Merge branch 'sec/2020.06.02' into 'master'

Security updates for 2020.06.02

See merge request adelie/packages!464

15 files changed, 201 insertions, 327 deletions

diff --git a/user/dbus/APKBUILD b/user/dbus/APKBUILD
index d9a305186..4ff57480f 100644
--- a/user/dbus/APKBUILD
+++ b/user/dbus/APKBUILD
@@ -1,9 +1,9 @@
 # Maintainer: A. Wilcox <awilfox@adelielinux.org>
 pkgname=dbus
-pkgver=1.12.16
-pkgrel=1
+pkgver=1.12.18
+pkgrel=0
 pkgdesc="IPC/message bus system, allowing user applications to communicate"
-url="http://www.freedesktop.org/wiki/Software/dbus/"
+url="https://www.freedesktop.org/wiki/Software/dbus/"
 pkggroups="messagebus"
 pkgusers="messagebus"
 arch="all"
@@ -23,7 +23,9 @@ source="http://dbus.freedesktop.org/releases/dbus/dbus-$pkgver.tar.gz
 
 # secfixes:
 #   1.12.16-r0:
-#   - CVE-2019-12749
+#     - CVE-2019-12749
+#   1.12.18-r0:
+#     - CVE-2020-12049
 
 build() {
 	./configure \
@@ -65,5 +67,5 @@ x11() {
 	mv "$pkgdir"/usr/bin/dbus-launch "$subpkgdir"/usr/bin/
 }
 
-sha512sums="27ae805170e9515a8bb0fba5f29d414edc70e3b6b28b7b65bbea47035b8eafa9ac4820cdc92645be6035f6748f8aa45679e1ffc84ba74a64859a3056d318b9bb  dbus-1.12.16.tar.gz
+sha512sums="817674e86a5d4cbfa705a79ca5197176311e47505c5da02334c2811f63b55014b582a12bce53bc73a08a3ad5061f210ba0d1e5f3bbf7697c81ca70c22a76fc13  dbus-1.12.18.tar.gz
 df74e7d6a4f76f777d356e94bd23422b17656aa51a5b2d3c655fcabb32c84f2f06b9f5cd8827920d51842f89e8c0d968a6e723315e4bf216e55711fcda9b0ee9  dbus.initd"
diff --git a/user/freetds/APKBUILD b/user/freetds/APKBUILD
index 3687b3cdc..0dd8562cf 100644
--- a/user/freetds/APKBUILD
+++ b/user/freetds/APKBUILD
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 # Contributor: Michael Mason <ms13sp@gmail.com>
 # Maintainer: A. Wilcox <awilfox@adelielinux.org>
 pkgname=freetds
-pkgver=1.1.6
+pkgver=1.1.40
 pkgrel=0
 pkgdesc="Library for accessing Sybase and MS SQL Server databases"
 url="https://www.freetds.org/"
@@ -13,6 +13,10 @@ subpackages="$pkgname-doc $pkgname-dev"
 source="ftp://ftp.freetds.org/pub/freetds/stable/$pkgname-$pkgver.tar.gz
 	fix-includes.patch"
 
+# secfixes:
+#   1.1.40-r0:
+#     - CVE-2019-13508
+
 build() {
 	./configure \
 		--build=$CBUILD \
@@ -36,5 +40,5 @@ package() {
 	make -j1 DESTDIR="$pkgdir" install
 }
 
-sha512sums="fcd3ed52ffbf482535d8d343b2d45c999875d2bfcbf13ef72a15f4440c791ff138b839798bad05593428c0839981e667133473f7d76570e0de3ebf9e474ea632  freetds-1.1.6.tar.gz
+sha512sums="03f6d1e7f57f69068771e1706bbe4a3131e82b00f0191c988ec7d25f571d07caba9ef61598dc381eace1b1e88bc74af8f8506bd79236f9be15a56419a3e5c4c0  freetds-1.1.40.tar.gz
 d75d1aab6687586697f3e430db1e82f21208f10076b45996542eea682e36cbbbb344f479a9336fcfd294b5b87d7acb2ec5fb8ddd1914e990e23dd5e7ae93a0b6  fix-includes.patch"
diff --git a/user/gnutls/APKBUILD b/user/gnutls/APKBUILD
index 616793f57..e75b1d552 100644
--- a/user/gnutls/APKBUILD
+++ b/user/gnutls/APKBUILD
@@ -2,12 +2,11 @@
 # Contributor: Michael Mason <ms13sp@gmail.com>
 # Maintainer: 
 pkgname=gnutls
-pkgver=3.6.11.1
+pkgver=3.6.14
 pkgrel=0
 pkgdesc="A TLS protocol implementation"
-url="http://www.gnutls.org/"
+url="https://www.gnutls.org/"
 arch="all"
-options="!check"  # https://gitlab.com/gnutls/gnutls/issues/560
 license="LGPL-2.1+"
 makedepends="libtasn1-dev libunistring-dev nettle-dev p11-kit-dev texinfo
 	unbound-dev cmd:which zlib-dev"
@@ -23,11 +22,16 @@ case $pkgver in
 	;;
 esac
 source="https://www.gnupg.org/ftp/gcrypt/gnutls/v${_v}/$pkgname-$pkgver.tar.xz
-	gnulib-tests-dont-require-gpg-passphrase.patch"
+	gnulib-tests-dont-require-gpg-passphrase.patch
+	disable-certtool-test.patch
+	"
 
