diff options
36 files changed, 1409 insertions, 445 deletions
diff --git a/system/icu/APKBUILD b/system/icu/APKBUILD index 4165246a3..046698316 100644 --- a/system/icu/APKBUILD +++ b/system/icu/APKBUILD @@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ pkgver=65.1 # convert x.y.z to x_y_z _ver=$(printf '%s' "$pkgver" | tr . _) -pkgrel=0 +pkgrel=1 pkgdesc="International Components for Unicode" url="http://site.icu-project.org/" arch="all" @@ -17,6 +17,7 @@ makedepends="" subpackages="$pkgname-static $pkgname-dev $pkgname-doc $pkgname-libs" source="https://github.com/unicode-org/icu/releases/download/release-$(printf '%s' "$pkgver" | tr . -)/${pkgname}4c-$_ver-src.tgz icu-60.2-always-use-utf8.patch + CVE-2020-10531.patch " # secfixes: @@ -27,6 +28,9 @@ source="https://github.com/unicode-org/icu/releases/download/release-$(printf '% # 58.2-r2: # - CVE-2017-7867 # - CVE-2017-7868 +# 65.1-r1: +# - CVE-2020-10531 + builddir="$srcdir"/icu/source prepare() { @@ -73,4 +77,5 @@ static() { } sha512sums="8f1ef33e1f4abc9a8ee870331c59f01b473d6da1251a19ce403f822f3e3871096f0791855d39c8f20c612fc49cda2c62c06864aa32ddab2dbd186d2b21ce9139 icu4c-65_1-src.tgz -f86c62422f38f6485c58d4766e629bab69e4b0e00fa910854e40e7db1ace299152eaefa99ae2fbab7465e65d3156cbea7124612defa60680db58ab5c34d6262f icu-60.2-always-use-utf8.patch" +f86c62422f38f6485c58d4766e629bab69e4b0e00fa910854e40e7db1ace299152eaefa99ae2fbab7465e65d3156cbea7124612defa60680db58ab5c34d6262f icu-60.2-always-use-utf8.patch +2901235a24b1973516e495473188b077eb0486714ac47f702f226a3406176e913672159978b67548a1316284ecc716e06158b05c190ddfa83ad576a7a3539d72 CVE-2020-10531.patch" diff --git a/system/icu/CVE-2017-7867-7868.patch b/system/icu/CVE-2017-7867-7868.patch deleted file mode 100644 index df18283c2..000000000 --- a/system/icu/CVE-2017-7867-7868.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,155 +0,0 @@ -Index: source/common/utext.cpp
-===================================================================
---- source/common/utext.cpp (revision 39670)
-+++ source/common/utext.cpp (revision 39671)
-@@ -848,7 +848,13 @@
-
- // Chunk size.
--// Must be less than 85, because of byte mapping from UChar indexes to native indexes.
--// Worst case is three native bytes to one UChar. (Supplemenaries are 4 native bytes
--// to two UChars.)
-+// Must be less than 42 (256/6), because of byte mapping from UChar indexes to native indexes.
-+// Worst case there are six UTF-8 bytes per UChar.
-+// obsolete 6 byte form fd + 5 trails maps to fffd
-+// obsolete 5 byte form fc + 4 trails maps to fffd
-+// non-shortest 4 byte forms maps to fffd
-+// normal supplementaries map to a pair of utf-16, two utf8 bytes per utf-16 unit
-+// mapToUChars array size must allow for the worst case, 6.
-+// This could be brought down to 4, by treating fd and fc as pure illegal,
-+// rather than obsolete lead bytes. But that is not compatible with the utf-8 access macros.
- //
- enum { UTF8_TEXT_CHUNK_SIZE=32 };
-@@ -890,5 +896,5 @@
- // one for a supplementary starting in the last normal position,
- // and one for an entry for the buffer limit position.
-- uint8_t mapToUChars[UTF8_TEXT_CHUNK_SIZE*3+6]; // Map native offset from bufNativeStart to
-+ uint8_t mapToUChars[UTF8_TEXT_CHUNK_SIZE*6+6]; // Map native offset from bufNativeStart to
- // correspoding offset in filled part of buf.
- int32_t align;
-@@ -1033,4 +1039,5 @@
- u8b = (UTF8Buf *)ut->p; // the current buffer
- mapIndex = ix - u8b->toUCharsMapStart;
-+ U_ASSERT(mapIndex < (int32_t)sizeof(UTF8Buf::mapToUChars));
- ut->chunkOffset = u8b->mapToUChars[mapIndex] - u8b->bufStartIdx;
- return TRUE;
-@@ -1299,4 +1306,8 @@
- // If index is at the end, there is no character there to look at.
- if (ix != ut->b) {
-+ // Note: this function will only move the index back if it is on a trail byte
-+ // and there is a preceding lead byte and the sequence from the lead
-+ // through this trail could be part of a valid UTF-8 sequence
-+ // Otherwise the index remains unchanged.
- U8_SET_CP_START(s8, 0, ix);
- }
-@@ -1312,5 +1323,8 @@
- uint8_t *mapToNative = u8b->mapToNative;
- uint8_t *mapToUChars = u8b->mapToUChars;
-- int32_t toUCharsMapStart = ix - (UTF8_TEXT_CHUNK_SIZE*3 + 1);
-+ int32_t toUCharsMapStart = ix - sizeof(UTF8Buf::mapToUChars) + 1;
-+ // Note that toUCharsMapStart can be negative. Happens when the remaining
-+ // text from current position to the beginning is less than the buffer size.
-+ // + 1 because mapToUChars must have a slot at the end for the bufNativeLimit entry.
- int32_t destIx = UTF8_TEXT_CHUNK_SIZE+2; // Start in the overflow region
- // at end of buffer to leave room
-@@ -1339,4 +1353,5 @@
- // Special case ASCII range for speed.
- buf[destIx] = (UChar)c;
-+ U_ASSERT(toUCharsMapStart <= srcIx);
- mapToUChars[srcIx - toUCharsMapStart] = (uint8_t)destIx;
- mapToNative[destIx] = (uint8_t)(srcIx - toUCharsMapStart);
-@@ -1368,4 +1383,5 @@
- mapToUChars[sIx-- - toUCharsMapStart] = (uint8_t)destIx;
- } while (sIx >= srcIx);
-+ U_ASSERT(toUCharsMapStart <= (srcIx+1));
-
- // Set native indexing limit to be the current position.
