user/libexif: patch CVE-2016-6328 and CVE-2019-9278

3 files changed, 154 insertions, 2 deletions

diff --git a/user/libexif/APKBUILD b/user/libexif/APKBUILD
index de51ae7b0..06e1e832a 100644
--- a/user/libexif/APKBUILD
+++ b/user/libexif/APKBUILD
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 # Maintainer: 
 pkgname=libexif
 pkgver=0.6.21
-pkgrel=3
+pkgrel=4
 pkgdesc="Library to parse EXIF metadata"
 url="https://sourceforge.net/projects/libexif"
 arch="all"
@@ -10,14 +10,19 @@ subpackages="$pkgname-dev $pkgname-doc $pkgname-lang"
 depends=""
 makedepends=""
 source="https://downloads.sourceforge.net/$pkgname/$pkgname-$pkgver.tar.bz2
+	CVE-2016-6328.patch
 	CVE-2017-7544.patch
 	CVE-2018-20030.patch
+	CVE-2019-9278.patch
 	"
 
 # secfixes:
 #   0.6.21-r3:
 #     - CVE-2017-7544
 #     - CVE-2018-20030
+#   0.6.21-r4:
+#     - CVE-2016-6328
+#     - CVE-2019-9278
 
 prepare() {
 	default_prepare
@@ -41,5 +46,7 @@ package() {
 }
 
 sha512sums="4e0fe2abe85d1c95b41cb3abe1f6333dc3a9eb69dba106a674a78d74a4d5b9c5a19647118fa1cc2d72b98a29853394f1519eda9e2889eb28d3be26b21c7cfc35  libexif-0.6.21.tar.bz2
+c0d4c74207993efc373615ef2c797d720162a2ee6fd7ad026edf2ced4198d9b1165b88790c2af3194f6bb7c2de88d4672c041c2cff8a82c8914700633332b8c5  CVE-2016-6328.patch
 d529c6c5bd26dc21c0946702574184e1f61c2bfd4fb95b41e314f486a0dd55571963ff2cad566d2fb0804de3c0799bcd956c15a3dc10a520ce207728edad4e2d  CVE-2017-7544.patch
-0d6123bd275ace338ad9cebb31a2e714de0141b91860f07394b281686a5393566c3f4159679d4ba689ae7ea69ae2e412b158c3deb451c40c210b5817f6888bbc  CVE-2018-20030.patch"
+0d6123bd275ace338ad9cebb31a2e714de0141b91860f07394b281686a5393566c3f4159679d4ba689ae7ea69ae2e412b158c3deb451c40c210b5817f6888bbc  CVE-2018-20030.patch
+c30c03fefea94d175b94c9f0c4d60cbb3aa0ad78b0d29008975fbbb15c17f2907a16fd50970e5fa18d533d0ce291a5ee9b62934210cb40b0f463693460607738  CVE-2019-9278.patch"
diff --git a/user/libexif/CVE-2016-6328.patch b/user/libexif/CVE-2016-6328.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..0568f27d2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/user/libexif/CVE-2016-6328.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,60 @@
+From 41bd04234b104312f54d25822f68738ba8d7133d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Marcus Meissner <marcus@jet.franken.de>
+Date: Tue, 25 Jul 2017 23:44:44 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] fixes some (not all) buffer overreads during decoding pentax
+ makernote entries.
+
+This should fix:
+https://sourceforge.net/p/libexif/bugs/125/ CVE-2016-6328
+---
+ libexif/pentax/mnote-pentax-entry.c | 16 +++++++++++++---
+ 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/libexif/pentax/mnote-pentax-entry.c b/libexif/pentax/mnote-pentax-entry.c
+index d03d159..ea0429a 100644
+--- a/libexif/pentax/mnote-pentax-entry.c
++++ b/libexif/pentax/mnote-pentax-entry.c
+@@ -425,24 +425,34 @@ mnote_pentax_entry_get_value (MnotePentaxEntry *entry,
+ 		case EXIF_FORMAT_SHORT:
+ 		  {
+ 			const unsigned char *data = entry->data;
+-		  	size_t k, len = strlen(val);
++		  	size_t k, len = strlen(val), sizeleft;
++
++			sizeleft = entry->size;
+ 		  	for(k=0; k<entry->components; k++) {
++				if (sizeleft < 2)
++					break;
+ 				vs = exif_get_short (data, entry->order);
+ 				snprintf (val+len, maxlen-len, "%i ", vs);
+ 				len = strlen(val);
+ 				data += 2;
++				sizeleft -= 2;
+ 			}
+ 		  }
+ 		  break;
+ 		case EXIF_FORMAT_LONG:
+ 		  {
+ 			const unsigned char *data = entry->data;
+-		  	size_t k, len = strlen(val);
++		  	size_t k, len = strlen(val), sizeleft;
++
++			sizeleft = entry->size;
+ 		  	for(k=0; k<entry->components; k++) {
++				if (sizeleft < 4)
++					break;
+ 				vl = exif_get_long (data, entry->order);
+ 				snprintf (val+len, maxlen-len, "%li", (long int) vl);
+ 				len = strlen(val);
+ 				data += 4;
++				sizeleft -= 4;
+ 			}