 # secfixes:
 #   3.5.13-r0:
 #     - CVE-2017-7507
+#   3.6.14-r0:
+#     - CVE-2020-11501
+#     - CVE-2020-13777
 
 build() {
 	LIBS="-lgmp" ./configure \
@@ -79,5 +83,6 @@ xx() {
 	mv "$pkgdir"/usr/lib/lib*xx.so.* "$subpkgdir"/usr/lib/
 }
 
-sha512sums="55fbbf0ebc824fbc91ccd08d1708452c5b1c12af75e332f29414540eb2f81337fa605a693ce9f34319a927e9d71177e6e7ffea5c6747792d341fb740f68c9489  gnutls-3.6.11.1.tar.xz
-abc24ee59cc67805fe953535b0bae33080fc8b0bf788304377f6d10ec8c162c4cf203a69c98a4ba3483b4c60ed7a204433cc7db9b8190eddb0d68f6fb6dad52d  gnulib-tests-dont-require-gpg-passphrase.patch"
+sha512sums="b2d427b5542a4679117c011dffa8efb0e0bffa3ce9cebc319f8998d03f80f4168d08f9fda35df18dbeaaada59e479d325a6c1c77d5ca7f8ce221b44e42bfe604  gnutls-3.6.14.tar.xz
+abc24ee59cc67805fe953535b0bae33080fc8b0bf788304377f6d10ec8c162c4cf203a69c98a4ba3483b4c60ed7a204433cc7db9b8190eddb0d68f6fb6dad52d  gnulib-tests-dont-require-gpg-passphrase.patch
+25400be364c1f27b88451002a471cbf841b9738dd93c42dcbeaf7644c3deea6afc85300b40d5ae32d29dc4d441237e8b311f3e07f0af2fb4788701ee4e240c0f  disable-certtool-test.patch"
diff --git a/user/gnutls/disable-certtool-test.patch b/user/gnutls/disable-certtool-test.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..2ae16a38e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/user/gnutls/disable-certtool-test.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
+If GNUTLS_PIN is not available in the environment, the test will fail
+because it cannot ask for the password:
+
+Generating a self signed certificate...
+No PIN given.
+note: when operating in batch mode, set the GNUTLS_PIN or GNUTLS_SO_PIN environment variables
+cert generation failed
+FAIL certtool (exit status: 1)
+
+The comment above this line says "some CI runners need GNUTLS_PIN
+(GNUTLS_PIN=${PASS})" (i.e. GNUTLS_PIN=1234). When this is passed
+instead, the test fails again because "No password was asked" (it greps
+for "Enter password" in the output, but this won't happen because
+GNUTLS_PIN is set).
+
+The folks at Nix believe this is an incompatibility due to musl's
+getpass not falling back to stdin/stderr if it cannot connect to a tty,
+as glibc does.
+
+https://gitlab.com/gnutls/gnutls/-/issues/945
+
+--- gnutls-3.6.13/tests/cert-tests/certtool	2020-01-01 14:10:19.000000000 -0600
++++ gnutls-3.6.13/tests/cert-tests/certtool	2020-06-02 20:36:20.380039844 -0500
+@@ -20,6 +20,9 @@
+ 
+ #set -e
+ 
++echo 'this test is not compatible with musl'
++exit 77
++
+ srcdir="${srcdir:-.}"
+ CERTTOOL="${CERTTOOL:-../../src/certtool${EXEEXT}}"
+ DIFF="${DIFF:-diff -b -B}"
diff --git a/user/libexif/APKBUILD b/user/libexif/APKBUILD
index 06e1e832a..320b87492 100644
--- a/user/libexif/APKBUILD
+++ b/user/libexif/APKBUILD
@@ -1,19 +1,17 @@
 # Maintainer: 
 pkgname=libexif
-pkgver=0.6.21
-pkgrel=4
+pkgver=0.6.22
+_pkgver=$(printf '%s' "$pkgver" | tr . _)
+pkgrel=0
 pkgdesc="Library to parse EXIF metadata"
-url="https://sourceforge.net/projects/libexif"
+url="https://libexif.github.io/"
 arch="all"
 license="LGPL-2.0+"
 subpackages="$pkgname-dev $pkgname-doc $pkgname-lang"
 depends=""
 makedepends=""
-source="https://downloads.sourceforge.net/$pkgname/$pkgname-$pkgver.tar.bz2
-	CVE-2016-6328.patch
-	CVE-2017-7544.patch
-	CVE-2018-20030.patch
-	CVE-2019-9278.patch
+source="https://github.com/libexif/libexif/releases/download/libexif-$_pkgver-release/libexif-$pkgver.tar.xz
+	CVE-2020-0198.patch
 	"
 
 # secfixes:
@@ -23,6 +21,14 @@ source="https://downloads.sourceforge.net/$pkgname/$pkgname-$pkgver.tar.bz2
 #   0.6.21-r4:
 #     - CVE-2016-6328
 #     - CVE-2019-9278
+#   0.6.22-r0:
+#     - CVE-2020-0093
+#     - CVE-2020-0182
+#     - CVE-2020-0198
+#     - CVE-2020-12767
+#     - CVE-2020-13112
+#     - CVE-2020-13113
+#     - CVE-2020-13114
 
 prepare() {
 	default_prepare
@@ -45,8 +51,5 @@ package() {
 	make DESTDIR="$pkgdir" install
 }
 