-@@ -1542,4 +1558,5 @@
- U_ASSERT(index<=ut->chunkNativeLimit);
- int32_t mapIndex = index - u8b->toUCharsMapStart;
-+ U_ASSERT(mapIndex < (int32_t)sizeof(UTF8Buf::mapToUChars));
- int32_t offset = u8b->mapToUChars[mapIndex] - u8b->bufStartIdx;
- U_ASSERT(offset>=0 && offset<=ut->chunkLength);
-Index: source/test/intltest/utxttest.cpp
-===================================================================
---- source/test/intltest/utxttest.cpp (revision 39670)
-+++ source/test/intltest/utxttest.cpp (revision 39671)
-@@ -68,4 +68,6 @@
- case 7: name = "Ticket12130";
- if (exec) Ticket12130(); break;
-+ case 8: name = "Ticket12888";
-+ if (exec) Ticket12888(); break;
- default: name = ""; break;
- }
-@@ -1584,2 +1586,62 @@
- utext_close(&ut);
- }
-+
-+// Ticket 12888: bad handling of illegal utf-8 containing many instances of the archaic, now illegal,
-+// six byte utf-8 forms. Original implementation had an assumption that
-+// there would be at most three utf-8 bytes per UTF-16 code unit.
-+// The five and six byte sequences map to a single replacement character.
-+
-+void UTextTest::Ticket12888() {
-+ const char *badString =
-+ "\xfd\x80\x80\x80\x80\x80\xfd\x80\x80\x80\x80\x80\xfd\x80\x80\x80\x80\x80\xfd\x80\x80\x80\x80\x80"
-+ "\xfd\x80\x80\x80\x80\x80\xfd\x80\x80\x80\x80\x80\xfd\x80\x80\x80\x80\x80\xfd\x80\x80\x80\x80\x80"
-+ "\xfd\x80\x80\x80\x80\x80\xfd\x80\x80\x80\x80\x80\xfd\x80\x80\x80\x80\x80\xfd\x80\x80\x80\x80\x80"
-+ "\xfd\x80\x80\x80\x80\x80\xfd\x80\x80\x80\x80\x80\xfd\x80\x80\x80\x80\x80\xfd\x80\x80\x80\x80\x80"
-+ "\xfd\x80\x80\x80\x80\x80\xfd\x80\x80\x80\x80\x80\xfd\x80\x80\x80\x80\x80\xfd\x80\x80\x80\x80\x80"
-+ "\xfd\x80\x80\x80\x80\x80\xfd\x80\x80\x80\x80\x80\xfd\x80\x80\x80\x80\x80\xfd\x80\x80\x80\x80\x80"
-+ "\xfd\x80\x80\x80\x80\x80\xfd\x80\x80\x80\x80\x80\xfd\x80\x80\x80\x80\x80\xfd\x80\x80\x80\x80\x80"
-+ "\xfd\x80\x80\x80\x80\x80\xfd\x80\x80\x80\x80\x80\xfd\x80\x80\x80\x80\x80\xfd\x80\x80\x80\x80\x80"
-+ "\xfd\x80\x80\x80\x80\x80\xfd\x80\x80\x80\x80\x80\xfd\x80\x80\x80\x80\x80\xfd\x80\x80\x80\x80\x80"
-+ "\xfd\x80\x80\x80\x80\x80\xfd\x80\x80\x80\x80\x80\xfd\x80\x80\x80\x80\x80\xfd\x80\x80\x80\x80\x80"
-+ "\xfd\x80\x80\x80\x80\x80\xfd\x80\x80\x80\x80\x80\xfd\x80\x80\x80\x80\x80\xfd\x80\x80\x80\x80\x80"
-+ "\xfd\x80\x80\x80\x80\x80\xfd\x80\x80\x80\x80\x80\xfd\x80\x80\x80\x80\x80\xfd\x80\x80\x80\x80\x80"
-+ "\xfd\x80\x80\x80\x80\x80\xfd\x80\x80\x80\x80\x80\xfd\x80\x80\x80\x80\x80\xfd\x80\x80\x80\x80\x80"
-+ "\xfd\x80\x80\x80\x80\x80\xfd\x80\x80\x80\x80\x80\xfd\x80\x80\x80\x80\x80\xfd\x80\x80\x80\x80\x80"
-+ "\xfd\x80\x80\x80\x80\x80\xfd\x80\x80\x80\x80\x80\xfd\x80\x80\x80\x80\x80\xfd\x80\x80\x80\x80\x80"
-+ "\xfd\x80\x80\x80\x80\x80\xfd\x80\x80\x80\x80\x80\xfd\x80\x80\x80\x80\x80\xfd\x80\x80\x80\x80\x80"
-+ "\xfd\x80\x80\x80\x80\x80\xfd\x80\x80\x80\x80\x80\xfd\x80\x80\x80\x80\x80\xfd\x80\x80\x80\x80\x80"
-+ "\xfd\x80\x80\x80\x80\x80\xfd\x80\x80\x80\x80\x80\xfd\x80\x80\x80\x80\x80\xfd\x80\x80\x80\x80\x80"
-+ "\xfd\x80\x80\x80\x80\x80\xfd\x80\x80\x80\x80\x80\xfd\x80\x80\x80\x80\x80\xfd\x80\x80\x80\x80\x80"
-+ "\xfd\x80\x80\x80\x80\x80\xfd\x80\x80\x80\x80\x80\xfd\x80\x80\x80\x80\x80\xfd\x80\x80\x80\x80\x80";
-+
-+ UErrorCode status = U_ZERO_ERROR;
-+ LocalUTextPointer ut(utext_openUTF8(NULL, badString, -1, &status));
-+ TEST_SUCCESS(status);
-+ for (;;) {
-+ UChar32 c = utext_next32(ut.getAlias());
-+ if (c == U_SENTINEL) {
-+ break;
-+ }
-+ }
-+ int32_t endIdx = utext_getNativeIndex(ut.getAlias());
-+ if (endIdx != (int32_t)strlen(badString)) {
-+ errln("%s:%d expected=%d, actual=%d", __FILE__, __LINE__, strlen(badString), endIdx);
-+ return;
-+ }
-+
-+ for (int32_t prevIndex = endIdx; prevIndex>0;) {
-+ UChar32 c = utext_previous32(ut.getAlias());
-+ int32_t currentIndex = utext_getNativeIndex(ut.getAlias());
-+ if (c != 0xfffd) {
-+ errln("%s:%d (expected, actual, index) = (%d, %d, %d)\n",
-+ __FILE__, __LINE__, 0xfffd, c, currentIndex);
-+ break;
-+ }
-+ if (currentIndex != prevIndex - 6) {
-+ errln("%s:%d: wrong index. Expected, actual = %d, %d",
-+ __FILE__, __LINE__, prevIndex - 6, currentIndex);
-+ break;
-+ }
-+ prevIndex = currentIndex;
-+ }
-+}
-Index: source/test/intltest/utxttest.h
-===================================================================
---- source/test/intltest/utxttest.h (revision 39670)
-+++ source/test/intltest/utxttest.h (revision 39671)
-@@ -39,4 +39,5 @@
- void Ticket10983();
- void Ticket12130();
-+ void Ticket12888();
-
- private:
