lead to later assertion failures.
-
-Fixes #1231 / CVE-2020-8112
----
- src/lib/openjp2/tcd.c | 20 ++++++++++++++++++--
- 1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/src/lib/openjp2/tcd.c b/src/lib/openjp2/tcd.c
-index deecc4dff..aa419030a 100644
---- a/src/lib/openjp2/tcd.c
-+++ b/src/lib/openjp2/tcd.c
-@@ -905,8 +905,24 @@ static INLINE OPJ_BOOL opj_tcd_init_tile(opj_tcd_t *p_tcd, OPJ_UINT32 p_tile_no,
-             /* p. 64, B.6, ISO/IEC FDIS15444-1 : 2000 (18 august 2000)  */
-             l_tl_prc_x_start = opj_int_floordivpow2(l_res->x0, (OPJ_INT32)l_pdx) << l_pdx;
-             l_tl_prc_y_start = opj_int_floordivpow2(l_res->y0, (OPJ_INT32)l_pdy) << l_pdy;
--            l_br_prc_x_end = opj_int_ceildivpow2(l_res->x1, (OPJ_INT32)l_pdx) << l_pdx;
--            l_br_prc_y_end = opj_int_ceildivpow2(l_res->y1, (OPJ_INT32)l_pdy) << l_pdy;
-+            {
-+                OPJ_UINT32 tmp = ((OPJ_UINT32)opj_int_ceildivpow2(l_res->x1,
-+                                  (OPJ_INT32)l_pdx)) << l_pdx;
-+                if (tmp > (OPJ_UINT32)INT_MAX) {
-+                    opj_event_msg(manager, EVT_ERROR, "Integer overflow\n");
-+                    return OPJ_FALSE;
-+                }
-+                l_br_prc_x_end = (OPJ_INT32)tmp;
-+            }
-+            {
-+                OPJ_UINT32 tmp = ((OPJ_UINT32)opj_int_ceildivpow2(l_res->y1,
-+                                  (OPJ_INT32)l_pdy)) << l_pdy;
-+                if (tmp > (OPJ_UINT32)INT_MAX) {
-+                    opj_event_msg(manager, EVT_ERROR, "Integer overflow\n");
-+                    return OPJ_FALSE;
-+                }
-+                l_br_prc_y_end = (OPJ_INT32)tmp;
-+            }
-             /*fprintf(stderr, "\t\t\tprc_x_start=%d, prc_y_start=%d, br_prc_x_end=%d, br_prc_y_end=%d \n", l_tl_prc_x_start, l_tl_prc_y_start, l_br_prc_x_end ,l_br_prc_y_end );*/
- 
-             l_res->pw = (l_res->x0 == l_res->x1) ? 0U : (OPJ_UINT32)((