-sha512sums="4e0fe2abe85d1c95b41cb3abe1f6333dc3a9eb69dba106a674a78d74a4d5b9c5a19647118fa1cc2d72b98a29853394f1519eda9e2889eb28d3be26b21c7cfc35  libexif-0.6.21.tar.bz2
-c0d4c74207993efc373615ef2c797d720162a2ee6fd7ad026edf2ced4198d9b1165b88790c2af3194f6bb7c2de88d4672c041c2cff8a82c8914700633332b8c5  CVE-2016-6328.patch
-d529c6c5bd26dc21c0946702574184e1f61c2bfd4fb95b41e314f486a0dd55571963ff2cad566d2fb0804de3c0799bcd956c15a3dc10a520ce207728edad4e2d  CVE-2017-7544.patch
-0d6123bd275ace338ad9cebb31a2e714de0141b91860f07394b281686a5393566c3f4159679d4ba689ae7ea69ae2e412b158c3deb451c40c210b5817f6888bbc  CVE-2018-20030.patch
-c30c03fefea94d175b94c9f0c4d60cbb3aa0ad78b0d29008975fbbb15c17f2907a16fd50970e5fa18d533d0ce291a5ee9b62934210cb40b0f463693460607738  CVE-2019-9278.patch"
+sha512sums="0a9e7bf0258ed98a794b667d45e8fc65299101a2a2d2e39c358715b20b003beff258782f0736cd5b53978428a2f878a989f303bee249a978850a065f33c534af  libexif-0.6.22.tar.xz
+7df084f9acdc09bd05fadfb66332956d8587fcaac9d693000f47fadeba17b3c49eafa402d1e2c9b7d394e697feccd1f760bab8b64378deaea1777c5a3b90c3b2  CVE-2020-0198.patch"
diff --git a/user/libexif/CVE-2016-6328.patch b/user/libexif/CVE-2016-6328.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 0568f27d2..000000000
--- a/user/libexif/CVE-2016-6328.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,60 +0,0 @@
-From 41bd04234b104312f54d25822f68738ba8d7133d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Marcus Meissner <marcus@jet.franken.de>
-Date: Tue, 25 Jul 2017 23:44:44 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH] fixes some (not all) buffer overreads during decoding pentax
- makernote entries.
-
-This should fix:
-https://sourceforge.net/p/libexif/bugs/125/ CVE-2016-6328
----
- libexif/pentax/mnote-pentax-entry.c | 16 +++++++++++++---
- 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/libexif/pentax/mnote-pentax-entry.c b/libexif/pentax/mnote-pentax-entry.c
-index d03d159..ea0429a 100644
---- a/libexif/pentax/mnote-pentax-entry.c
-+++ b/libexif/pentax/mnote-pentax-entry.c
-@@ -425,24 +425,34 @@ mnote_pentax_entry_get_value (MnotePentaxEntry *entry,
- 		case EXIF_FORMAT_SHORT:
- 		  {
- 			const unsigned char *data = entry->data;
--		  	size_t k, len = strlen(val);
-+		  	size_t k, len = strlen(val), sizeleft;
-+
-+			sizeleft = entry->size;
- 		  	for(k=0; k<entry->components; k++) {
-+				if (sizeleft < 2)
-+					break;
- 				vs = exif_get_short (data, entry->order);
- 				snprintf (val+len, maxlen-len, "%i ", vs);
- 				len = strlen(val);
- 				data += 2;
-+				sizeleft -= 2;
- 			}
- 		  }
- 		  break;
- 		case EXIF_FORMAT_LONG:
- 		  {
- 			const unsigned char *data = entry->data;
--		  	size_t k, len = strlen(val);
-+		  	size_t k, len = strlen(val), sizeleft;
-+
-+			sizeleft = entry->size;
- 		  	for(k=0; k<entry->components; k++) {
-+				if (sizeleft < 4)
-+					break;
- 				vl = exif_get_long (data, entry->order);
- 				snprintf (val+len, maxlen-len, "%li", (long int) vl);
- 				len = strlen(val);
- 				data += 4;
-+				sizeleft -= 4;
- 			}
- 		  }
- 		  break;
-@@ -455,5 +465,5 @@ mnote_pentax_entry_get_value (MnotePentaxEntry *entry,
- 		break;
- 	}
- 
--	return (val);
-+	return val;
- }
diff --git a/user/libexif/CVE-2017-7544.patch b/user/libexif/CVE-2017-7544.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 534817417..000000000
--- a/user/libexif/CVE-2017-7544.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,30 +0,0 @@
-From c39acd1692023b26290778a02a9232c873f9d71a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Marcus Meissner <marcus@jet.franken.de>
-Date: Tue, 25 Jul 2017 23:38:56 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH] On saving makernotes, make sure the makernote container tags
- has a type with 1 byte components.
-
-Fixes (at least):
-	https://sourceforge.net/p/libexif/bugs/130
-	https://sourceforge.net/p/libexif/bugs/129
----
- libexif/exif-data.c | 6 ++++++
- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
-
-diff --git a/libexif/exif-data.c b/libexif/exif-data.c
-index 67df4db..91f4c33 100644
---- a/libexif/exif-data.c
-+++ b/libexif/exif-data.c
-@@ -255,6 +255,12 @@ exif_data_save_data_entry (ExifData *data, ExifEntry *e,
- 			exif_mnote_data_set_offset (data->priv->md, *ds - 6);
- 			exif_mnote_data_save (data->priv->md, &e->data, &e->size);
- 			e->components = e->size;
-+			if (exif_format_get_size (e->format) != 1) {
-+				/* e->format is taken from input code,
-+				 * but we need to make sure it is a 1 byte
-+				 * entity due to the multiplication below. */
-+				e->format = EXIF_FORMAT_UNDEFINED;
-+			}
- 		}
- 	}
- 
diff --git a/user/libexif/CVE-2018-20030.patch b/user/libexif/CVE-2018-20030.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 837d003d7..000000000
--- a/user/libexif/CVE-2018-20030.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,115 +0,0 @@
-Edited slightly to backport to stable
-
-From 6aa11df549114ebda520dde4cdaea2f9357b2c89 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Dan Fandrich <dan@coneharvesters.com>
-Date: Fri, 12 Oct 2018 16:01:45 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH] Improve deep recursion detection in
- exif_data_load_data_content.
-
-The existing detection was still vulnerable to pathological cases
-causing DoS by wasting CPU. The new algorithm takes the number of tags
-into account to make it harder to abuse by cases using shallow recursion
-but with a very large number of tags.  This improves on commit 5d28011c
-which wasn't sufficient to counter this kind of case.
-