diff --git a/system/icu/CVE-2020-10531.patch b/system/icu/CVE-2020-10531.patch new file mode 100644 index 000000000..f456b06ec --- /dev/null +++ b/system/icu/CVE-2020-10531.patch @@ -0,0 +1,118 @@ +From b7d08bc04a4296982fcef8b6b8a354a9e4e7afca Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Frank Tang <ftang@chromium.org> +Date: Sat, 1 Feb 2020 02:39:04 +0000 +Subject: [PATCH] ICU-20958 Prevent SEGV_MAPERR in append + +See #971 +--- + source/common/unistr.cpp | 6 ++- + source/test/intltest/ustrtest.cpp | 62 +++++++++++++++++++++++++ + source/test/intltest/ustrtest.h | 1 + + 3 files changed, 68 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) + +diff --git source/common/unistr.cpp source/common/unistr.cpp +index 901bb3358ba..077b4d6ef20 100644 +--- source/common/unistr.cpp ++++ source/common/unistr.cpp +@@ -1563,7 +1563,11 @@ UnicodeString::doAppend(const UChar *srcChars, int32_t srcStart, int32_t srcLeng + } + + int32_t oldLength = length(); +- int32_t newLength = oldLength + srcLength; ++ int32_t newLength; ++ if (uprv_add32_overflow(oldLength, srcLength, &newLength)) { ++ setToBogus(); ++ return *this; ++ } + + // Check for append onto ourself + const UChar* oldArray = getArrayStart(); +diff --git source/test/intltest/ustrtest.cpp source/test/intltest/ustrtest.cpp +index b6515ea813c..ad38bdf53a3 100644 +--- source/test/intltest/ustrtest.cpp ++++ source/test/intltest/ustrtest.cpp +@@ -67,6 +67,7 @@ void UnicodeStringTest::runIndexedTest( int32_t index, UBool exec, const char* & + TESTCASE_AUTO(TestWCharPointers); + TESTCASE_AUTO(TestNullPointers); + TESTCASE_AUTO(TestUnicodeStringInsertAppendToSelf); ++ TESTCASE_AUTO(TestLargeAppend); + TESTCASE_AUTO_END; + } + +@@ -2310,3 +2311,64 @@ void UnicodeStringTest::TestUnicodeStringInsertAppendToSelf() { + str.insert(2, sub); + assertEquals("", u"abbcdcde", str); + } ++ ++void UnicodeStringTest::TestLargeAppend() { ++ if(quick) return; ++ ++ IcuTestErrorCode status(*this, "TestLargeAppend"); ++ // Make a large UnicodeString ++ int32_t len = 0xAFFFFFF; ++ UnicodeString str; ++ char16_t *buf = str.getBuffer(len); ++ // A fast way to set buffer to valid Unicode. ++ // 4E4E is a valid unicode character ++ uprv_memset(buf, 0x4e, len * 2); ++ str.releaseBuffer(len); ++ UnicodeString dest; ++ // Append it 16 times ++ // 0xAFFFFFF times 16 is 0xA4FFFFF1, ++ // which is greater than INT32_MAX, which is 0x7FFFFFFF. ++ int64_t total = 0; ++ for (int32_t i = 0; i < 16; i++) { ++ dest.append(str); ++ total += len; ++ if (total <= INT32_MAX) { ++ assertFalse("dest is not bogus", dest.isBogus()); ++ } else { ++ assertTrue("dest should be bogus", dest.isBogus()); ++ } ++ } ++ dest.remove(); ++ total = 0; ++ for (int32_t i = 0; i < 16; i++) { ++ dest.append(str); ++ total += len; ++ if (total + len <= INT32_MAX) { ++ assertFalse("dest is not bogus", dest.isBogus()); ++ } else if (total <= INT32_MAX) { ++ // Check that a string of exactly the maximum size works ++ UnicodeString str2; ++ int32_t remain = INT32_MAX - total; ++ char16_t *buf2 = str2.getBuffer(remain); ++ if (buf2 == nullptr) { ++ // if somehow memory allocation fail, return the test ++ return; ++ } ++ uprv_memset(buf2, 0x4e, remain * 2); ++ str2.releaseBuffer(remain); ++ dest.append(str2); ++ total += remain; ++ assertEquals("When a string of exactly the maximum size works", (int64_t)INT32_MAX, total); ++ assertEquals("When a string of exactly the maximum size works", INT32_MAX, dest.length()); ++ assertFalse("dest is not bogus", dest.isBogus()); ++ ++ // Check that a string size+1 goes bogus ++ str2.truncate(1); ++ dest.append(str2); ++ total++; ++ assertTrue("dest should be bogus", dest.isBogus()); ++ } else { ++ assertTrue("dest should be bogus", dest.isBogus()); ++ } ++ } ++} +diff --git source/test/intltest/ustrtest.h source/test/intltest/ustrtest.h +index 218befdcc68..4a356a92c7a 100644 +--- source/test/intltest/ustrtest.h ++++ source/test/intltest/ustrtest.h +@@ -97,6 +97,7 @@ class UnicodeStringTest: public IntlTest { + void TestWCharPointers(); + void TestNullPointers(); + void TestUnicodeStringInsertAppendToSelf(); ++ void TestLargeAppend(); + }; + + #endif diff --git a/system/pcre2/APKBUILD b/system/pcre2/APKBUILD index 7bca0e450..4120d0a7b 100644 --- a/system/pcre2/APKBUILD +++ b/system/pcre2/APKBUILD @@ -2,7 +2,7 @@ # Maintainer: pkgname=pcre2 pkgver=10.33 -pkgrel=0 +pkgrel=1 pkgdesc="Perl-compatible regular expression library" url="https://pcre.org" arch="all" @@ -12,7 +12,13 @@ depends_dev="libedit-dev zlib-dev" makedepends="$depends_dev" subpackages="$pkgname-dev $pkgname-doc $pkgname-tools libpcre2-16:_libpcre libpcre2-32:_libpcre" -source="https://ftp.pcre.org/pub/pcre/$pkgname-$pkgver.tar.gz" +source="https://ftp.pcre.org/pub/pcre/$pkgname-$pkgver.tar.gz + CVE-2019-20454.patch + " + +# secfixes: +# 10.33-r1: +# - CVE-2019-20454 case "$CARCH" in s390x) _enable_jit="";; @@ -62,4 +68,5 @@ tools() { mv "$pkgdir"/usr/bin "$subpkgdir"/usr/ } -sha512sums="649983c7725e2fd2451ba89243b4c08c408fc279b7be3b2d225045cced3b0667ff6da4c9dd37510eb9e5aed6478aff54c2dbd1d92f4d0f1174579df9ec2c1882 pcre2-10.33.tar.gz" +sha512sums="649983c7725e2fd2451ba89243b4c08c408fc279b7be3b2d225045cced3b0667ff6da4c9dd37510eb9e5aed6478aff54c2dbd1d92f4d0f1174579df9ec2c1882 pcre2-10.33.tar.gz +07c43ccf130c1ed2b4f97036671f92e9c1d0100fd32c053b448e5dbdf976543c12f74568e37b661db7fbd603e815f5683a59cb2a9f9c307505dca3cb36db8120 CVE-2019-20454.patch" diff --git a/system/pcre2/CVE-2019-20454.patch b/system/pcre2/CVE-2019-20454.patch new file mode 100644 index 000000000..bdec87294 --- /dev/null +++ b/system/pcre2/CVE-2019-20454.patch @@ -0,0 +1,50 @@ +Revision: 1091 +Author: ph10 +Date: Mon May 13 16:26:17 2019 UTC +URL: https://vcs.pcre.org/pcre2?view=revision&revision=1091 + +Fix crash when \X is used without UTF in JIT. + +--- a/testdata/testinput4 2019/05/11 11:43:39 1090 ++++ b/testdata/testinput4 2019/05/13 16:26:17 1091 +@@ -2480,4 +2480,7 @@ + /^(?'