+ 		  }
+ 		  break;
+@@ -455,5 +465,5 @@ mnote_pentax_entry_get_value (MnotePentaxEntry *entry,
+ 		break;
+ 	}
+ 
+-	return (val);
++	return val;
+ }
diff --git a/user/libexif/CVE-2019-9278.patch b/user/libexif/CVE-2019-9278.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..bd15e8d13
--- /dev/null
+++ b/user/libexif/CVE-2019-9278.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,85 @@
+From 75aa73267fdb1e0ebfbc00369e7312bac43d0566 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Marcus Meissner <meissner@suse.de>
+Date: Sat, 18 Jan 2020 09:29:42 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] fix CVE-2019-9278
+
+avoid the use of unsafe integer overflow checking constructs (unsigned integer operations cannot overflow, so "u1 + u2 > u1" can be optimized away)
+
+check for the actual sizes, which should also handle the overflows
+document other places google patched, but do not seem relevant due to other restrictions
+
+fixes https://github.com/libexif/libexif/issues/26
+---
+ libexif/exif-data.c | 28 ++++++++++++++++++----------
+ 1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/libexif/exif-data.c b/libexif/exif-data.c
+index a6f9c94..6332cd1 100644
+--- a/libexif/exif-data.c
++++ b/libexif/exif-data.c
+@@ -192,9 +192,15 @@ exif_data_load_data_entry (ExifData *data, ExifEntry *entry,
+ 		doff = offset + 8;
+ 
+ 	/* Sanity checks */
+-	if ((doff + s < doff) || (doff + s < s) || (doff + s > size)) {
++	if (doff >= size) {
+ 		exif_log (data->priv->log, EXIF_LOG_CODE_DEBUG, "ExifData",
+-				  "Tag data past end of buffer (%u > %u)", doff+s, size);	
++				  "Tag starts past end of buffer (%u > %u)", doff, size);
++		return 0;
++	}
++
++	if (s > size - doff) {
++		exif_log (data->priv->log, EXIF_LOG_CODE_DEBUG, "ExifData",
++				  "Tag data goes past end of buffer (%u > %u)", doff+s, size);
+ 		return 0;
+ 	}
+ 
+@@ -315,13 +321,14 @@ exif_data_load_data_thumbnail (ExifData *data, const unsigned char *d,
+ 			       unsigned int ds, ExifLong o, ExifLong s)
+ {
+ 	/* Sanity checks */
+-	if ((o + s < o) || (o + s < s) || (o + s > ds) || (o > ds)) {
+-		exif_log (data->priv->log, EXIF_LOG_CODE_DEBUG, "ExifData",
+-			  "Bogus thumbnail offset (%u) or size (%u).",
+-			  o, s);
++	if (o >= ds) {
++		exif_log (data->priv->log, EXIF_LOG_CODE_DEBUG, "ExifData", "Bogus thumbnail offset (%u).", o);
++		return;
++	}
++	if (s > ds - o) {
++		exif_log (data->priv->log, EXIF_LOG_CODE_DEBUG, "ExifData", "Bogus thumbnail size (%u), max would be %u.", s, ds-o);
+ 		return;
+ 	}
+-
+ 	if (data->data) 
+ 		exif_mem_free (data->priv->mem, data->data);
+ 	if (!(data->data = exif_data_alloc (data, s))) {
+@@ -947,7 +954,7 @@ exif_data_load_data (ExifData *data, const unsigned char *d_orig,
+ 	exif_log (data->priv->log, EXIF_LOG_CODE_DEBUG, "ExifData", 
+ 		  "IFD 0 at %i.", (int) offset);
+ 
+-	/* Sanity check the offset, being careful about overflow */
++	/* ds is restricted to 16 bit above, so offset is restricted too, and offset+8 should not overflow. */
+ 	if (offset > ds || offset + 6 + 2 > ds)
+ 		return;
+ 
+@@ -956,6 +963,7 @@ exif_data_load_data (ExifData *data, const unsigned char *d_orig,
+ 
+ 	/* IFD 1 offset */
+ 	n = exif_get_short (d + 6 + offset, data->priv->order);
++	/* offset < 2<<16, n is 16 bit at most, so this op will not overflow */
+ 	if (offset + 6 + 2 + 12 * n + 4 > ds)
+ 		return;
+ 
+@@ -964,8 +972,8 @@ exif_data_load_data (ExifData *data, const unsigned char *d_orig,
+ 		exif_log (data->priv->log, EXIF_LOG_CODE_DEBUG, "ExifData",
+ 			  "IFD 1 at %i.", (int) offset);
+ 
+-		/* Sanity check. */
+-		if (offset > ds || offset + 6 > ds) {
++		/* Sanity check. ds is ensured to be above 6 above, offset is 16bit */
++		if (offset > ds - 6) {
+ 			exif_log (data->priv->log, EXIF_LOG_CODE_CORRUPT_DATA,
+ 				  "ExifData", "Bogus offset of IFD1.");
+ 		} else {