-The limitation in the previous fix was discovered by Laurent Delosieres,
-Secunia Research at Flexera (Secunia Advisory SA84652) and is assigned
-the identifier CVE-2018-20030.
----
- libexif/exif-data.c | 45 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------
-
-diff --git a/libexif/exif-data.c b/libexif/exif-data.c
-index e35403d..a6f9c94 100644
---- a/libexif/exif-data.c
-+++ b/libexif/exif-data.c
-@@ -35,6 +35,7 @@
- #include <libexif/olympus/exif-mnote-data-olympus.h>
- #include <libexif/pentax/exif-mnote-data-pentax.h>
- 
-+#include <math.h>
- #include <stdlib.h>
- #include <stdio.h>
- #include <string.h>
-@@ -350,6 +351,20 @@ if (data->ifd[(i)]->count) {				\
- 	break;						\
- }
- 
-+/*! Calculate the recursion cost added by one level of IFD loading.
-+ *
-+ * The work performed is related to the cost in the exponential relation
-+ *   work=1.1**cost
-+ */
-+static unsigned int
-+level_cost(unsigned int n)
-+{
-+    static const double log_1_1 = 0.09531017980432493;
-+
-+	/* Adding 0.1 protects against the case where n==1 */
-+	return ceil(log(n + 0.1)/log_1_1);
-+}
-+
- /*! Load data for an IFD.
-  *
-  * \param[in,out] data #ExifData
-@@ -357,13 +372,13 @@ if (data->ifd[(i)]->count) {				\
-  * \param[in] d pointer to buffer containing raw IFD data
-  * \param[in] ds size of raw data in buffer at \c d
-  * \param[in] offset offset into buffer at \c d at which IFD starts
-- * \param[in] recursion_depth number of times this function has been
-- * recursively called without returning
-+ * \param[in] recursion_cost factor indicating how expensive this recursive
-+ * call could be
-  */
- static void
- exif_data_load_data_content (ExifData *data, ExifIfd ifd,
- 			     const unsigned char *d,
--			     unsigned int ds, unsigned int offset, unsigned int recursion_depth)
-+			     unsigned int ds, unsigned int offset, unsigned int recursion_cost)
- {
- 	ExifLong o, thumbnail_offset = 0, thumbnail_length = 0;
- 	ExifShort n;
-@@ -378,9 +393,20 @@ exif_data_load_data_content (ExifData *data, ExifIfd ifd,
- 	if ((((int)ifd) < 0) || ( ((int)ifd) >= EXIF_IFD_COUNT))
- 	  return;
- 
--	if (recursion_depth > 30) {
-+	if (recursion_cost > 170) {
-+		/*
-+		 * recursion_cost is a logarithmic-scale indicator of how expensive this
-+		 * recursive call might end up being. It is an indicator of the depth of
-+		 * recursion as well as the potential for worst-case future recursive
-+		 * calls. Since it's difficult to tell ahead of time how often recursion
-+		 * will occur, this assumes the worst by assuming every tag could end up
-+		 * causing recursion.
-+		 * The value of 170 was chosen to limit typical EXIF structures to a
-+		 * recursive depth of about 6, but pathological ones (those with very
-+		 * many tags) to only 2.
-+		 */
- 		exif_log (data->priv->log, EXIF_LOG_CODE_CORRUPT_DATA, "ExifData",
--			  "Deep recursion detected!");
-+			  "Deep/expensive recursion detected!");
- 		return;
- 	}
- 
-@@ -422,15 +448,18 @@ exif_data_load_data_content (ExifData *data, ExifIfd ifd,
- 			switch (tag) {
- 			case EXIF_TAG_EXIF_IFD_POINTER:
- 				CHECK_REC (EXIF_IFD_EXIF);
--				exif_data_load_data_content (data, EXIF_IFD_EXIF, d, ds, o, recursion_depth + 1);
-+				exif_data_load_data_content (data, EXIF_IFD_EXIF, d, ds, o,
-+					recursion_cost + level_cost(n));
- 				break;
- 			case EXIF_TAG_GPS_INFO_IFD_POINTER:
- 				CHECK_REC (EXIF_IFD_GPS);
--				exif_data_load_data_content (data, EXIF_IFD_GPS, d, ds, o, recursion_depth + 1);
-+				exif_data_load_data_content (data, EXIF_IFD_GPS, d, ds, o,
-+					recursion_cost + level_cost(n));
- 				break;
- 			case EXIF_TAG_INTEROPERABILITY_IFD_POINTER:
- 				CHECK_REC (EXIF_IFD_INTEROPERABILITY);
--				exif_data_load_data_content (data, EXIF_IFD_INTEROPERABILITY, d, ds, o, recursion_depth + 1);
-+				exif_data_load_data_content (data, EXIF_IFD_INTEROPERABILITY, d, ds, o,
-+					recursion_cost + level_cost(n));
- 				break;
- 			case EXIF_TAG_JPEG_INTERCHANGE_FORMAT:
- 				thumbnail_offset = o;
diff --git a/user/libexif/CVE-2019-9278.patch b/user/libexif/CVE-2019-9278.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index bd15e8d13..000000000
--- a/user/libexif/CVE-2019-9278.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,85 +0,0 @@
-From 75aa73267fdb1e0ebfbc00369e7312bac43d0566 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Marcus Meissner <meissner@suse.de>
-Date: Sat, 18 Jan 2020 09:29:42 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH] fix CVE-2019-9278
-
-avoid the use of unsafe integer overflow checking constructs (unsigned integer operations cannot overflow, so "u1 + u2 > u1" can be optimized away)
-
-check for the actual sizes, which should also handle the overflows
-document other places google patched, but do not seem relevant due to other restrictions
-
-fixes https://github.com/libexif/libexif/issues/26
----
- libexif/exif-data.c | 28 ++++++++++++++++++----------
- 1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/libexif/exif-data.c b/libexif/exif-data.c
-index a6f9c94..6332cd1 100644
---- a/libexif/exif-data.c
-+++ b/libexif/exif-data.c
-@@ -192,9 +192,15 @@ exif_data_load_data_entry (ExifData *data, ExifEntry *entry,
- 		doff = offset + 8;
- 
- 	/* Sanity checks */
--	if ((doff + s < doff) || (doff + s < s) || (doff + s > size)) {
-+	if (doff >= size) {
- 		exif_log (data->priv->log, EXIF_LOG_CODE_DEBUG, "ExifData",
--				  "Tag data past end of buffer (%u > %u)", doff+s, size);	
-+				  "Tag starts past end of buffer (%u > %u)", doff, size);
-+		return 0;
-+	}
-+
-+	if (s > size - doff) {