אABC'...)(?&אABC)/utf + 123123123456 + ++/\X*/ ++ \xF3aaa\xE4\xEA\xEB\xFEa ++ + # End of testinput4 +--- a/testdata/testoutput4 2019/05/11 11:43:39 1090 ++++ b/testdata/testoutput4 2019/05/13 16:26:17 1091 +@@ -4012,4 +4012,8 @@ + 0: 123123 + 1: 123 + ++/\X*/ ++ \xF3aaa\xE4\xEA\xEB\xFEa ++ 0: \xf3aaa\xe4\xea\xeb\xfea ++ + # End of testinput4 + +Revision: 1092 +Author: ph10 +Date: Mon May 13 16:38:18 2019 UTC +URL: https://vcs.pcre.org/pcre2?view=revision&revision=1092 + +Forgot this file in previous commit. Fixes JIT non-UTF bug. + +--- a/src/pcre2_jit_compile.c 2019/05/13 16:26:17 1091 ++++ b/src/pcre2_jit_compile.c 2019/05/13 16:38:18 1092 +@@ -8571,7 +8571,10 @@ + PCRE2_SPTR bptr; + uint32_t c; + +-GETCHARINC(c, cc); ++/* Patch by PH */ ++/* GETCHARINC(c, cc); */ ++ ++c = *cc++; + #if PCRE2_CODE_UNIT_WIDTH == 32 + if (c >= 0x110000) + return NULL; diff --git a/system/python3/APKBUILD b/system/python3/APKBUILD index b8c72f3a7..e875d3941 100644 --- a/system/python3/APKBUILD +++ b/system/python3/APKBUILD @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ # Contributor: Kiyoshi Aman <adelie@aerdan.vulpine.house> # Maintainer: A. Wilcox <awilfox@adelielinux.org> pkgname=python3 -pkgver=3.6.9 +pkgver=3.6.10 _basever="${pkgver%.*}" pkgrel=2 pkgdesc="A high-level scripting language" @@ -40,8 +40,7 @@ makedepends="expat-dev openssl-dev zlib-dev ncurses-dev bzip2-dev xz-dev source="https://www.python.org/ftp/python/$pkgver/Python-$pkgver.tar.xz musl-find_library.patch fix-xattrs-glibc.patch - CVE-2019-16056.patch - CVE-2019-16935.patch + CVE-2019-18348.patch " builddir="$srcdir/Python-$pkgver" @@ -63,6 +62,8 @@ builddir="$srcdir/Python-$pkgver" # - CVE-2019-16056 # 3.6.9-r2: # - CVE-2019-16935 +# 3.6.10-r0: +# - CVE-2019-18348 prepare() { default_prepare @@ -153,11 +154,14 @@ EOF } package() { + export XDG_CACHE_HOME="$(mktemp -d)" make -j1 DESTDIR="$pkgdir" EXTRA_CFLAGS="$CFLAGS" install maninstall install -Dm644 LICENSE "$pkgdir"/usr/share/licenses/$pkgname/LICENSE # those are provided by python3-tkinter rm -r "$pkgdir"/usr/bin/idle* "$pkgdir"/usr/lib/python*/idlelib \ "$pkgdir"/usr/lib/python*/tkinter + + rm -rf "$XDG_CACHE_HOME" } dev() { @@ -189,8 +193,7 @@ wininst() { "$subpkgdir"/usr/lib/python$_basever/distutils/command } -sha512sums="05de9c6f44d96a52bfce10ede4312de892573edaf8bece65926d19973a3a800d65eed7a857af945f69efcfb25efa3788e7a54016b03d80b611eb51c3ea074819 Python-3.6.9.tar.xz +sha512sums="26147099e1f1a0ffc85febad26e18e991f019599a150887ea0b925e34663fad8e03b3c2a941e2770c1a63960695e173ef32709572c9361e7f2cb862ccf75b28a Python-3.6.10.tar.xz ab8eaa2858d5109049b1f9f553198d40e0ef8d78211ad6455f7b491af525bffb16738fed60fc84e960c4889568d25753b9e4a1494834fea48291b33f07000ec2 musl-find_library.patch 37b6ee5d0d5de43799316aa111423ba5a666c17dc7f81b04c330f59c1d1565540eac4c585abe2199bbed52ebe7426001edb1c53bd0a17486a2a8e052d0f494ad fix-xattrs-glibc.patch -1f1eb61355eb7832bef8e9c3915895cc3b2966a30c809371430b4416260452cd39c48ba593b2259574867bd1e8fea98efbc45c4b0bd95aeb0690c8514b380ea0 CVE-2019-16056.patch -7f94d887c81f79d90afd4a9621547c13cbdd0232250f62a686b26a63160a4d286a6db9b342d06b9b63af64f994835b489c37bab499a2093c3c2585dc7a04d8a1 CVE-2019-16935.patch" +7a15409165feb60358455b711f978b7b1c4dea9ad53aa7b5be07c1f70262988e592e7a630f83125f37051bbed14d14b66d2acd775234a163ff5b048621b9a59c CVE-2019-18348.patch" diff --git a/system/python3/CVE-2019-16056.patch b/system/python3/CVE-2019-16056.patch deleted file mode 100644 index b2f5ce826..000000000 --- a/system/python3/CVE-2019-16056.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,131 +0,0 @@ -From 13a19139b5e76175bc95294d54afc9425e4f36c9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: "Miss Islington (bot)" - <31488909+miss-islington@users.noreply.github.com> -Date: Fri, 9 Aug 2019 08:22:19 -0700 -Subject: [PATCH] bpo-34155: Dont parse domains containing @ (GH-13079) - (GH-14826) - -Before: - - >>> email.message_from_string('From: a@malicious.org@important.com', policy=email.policy.default)['from'].addresses - (Address(display_name='', username='a', domain='malicious.org'),) - - >>> parseaddr('a@malicious.org@important.com') - ('', 'a@malicious.org') - - After: - - >>> email.message_from_string('From: a@malicious.org@important.com', policy=email.policy.default)['from'].addresses - (Address(display_name='', username='', domain=''),) - - >>> parseaddr('a@malicious.org@important.com') - ('', 'a@') - -https://bugs.python.org/issue34155 -(cherry picked from commit 8cb65d1381b027f0b09ee36bfed7f35bb4dec9a9) - -Co-authored-by: jpic <jpic@users.noreply.github.com> ---- - Lib/email/_header_value_parser.py | 2 ++ - Lib/email/_parseaddr.py | 11 ++++++++++- - Lib/test/test_email/test__header_value_parser.py | 10 ++++++++++ - Lib/test/test_email/test_email.py | 14 ++++++++++++++ - .../2019-05-04-13-33-37.bpo-34155.MJll68.rst | 1 + - 5 files changed, 37 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) - create mode 100644 Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2019-05-04-13-33-37.bpo-34155.MJll68.rst - -diff --git a/Lib/email/_header_value_parser.py b/Lib/email/_header_value_parser.py -index 737951e4b1b1..bc9c9b6241d4 100644 ---- a/Lib/email/_header_value_parser.py -+++ b/Lib/email/_header_value_parser.py -@@ -1561,6 +1561,8 @@ def get_domain(value): - token, value = get_dot_atom(value) - except errors.HeaderParseError: - token, value = get_atom(value) -+ if value and value[0] == '@': -+ raise errors.HeaderParseError('Invalid Domain') - if leader is not None: - token[:0] = [leader] - domain.append(token) -diff --git a/Lib/email/_parseaddr.py b/Lib/email/_parseaddr.py -index cdfa3729adc7..41ff6f8c000d 100644 ---- a/Lib/email/_parseaddr.py -+++ b/Lib/email/_parseaddr.py -@@ -379,7 +379,12 @@ def getaddrspec(self): - aslist.append('@') - self.pos += 1 - self.gotonext() -- return EMPTYSTRING.join(aslist) + self.getdomain() -+ domain = self.getdomain() -+ if not domain: -+ # Invalid domain, return an empty address instead of returning a -+ # local part to denote failed parsing. -+ return EMPTYSTRING -+ return EMPTYSTRING.join(aslist) + domain - - def getdomain(self): - """Get the complete domain name from an address.""" -@@ -394,6 +399,10 @@ def getdomain(self): - elif self.field[self.pos] == '.': - self.pos += 1 - sdlist.append('.') -+ elif self.field[self.pos] == '@': -+ # bpo-34155: Don't parse domains with two `@` like -+ # `a@malicious.org@important.com`. -+ return EMPTYSTRING - elif self.field[self.pos] in self.atomends: - break - else: -diff --git a/Lib/test/test_email/test__header_value_parser.py b/Lib/test/test_email/test__header_value_parser.py -index a2c900fa7fd2..02ef3e1006c6 100644 ---- a/Lib/test/test_email/test__header_value_parser.py -+++ b/Lib/test/test_email/test__header_value_parser.py -@@ -1418,6 +1418,16 @@ def test_get_addr_spec_dot_atom(self): - self.assertEqual(addr_spec.domain, 'example.com') - self.assertEqual(addr_spec.addr_spec, 'star.a.star@example.com') - -+ def test_get_addr_spec_multiple_domains(self): -+ with self.assertRaises(errors.HeaderParseError): -+ parser.get_addr_spec('star@a.star@example.com') -+ -+ with self.assertRaises(errors.HeaderParseError): -+ parser.get_addr_spec('star@a@example.com') -+ -+ with self.assertRaises(errors.HeaderParseError): -+ parser.get_addr_spec('star@172.17.0.1@example.com') -+ - # get_obs_route - - def test_get_obs_route_simple(self): -diff --git a/Lib/test/test_email/test_email.py b/Lib/test/test_email/test_email.py -index f97ccc6711cc..68d052279987 100644 ---- a/Lib/test/test_email/test_email.py -+++ b/Lib/test/test_email/test_email.py -@@ -3035,6 +3035,20 @@ def test_parseaddr_empty(self): - self.assertEqual(utils.parseaddr('<>'), ('', '')) - self.assertEqual(utils.formataddr(utils.parseaddr('<>')), '') - -+ def test_parseaddr_multiple_domains(self): -+ self.assertEqual( -+ utils.parseaddr('a@b@c'), -+ ('', '') -+ ) -+ self.assertEqual( -+ utils.parseaddr('a@b.c@c'), -+ ('', '') -+ ) -+ self.assertEqual( -+ utils.parseaddr('a@172.17.0.1@c'), -+ ('', '') -+ ) -+ - def test_noquote_dump(self): - self.assertEqual( - utils.formataddr(('A Silly Person', 'person@dom.ain')), -diff --git a/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2019-05-04-13-33-37.bpo-34155.MJll68.rst b/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2019-05-04-13-33-37.bpo-34155.MJll68.rst -new file mode 100644 -index 000000000000..50292e29ed1d ---- /dev/null -+++ b/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2019-05-04-13-33-37.bpo-34155.MJll68.rst -@@ -0,0 +1 @@ -+Fix parsing of invalid email addresses with more than one ``@`` (e.g. a@b@c.com.) to not return the part before 2nd ``@`` as valid email address. Patch by maxking & jpic. diff --git a/system/python3/CVE-2019-16935.patch b/system/python3/CVE-2019-16935.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 567eb90fc..000000000 --- a/system/python3/CVE-2019-16935.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,80 +0,0 @@ -From 1698cacfb924d1df452e78d11a4bf81ae7777389 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Victor Stinner <vstinner@redhat.com> -Date: Sat, 28 Sep 2019 09:33:00 +0200 -Subject: [PATCH] bpo-38243, xmlrpc.server: Escape the server_title (GH-16373) - (GH-16441) - -Escape the server title of xmlrpc.server.DocXMLRPCServer -when rendering the document page as HTML. - -(cherry picked from commit e8650a4f8c7fb76f570d4ca9c1fbe44e91c8dfaa) ---- - Lib/test/test_docxmlrpc.py | 16 ++++++++++++++++ - Lib/xmlrpc/server.py | 3 ++- - .../2019-09-25-13-21-09.bpo-38243.1pfz24.rst | 3 +++ - 3 files changed, 21 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) - create mode 100644 Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2019-09-25-13-21-09.bpo-38243.1pfz24.rst - -diff --git a/Lib/test/test_docxmlrpc.py b/Lib/test/test_docxmlrpc.py -index 00903337c07c2..d2adb21af0fb3 100644 ---- a/Lib/test/test_docxmlrpc.py -+++ b/Lib/test/test_docxmlrpc.py -@@ -1,5 +1,6 @@ - from xmlrpc.server import DocXMLRPCServer - import http.client -+import re - import sys - from test import support - threading = support.import_module('threading') -@@ -193,6 +194,21 @@ def test_annotations(self): - b'method_annotation</strong></a>(x: bytes)</dt></dl>'), - response.read()) - -+ def test_server_title_escape(self): -+ # bpo-38243: Ensure that the server title and documentation -+ # are escaped for HTML. -+ self.serv.set_server_title('test_title<script>') -+ self.serv.set_server_documentation('test_documentation<script>') -+ self.assertEqual('test_title<script>', self.serv.server_title) -+ self.assertEqual('test_documentation<script>', -+ self.serv.server_documentation) -+ -+ generated = self.serv.generate_html_documentation() -+ title = re.search(r'<title>(.+?)</title>', generated).group() -+ documentation = re.search(r'<p><tt>(.+?)</tt></p>', generated).group() -+ self.assertEqual('<title>Python: test_title<script></title>', title) -+ self.assertEqual('<p><tt>test_documentation<script></tt></p>', documentation) -+ - - if __name__ == '__main__': - unittest.main() -diff --git a/Lib/xmlrpc/server.py b/Lib/xmlrpc/server.py -index 3e0dca027f068..efe593748968c 100644 ---- a/Lib/xmlrpc/server.py -+++ b/Lib/xmlrpc/server.py -@@ -106,6 +106,7 @@ def export_add(self, x, y): - - from xmlrpc.client import Fault, dumps, loads, gzip_encode, gzip_decode - from http.server import BaseHTTPRequestHandler -+import html - import http.server - import socketserver - import sys -@@ -904,7 +905,7 @@ def generate_html_documentation(self): - methods - ) - -- return documenter.page(self.server_title, documentation) -+ return documenter.page(html.escape(self.server_title), documentation) - - class DocXMLRPCRequestHandler(SimpleXMLRPCRequestHandler): - """XML-RPC and documentation request handler class. -diff --git a/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2019-09-25-13-21-09.bpo-38243.1pfz24.rst b/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2019-09-25-13-21-09.bpo-38243.1pfz24.rst -new file mode 100644 -index 0000000000000..98d7be129573a ---- /dev/null -+++ b/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2019-09-25-13-21-09.bpo-38243.1pfz24.rst -@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@ -+Escape the server title of :class:`xmlrpc.server.DocXMLRPCServer` -+when rendering the document page as HTML. -+(Contributed by Dong-hee Na in :issue:`38243`.) diff --git a/system/python3/CVE-2019-18348.patch b/system/python3/CVE-2019-18348.patch new file mode 100644 index 000000000..9ebb963a8 --- /dev/null +++ b/system/python3/CVE-2019-18348.patch @@ -0,0 +1,147 @@ +From 83fc70159b24f5b11a5ef87c9b05c2cf4c7faeba Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: "Miss Islington (bot)" + <31488909+miss-islington@users.noreply.github.com> +Date: Sat, 14 Mar 2020 15:35:52 -0700 +Subject: [PATCH] bpo-38576: Disallow control characters in hostnames in + http.client (GH-18995) (GH-19002) + +Add host validation for control characters for more CVE-2019-18348 protection. +(cherry picked from commit 9165addc22d05e776a54319a8531ebd0b2fe01ef) + +Co-authored-by: Ashwin Ramaswami <aramaswamis@gmail.com> +--- + Lib/http/client.py | 10 ++++++ + Lib/test/test_httplib.py | 13 ++++++- + Lib/test/test_urllib.py | 36 +++++++++++++++++-- + .../2020-03-14-14-57-44.bpo-38576.OowwQn.rst | 1 + + 4 files changed, 57 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) + create mode 100644 Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2020-03-14-14-57-44.bpo-38576.OowwQn.rst + +diff --git a/Lib/http/client.py b/Lib/http/client.py +index d4821f1a96e07..c0ac7db6f40a0 100644 +--- a/Lib/http/client.py ++++ b/Lib/http/client.py +@@ -858,6 +858,8 @@ def __init__(self, host, port=None, timeout=socket._GLOBAL_DEFAULT_TIMEOUT, + + (self.host, self.port) = self._get_hostport(host, port) + ++ self._validate_host(self.host) ++ + # This is stored as an instance variable to allow unit + # tests to replace it with a suitable mockup + self._create_connection = socket.create_connection +@@ -1215,6 +1217,14 @@ def _validate_path(self, url): + raise InvalidURL(f"URL can't contain control characters. {url!r} " + f"(found at least {match.group()!r})") + ++ def _validate_host(self, host): ++ """Validate a host so it doesn't contain control characters.""" ++ # Prevent CVE-2019-18348. ++ match = _contains_disallowed_url_pchar_re.search(host) ++ if match: ++ raise InvalidURL(f"URL can't contain control characters. {host!r} " ++ f"(found at least {match.group()!r})") ++ + def putheader(self, header, *values): + """Send a request header line to the server. + +diff --git a/Lib/test/test_httplib.py b/Lib/test/test_httplib.py +index 14d42d483773c..fcd9231666ede 100644 +--- a/Lib/test/test_httplib.py ++++ b/Lib/test/test_httplib.py +@@ -1132,7 +1132,7 @@ def run_server(): + thread.join() + self.assertEqual(result, b"proxied data\n") + +- def test_putrequest_override_validation(self): ++ def test_putrequest_override_domain_validation(self): + """ + It should be possible to override the default validation + behavior in putrequest (bpo-38216). +@@ -1145,6 +1145,17 @@ def _validate_path(self, url): + conn.sock = FakeSocket('') + conn.putrequest('GET', '/\x00') + ++ def test_putrequest_override_host_validation(self): ++ class UnsafeHTTPConnection(client.HTTPConnection): ++ def _validate_host(self, url): ++ pass ++ ++ conn = UnsafeHTTPConnection('example.com\r\n') ++ conn.sock = FakeSocket('') ++ # set skip_host so a ValueError is not raised upon adding the ++ # invalid URL as the value of the "Host:" header ++ conn.putrequest('GET', '/', skip_host=1) ++ + def test_putrequest_override_encoding(self): + """ + It should be possible to override the default encoding +diff --git a/Lib/test/test_urllib.py b/Lib/test/test_urllib.py +index 0061a5297cb35..ddf425fd8d4b5 100644 +--- a/Lib/test/test_urllib.py ++++ b/Lib/test/test_urllib.py +@@ -331,7 +331,7 @@ def test_willclose(self): + self.unfakehttp() + + @unittest.skipUnless(ssl, "ssl module required") +- def test_url_with_control_char_rejected(self): ++ def test_url_path_with_control_char_rejected(self): + for char_no in list(range(0, 0x21)) + [0x7f]: + char = chr(char_no) + schemeless_url = f"//localhost:7777/test{char}/" +@@ -358,7 +358,7 @@ def test_url_with_control_char_rejected(self): + self.unfakehttp() + + @unittest.skipUnless(ssl, "ssl module required") +- def test_url_with_newline_header_injection_rejected(self): ++ def test_url_path_with_newline_header_injection_rejected(self): + self.fakehttp(b"HTTP/1.1 200 OK\r\n\r\nHello.") + host = "localhost:7777?a=1 HTTP/1.1\r\nX-injected: header\r\nTEST: 123" + schemeless_url = "//" + host + ":8080/test/?test=a" +@@ -383,6 +383,38 @@ def test_url_with_newline_header_injection_rejected(self): + finally: + self.unfakehttp() + ++ @unittest.skipUnless(ssl, "ssl module required") ++ def test_url_host_with_control_char_rejected(self): ++ for char_no in list(range(0, 0x21)) + [0x7f]: ++ char = chr(char_no) ++ schemeless_url = f"//localhost{char}/test/" ++ self.fakehttp(b"HTTP/1.1 200 OK\r\n\r\nHello.") ++ try: ++ escaped_char_repr = repr(char).replace('\\', r'\\') ++ InvalidURL = http.client.InvalidURL ++ with self.assertRaisesRegex( ++ InvalidURL, f"contain control.*{escaped_char_repr}"): ++ urlopen(f"http:{schemeless_url}") ++ with self.assertRaisesRegex(InvalidURL, f"contain control.*{escaped_char_repr}"): ++ urlopen(f"https:{schemeless_url}") ++ finally: ++ self.unfakehttp() ++ ++ @unittest.skipUnless(ssl, "ssl module required") ++ def test_url_host_with_newline_header_injection_rejected(self): ++ self.fakehttp(b"HTTP/1.1 200 OK\r\n\r\nHello.") ++ host = "localhost\r\nX-injected: header\r\n" ++ schemeless_url = "//" + host + ":8080/test/?test=a" ++ try: ++ InvalidURL = http.client.InvalidURL ++ with self.assertRaisesRegex( ++ InvalidURL, r"contain control.*\\r"): ++ urlopen(f"http:{schemeless_url}") ++ with self.assertRaisesRegex(InvalidURL, r"contain control.*\\n"): ++ urlopen(f"https:{schemeless_url}") ++ finally: ++ self.unfakehttp() ++ + def test_read_0_9(self): + # "0.9" response accepted (but not "simple responses" without + # a status line) +diff --git a/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2020-03-14-14-57-44.bpo-38576.OowwQn.rst b/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2020-03-14-14-57-44.bpo-38576.OowwQn.rst +new file mode 100644 +index 0000000000000..34b8af28988fa +--- /dev/null ++++ b/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2020-03-14-14-57-44.bpo-38576.OowwQn.rst +@@ -0,0 +1 @@ ++Disallow control characters in hostnames in http.client, addressing CVE-2019-18348. Such potentially malicious header injection URLs now cause a InvalidURL to be raised. +\ No newline at end of file diff --git a/system/sqlite/APKBUILD b/system/sqlite/APKBUILD index 0a3e367c1..e8db13ba0 100644 --- a/system/sqlite/APKBUILD +++ b/system/sqlite/APKBUILD @@ -1,20 +1,37 @@ # Contributor: Łukasz Jendrysik <scadu@yandex.com> # Maintainer: A. Wilcox <awilfox@adelielinux.org> pkgname=sqlite -pkgver=3.30.1 +pkgver=3.31.1 _pkgver=${pkgver%.*}0${pkgver#*.*.}00 _pkgver=${_pkgver%.*}${_pkgver#*.