-+		exif_log (data->priv->log, EXIF_LOG_CODE_DEBUG, "ExifData",
-+				  "Tag data goes past end of buffer (%u > %u)", doff+s, size);
- 		return 0;
- 	}
- 
-@@ -315,13 +321,14 @@ exif_data_load_data_thumbnail (ExifData *data, const unsigned char *d,
- 			       unsigned int ds, ExifLong o, ExifLong s)
- {
- 	/* Sanity checks */
--	if ((o + s < o) || (o + s < s) || (o + s > ds) || (o > ds)) {
--		exif_log (data->priv->log, EXIF_LOG_CODE_DEBUG, "ExifData",
--			  "Bogus thumbnail offset (%u) or size (%u).",
--			  o, s);
-+	if (o >= ds) {
-+		exif_log (data->priv->log, EXIF_LOG_CODE_DEBUG, "ExifData", "Bogus thumbnail offset (%u).", o);
-+		return;
-+	}
-+	if (s > ds - o) {
-+		exif_log (data->priv->log, EXIF_LOG_CODE_DEBUG, "ExifData", "Bogus thumbnail size (%u), max would be %u.", s, ds-o);
- 		return;
- 	}
--
- 	if (data->data) 
- 		exif_mem_free (data->priv->mem, data->data);
- 	if (!(data->data = exif_data_alloc (data, s))) {
-@@ -947,7 +954,7 @@ exif_data_load_data (ExifData *data, const unsigned char *d_orig,
- 	exif_log (data->priv->log, EXIF_LOG_CODE_DEBUG, "ExifData", 
- 		  "IFD 0 at %i.", (int) offset);
- 
--	/* Sanity check the offset, being careful about overflow */
-+	/* ds is restricted to 16 bit above, so offset is restricted too, and offset+8 should not overflow. */
- 	if (offset > ds || offset + 6 + 2 > ds)
- 		return;
- 
-@@ -956,6 +963,7 @@ exif_data_load_data (ExifData *data, const unsigned char *d_orig,
- 
- 	/* IFD 1 offset */
- 	n = exif_get_short (d + 6 + offset, data->priv->order);
-+	/* offset < 2<<16, n is 16 bit at most, so this op will not overflow */
- 	if (offset + 6 + 2 + 12 * n + 4 > ds)
- 		return;
- 
-@@ -964,8 +972,8 @@ exif_data_load_data (ExifData *data, const unsigned char *d_orig,
- 		exif_log (data->priv->log, EXIF_LOG_CODE_DEBUG, "ExifData",
- 			  "IFD 1 at %i.", (int) offset);
- 
--		/* Sanity check. */
--		if (offset > ds || offset + 6 > ds) {
-+		/* Sanity check. ds is ensured to be above 6 above, offset is 16bit */
-+		if (offset > ds - 6) {
- 			exif_log (data->priv->log, EXIF_LOG_CODE_CORRUPT_DATA,
- 				  "ExifData", "Bogus offset of IFD1.");
- 		} else {
diff --git a/user/libexif/CVE-2020-0198.patch b/user/libexif/CVE-2020-0198.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..e0358c220
--- /dev/null
+++ b/user/libexif/CVE-2020-0198.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,58 @@
+From ce03ad7ef4e8aeefce79192bf5b6f69fae396f0c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Marcus Meissner <marcus@jet.franken.de>
+Date: Mon, 8 Jun 2020 17:27:06 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] fixed another unsigned integer overflow
+
+first fixed by google in android fork,
+https://android.googlesource.com/platform/external/libexif/+/1e187b62682ffab5003c702657d6d725b4278f16%5E%21/#F0
+
+(use a more generic overflow check method, also check second overflow instance.)
+
+https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2020-0198
+---
+ libexif/exif-data.c | 10 ++++++----
+ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/libexif/exif-data.c b/libexif/exif-data.c
+index 8b280d3..b495726 100644
+--- a/libexif/exif-data.c
++++ b/libexif/exif-data.c
+@@ -47,6 +47,8 @@
+ #undef JPEG_MARKER_APP1
+ #define JPEG_MARKER_APP1 0xe1
+ 
++#define CHECKOVERFLOW(offset,datasize,structsize) (( offset >= datasize) || (structsize > datasize) || (offset > datasize - structsize ))
++
+ static const unsigned char ExifHeader[] = {0x45, 0x78, 0x69, 0x66, 0x00, 0x00};
+ 
+ struct _ExifDataPrivate
+@@ -327,7 +329,7 @@ exif_data_load_data_thumbnail (ExifData *data, const unsigned char *d,
+ 		exif_log (data->priv->log, EXIF_LOG_CODE_DEBUG, "ExifData", "Bogus thumbnail offset (%u).", o);
+ 		return;
+ 	}
+-	if (s > ds - o) {
++	if (CHECKOVERFLOW(o,ds,s)) {
+ 		exif_log (data->priv->log, EXIF_LOG_CODE_DEBUG, "ExifData", "Bogus thumbnail size (%u), max would be %u.", s, ds-o);
+ 		return;
+ 	}
+@@ -420,9 +422,9 @@ exif_data_load_data_content (ExifData *data, ExifIfd ifd,
+ 	}
+ 
+ 	/* Read the number of entries */
+-	if ((offset + 2 < offset) || (offset + 2 < 2) || (offset + 2 > ds)) {
++	if (CHECKOVERFLOW(offset, ds, 2)) {
+ 		exif_log (data->priv->log, EXIF_LOG_CODE_CORRUPT_DATA, "ExifData",
+-			  "Tag data past end of buffer (%u > %u)", offset+2, ds);
++			  "Tag data past end of buffer (%u+2 > %u)", offset, ds);
+ 		return;
+ 	}
+ 	n = exif_get_short (d + offset, data->priv->order);
+@@ -431,7 +433,7 @@ exif_data_load_data_content (ExifData *data, ExifIfd ifd,
+ 	offset += 2;
+ 
+ 	/* Check if we have enough data. */
+-	if (offset + 12 * n > ds) {
++	if (CHECKOVERFLOW(offset, ds, 12*n)) {
+ 		n = (ds - offset) / 12;
+ 		exif_log (data->priv->log, EXIF_LOG_CODE_DEBUG, "ExifData",
+ 				  "Short data; only loading %hu entries...", n);
diff --git a/user/libjpeg-turbo/APKBUILD b/user/libjpeg-turbo/APKBUILD
index ad4a4076a..cbecdd1a4 100644
--- a/user/libjpeg-turbo/APKBUILD
+++ b/user/libjpeg-turbo/APKBUILD
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 # Maintainer: A. Wilcox <awilfox@adelielinux.org>
 pkgname=libjpeg-turbo
 pkgver=2.0.4
-pkgrel=0
+pkgrel=1
 pkgdesc="Accelerated JPEG compression and decompression library"
 url="https://libjpeg-turbo.org/"
 arch="all"
@@ -10,7 +10,9 @@ license="IJG AND BSD-3-Clause AND Zlib"
 depends=""
 makedepends="cmake"
 subpackages="$pkgname-doc $pkgname-dev $pkgname-utils"
-source="https://downloads.sourceforge.net/libjpeg-turbo/libjpeg-turbo-$pkgver.tar.gz"
+source="https://downloads.sourceforge.net/libjpeg-turbo/libjpeg-turbo-$pkgver.tar.gz
+	CVE-2020-13790.patch
+	"
 
 case "$CTARGET_ARCH" in
 pmmx | x86 | x86_64)	makedepends="$makedepends nasm" ;;
@@ -19,11 +21,20 @@ esac
 # secfixes:
 #   2.0.3-r0:
 #     - CVE-2019-2201
+#   2.0.4-r1:
+#     - CVE-2020-13790
 
 build() {
 	if [ "$CBUILD" != "$CHOST" ]; then
 		CMAKE_CROSSOPTS="-DCMAKE_SYSTEM_NAME=Linux -DCMAKE_HOST_SYSTEM_NAME=Linux"
 	fi
+
+	# https://github.com/libjpeg-turbo/libjpeg-turbo/issues/344
+	# https://github.com/libjpeg-turbo/libjpeg-turbo/issues/428
+	case "$CARCH" in
+	ppc) _floattest=64bit;;
+	esac
+
 	cmake \
 		-DCMAKE_INSTALL_PREFIX=/usr \
 		-DCMAKE_INSTALL_DEFAULT_LIBDIR=lib \
@@ -32,6 +43,7 @@ build() {
 		-DCMAKE_C_FLAGS="$CFLAGS" \
 		-DENABLE_STATIC=OFF \
 		-DWITH_JPEG8=ON \
+		${_floattest:+-DFLOATTEST="$_floattest"} \
 		${CMAKE_CROSSOPTS} .
 	make
 }
@@ -51,4 +63,5 @@ utils() {
 	mv "$pkgdir"/usr/bin "$subpkgdir"/usr/
 }
 
-sha512sums="708c2e7418d9ed5abca313e2ff5a08f8176d79cad2127573cda6036583c201973db4cfb0eafc0fc8f57ecc7b000d2b4af95980de54de5a0aed45969e993a5bf9  libjpeg-turbo-2.0.4.tar.gz"
+sha512sums="708c2e7418d9ed5abca313e2ff5a08f8176d79cad2127573cda6036583c201973db4cfb0eafc0fc8f57ecc7b000d2b4af95980de54de5a0aed45969e993a5bf9  libjpeg-turbo-2.0.4.tar.gz
+83752558d0cf60508a9ccd55505b91f4faa22277537916629a045b2aaa0cb3649e2f90b0df26d389687dc4aba78bdf76e64fc5e5eb324a65026ec86cd95dbe6a  CVE-2020-13790.patch"
diff --git a/user/libjpeg-turbo/CVE-2020-13790.patch b/user/libjpeg-turbo/CVE-2020-13790.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..aaeec0c9c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/user/libjpeg-turbo/CVE-2020-13790.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
+From 3de15e0c344d11d4b90f4a47136467053eb2d09a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: DRC <information@libjpeg-turbo.org>
+Date: Tue, 2 Jun 2020 14:15:37 -0500
+Subject: [PATCH] rdppm.c: Fix buf overrun caused by bad binary PPM
+
+This extends the fix in 1e81b0c3ea26f4ea8f56de05367469333de64a9f to
+include binary PPM files with maximum values < 255, thus preventing a
+malformed binary PPM input file with those specifications from
+triggering an overrun of the rescale array and potentially crashing
+cjpeg, TJBench, or any program that uses the tjLoadImage() function.
+
+Fixes #433
+
+diff --git a/rdppm.c b/rdppm.c
+index 87bc33090..a8507b902 100644
+--- a/rdppm.c
++++ b/rdppm.c
+@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@
+  * Copyright (C) 1991-1997, Thomas G. Lane.
+  * Modified 2009 by Bill Allombert, Guido Vollbeding.
+  * libjpeg-turbo Modifications:
+- * Copyright (C) 2015-2017, D. R. Commander.
++ * Copyright (C) 2015-2017, 2020, D. R. Commander.
+  * For conditions of distribution and use, see the accompanying README.ijg
+  * file.
+  *
+@@ -720,7 +720,7 @@ start_input_ppm(j_compress_ptr cinfo, cjpeg_source_ptr sinfo)
+     /* On 16-bit-int machines we have to be careful of maxval = 65535 */
+     source->rescale = (JSAMPLE *)
+       (*cinfo->mem->alloc_small) ((j_common_ptr)cinfo, JPOOL_IMAGE,
+-                                  (size_t)(((long)maxval + 1L) *
++                                  (size_t)(((long)MAX(maxval, 255) + 1L) *
+                                            sizeof(JSAMPLE)));
+     half_maxval = maxval / 2;
+     for (val = 0; val <= (long)maxval; val++) {
diff --git a/user/nghttp2/APKBUILD b/user/nghttp2/APKBUILD
index 41dd0bc58..063bc9b0f 100644
--- a/user/nghttp2/APKBUILD
+++ b/user/nghttp2/APKBUILD
@@ -1,17 +1,22 @@
 # Contributor: Natanael Copa <ncopa@alpinelinux.org>
 # Maintainer: 
 pkgname=nghttp2
-pkgver=1.40.0
+pkgver=1.41.0
 pkgrel=0
 pkgdesc="Experimental HTTP/2 client, server and proxy"
 url="https://nghttp2.org/"
 arch="all"
+options="!check"  # Requires cunit, which we don't currently ship
 license="MIT"
 depends=""
 makedepends="c-ares-dev libev-dev libxml2-dev openssl-dev zlib-dev"
 subpackages="$pkgname-dev $pkgname-doc $pkgname-libs"
 source="https://github.com/tatsuhiro-t/$pkgname/releases/download/v$pkgver/nghttp2-$pkgver.tar.xz"
 
+# secfixes:
+#   1.41.0-r0:
+#     - CVE-2020-11080
+
 build() {
 	./configure \
 		--build=$CBUILD \
@@ -37,4 +42,4 @@ package() {
 	make DESTDIR="$pkgdir" install
 }
 
-sha512sums="3f9b989c4bd9571b11bb9d59fe2dfd5596ba3962babfc836587d5047e780400a6cf46e43c602caa25ca83c03b84a1629953140d45223099b193df54a719745ce  nghttp2-1.40.0.tar.xz"
+sha512sums="c92e8022ccc876fa311f21bc5bf5af75feff8232efb56a4b2ab198031e974d15b67c16c046188cc76552f75a1b2e7115925d6ce1e42d6f94ae482fe69727466d  nghttp2-1.41.0.tar.xz"
diff --git a/user/openldap/APKBUILD b/user/openldap/APKBUILD
index 30f2059ff..1743a4e6d 100644
--- a/user/openldap/APKBUILD
+++ b/user/openldap/APKBUILD
@@ -1,6 +1,8 @@
 # Maintainer: A. Wilcox <awilfox@adelielinux.org>
 #
 # secfixes:
+#   2.4.50-r0:
+#     - CVE-2020-12243
 #   2.4.48-r0:
 #     - CVE-2019-13057
 #     - CVE-2019-13565
@@ -11,7 +13,7 @@
 #     - CVE-2017-9287
 #
 pkgname=openldap
-pkgver=2.4.49
+pkgver=2.4.50
 pkgrel=0
 pkgdesc="LDAP Server"
 url="https://www.openldap.org/"
@@ -29,7 +31,7 @@ subpackages="$pkgname-dev $pkgname-doc libldap $pkgname-openrc
 pkgusers="ldap"
 pkggroups="ldap"
 install="$pkgname.pre-install $pkgname.post-install $pkgname.post-upgrade"
-source="ftp://ftp.$pkgname.org/pub/OpenLDAP/$pkgname-release/$pkgname-$pkgver.tgz
+source="https://www.$pkgname.org/software/download/OpenLDAP/$pkgname-release/$pkgname-$pkgver.tgz
 	openldap-2.4-ppolicy.patch
 	openldap-2.4.11-libldap_r.patch
 	fix-manpages.patch
@@ -60,7 +62,6 @@ done
 
 prepare() {
 	default_prepare
-	update_config_sub
 
 	sed -i '/^STRIP/s,-s,,g' build/top.mk
 	libtoolize --force && aclocal && autoconf
@@ -198,7 +199,7 @@ _submv() {
 	done
 }
 
-sha512sums="99d1943d126b06e62865e31e5825fcff2cb15415f7f85ae4962fa0e7425bc3b58db5b9639150d7b09e3642c80257724c745e47c25ab4fcb1bba0ba771011dd49  openldap-2.4.49.tgz
+sha512sums="f528043ff9de36f7b65d8816c9a9c24f0ac400041b2969965178ee6eae62c92a11af33a0a883e4954e5fff98a0738a9f9aa2faf5b385d21974754e045aab31ae  openldap-2.4.50.tgz
 5d34d49eabe7cb66cf8284cc3bd9730fa23df4932df68549e242d250ee50d40c434ae074ebc720d5fbcd9d16587c9333c5598d30a5f1177caa61461ab7771f38  openldap-2.4-ppolicy.patch
 44d97efb25d4f39ab10cd5571db43f3bfa7c617a5bb087085ae16c0298aca899b55c8742a502121ba743a73e6d77cd2056bc96cee63d6d0862dabc8fb5574357  openldap-2.4.11-libldap_r.patch
 8c4244d316a05870dd1147b2ab7ddbcfd7626b5dce2f5a0e72f066dc635c2edb4f1ea3be88c6fec2d5ab016001be16bedef70f2ce0695c3cd96f69e1614ff177  fix-manpages.patch
diff --git a/user/py3-pyyaml/APKBUILD b/user/py3-pyyaml/APKBUILD
index e2ce44251..afbf6f336 100644
--- a/user/py3-pyyaml/APKBUILD
+++ b/user/py3-pyyaml/APKBUILD
@@ -2,11 +2,12 @@
 # Maintainer:
 pkgname=py3-pyyaml
 _pkgname=pyyaml
-pkgver=5.1.2
+pkgver=5.3.1
 pkgrel=0
 pkgdesc="YAML parser and emitter for Python"
 url="https://pyyaml.org/wiki/PyYAML"
 arch="noarch"
+# Certified net clean
 license="MIT"
 depends="python3 yaml"
 makedepends="python3-dev yaml yaml-dev"
@@ -14,6 +15,10 @@ subpackages=""
 source="$pkgname-$pkgver.tar.gz::https://github.com/yaml/$_pkgname/archive/$pkgver.tar.gz"
 builddir="$srcdir/$_pkgname-$pkgver"
 
+# secfixes:
+#   5.3.1-r0:
+#     - CVE-2020-1747
+
 build() {
 	# Seems like they need Cython to build the C extension now, so it falls back to pure Python.
 	# Once we ship Cython we can probably change this.
@@ -28,4 +33,4 @@ package() {
 	python3 setup.py install --prefix=/usr --root="$pkgdir"
 }
 
-sha512sums="7bc3dceadcfd512ede67581625887d00822464f20d3b646904f4a73afce8cf3b9766829c6004b626c31757edf8e2eedc27e60d96bee13afa68d3296a8a7f33bb  py3-pyyaml-5.1.2.tar.gz"
+sha512sums="27d97e8493c7660c7c0c471e20a8aa46c85431e4559a98bcbdafc2bd89a67fd04c6f2090e54ff6b206c868b33635ef8be68070a4c25d17a25c97fd5ad3549556  py3-pyyaml-5.3.1.tar.gz"