} pkgrel=0 pkgdesc="C library that implements an SQL database engine" url="https://sqlite.org/" arch="all" +options="!check" # Test suite requires tcl - circular dependency license="Public-Domain" depends="" makedepends="libedit-dev zlib-dev" -source="https://sqlite.org/2019/$pkgname-autoconf-$_pkgver.tar.gz" +source="https://sqlite.org/2020/$pkgname-autoconf-$_pkgver.tar.gz" subpackages="$pkgname-doc $pkgname-dev $pkgname-libs" builddir="$srcdir/$pkgname-autoconf-$_pkgver" +# secfixes: +# 3.31.1-r0: +# - CVE-2019-19242 +# - CVE-2019-19244 +# - CVE-2019-19317 +# - CVE-2019-19603 +# - CVE-2019-19645 +# - CVE-2019-19646 +# - CVE-2019-19880 +# - CVE-2019-19923 +# - CVE-2019-19924 +# - CVE-2019-19925 +# - CVE-2019-19926 +# - CVE-2019-19959 +# - CVE-2019-20218 + build() { local _amalgamation="-DSQLITE_ENABLE_FTS4 \ -DSQLITE_ENABLE_FTS3 \ @@ -61,4 +78,4 @@ libs() { mv "$pkgdir"/usr/lib "$subpkgdir"/usr/ } -sha512sums="9ec0283c417fb0323b0e43550af2a49e9a63988e4212c27ea62cc9da3534caa6faf5bdc7e051b6772c4ce61560a433b3d3288b68e05e9ba8495f61a3bcebda3e sqlite-autoconf-3300100.tar.gz" +sha512sums="d85250ba5f78f0c918880f663741709aba662192f04888b2324a0df17affdf5b8540e8428c6c7315119806e7adad758ea281c9b403c0ad94ac6a9bd1b93fd617 sqlite-autoconf-3310100.tar.gz" diff --git a/user/libvncserver/APKBUILD b/user/libvncserver/APKBUILD index 2b42311c2..7058ad208 100644 --- a/user/libvncserver/APKBUILD +++ b/user/libvncserver/APKBUILD @@ -3,7 +3,7 @@ # Maintainer: A. Wilcox <awilfox@adelielinux.org> pkgname=libvncserver pkgver=0.9.12 -pkgrel=0 +pkgrel=1 pkgdesc="Library to make writing a vnc server easy" url="https://libvnc.github.io/" arch="all" @@ -15,7 +15,10 @@ depends_dev="libgcrypt-dev libjpeg-turbo-dev gnutls-dev libpng-dev makedepends="$depends_dev cmake" subpackages="$pkgname-dev" source="https://github.com/LibVNC/libvncserver/archive/LibVNCServer-$pkgver.tar.gz - CVE-2018-15127.patch" + CVE-2018-15127.patch + CVE-2019-15681.patch + CVE-2019-15690.patch + " builddir="$srcdir"/libvncserver-LibVNCServer-$pkgver # secfixes: @@ -24,6 +27,9 @@ builddir="$srcdir"/libvncserver-LibVNCServer-$pkgver # - CVE-2016-9942 # 0.9.12-r0: # - CVE-2018-15127 +# 0.9.12-r1: +# - CVE-2019-15681 +# - CVE-2019-15690 build() { if [ "$CBUILD" != "$CHOST" ]; then @@ -49,4 +55,6 @@ package() { } sha512sums="60ff1cc93a937d6f8f97449bc58b763095846207112f7b1b3c43eb2d74448b595d6da949903a764bd484ee54e38ff6277e882adbe965dd6d26ba15ef6ff6fcb8 LibVNCServer-0.9.12.tar.gz -8b5b6742e6c3a181c60652484b15ec42cc0a3acc1e82cef38e82b61f43f1de456d09731976f4e5dfab44abf3e551e22aaf4300cb8418cd8e136d705fcb2a7dbe CVE-2018-15127.patch" +8b5b6742e6c3a181c60652484b15ec42cc0a3acc1e82cef38e82b61f43f1de456d09731976f4e5dfab44abf3e551e22aaf4300cb8418cd8e136d705fcb2a7dbe CVE-2018-15127.patch +5ecb5a26813f3f07440ef6c54eebaca4e9b4f7c1cf2ba13375e3b23b950a9b818d068d4eef5532d7ea4d7ae084c4356af7257c45426101ff51afe2b7da338a1f CVE-2019-15681.patch +52f62a65c3e91b7c7a11b5ad6e1432d697e1314bf6c938b5cb0c9cc8bdffbf1c25612c33e05282c11d59c6523e208b882f963fca8bcd34a5c72dd476427e7542 CVE-2019-15690.patch" diff --git a/user/libvncserver/CVE-2019-15681.patch b/user/libvncserver/CVE-2019-15681.patch new file mode 100644 index 000000000..e328d8792 --- /dev/null +++ b/user/libvncserver/CVE-2019-15681.patch @@ -0,0 +1,23 @@ +From d01e1bb4246323ba6fcee3b82ef1faa9b1dac82a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Christian Beier <dontmind@freeshell.org> +Date: Mon, 19 Aug 2019 22:32:25 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH] rfbserver: don't leak stack memory to the remote + +Thanks go to Pavel Cheremushkin of Kaspersky for reporting. +--- + libvncserver/rfbserver.c | 2 ++ + 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/libvncserver/rfbserver.c b/libvncserver/rfbserver.c +index 3bacc891..310e5487 100644 +--- a/libvncserver/rfbserver.c ++++ b/libvncserver/rfbserver.c +@@ -3724,6 +3724,8 @@ rfbSendServerCutText(rfbScreenInfoPtr rfbScreen,char *str, int len) + rfbServerCutTextMsg sct; + rfbClientIteratorPtr iterator; + ++ memset((char *)&sct, 0, sizeof(sct)); ++ + iterator = rfbGetClientIterator(rfbScreen); + while ((cl = rfbClientIteratorNext(iterator)) != NULL) { + sct.type = rfbServerCutText; diff --git a/user/libvncserver/CVE-2019-15690.patch b/user/libvncserver/CVE-2019-15690.patch new file mode 100644 index 000000000..7fe36e454 --- /dev/null +++ b/user/libvncserver/CVE-2019-15690.patch @@ -0,0 +1,36 @@ +From 54220248886b5001fbbb9fa73c4e1a2cb9413fed Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Christian Beier <dontmind@freeshell.org> +Date: Sun, 17 Nov 2019 17:18:35 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH] libvncclient/cursor: limit width/height input values + +Avoids a possible heap overflow reported by Pavel Cheremushkin +<Pavel.Cheremushkin@kaspersky.com>. + +re #275 +--- + libvncclient/cursor.c | 5 +++++ + 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/libvncclient/cursor.c b/libvncclient/cursor.c +index 67f45726..40ffb3b0 100644 +--- a/libvncclient/cursor.c ++++ b/libvncclient/cursor.c +@@ -28,6 +28,8 @@ + #define OPER_SAVE 0 + #define OPER_RESTORE 1 + ++#define MAX_CURSOR_SIZE 1024 ++ + #define RGB24_TO_PIXEL(bpp,r,g,b) \ + ((((uint##bpp##_t)(r) & 0xFF) * client->format.redMax + 127) / 255 \ + << client->format.redShift | \ +@@ -54,6 +56,9 @@ rfbBool HandleCursorShape(rfbClient* client,int xhot, int yhot, int width, int h + if (width * height == 0) + return TRUE; + ++ if (width >= MAX_CURSOR_SIZE || height >= MAX_CURSOR_SIZE) ++ return FALSE; ++ + /* Allocate memory for pixel data and temporary mask data. */ + if(client->rcSource) + free(client->rcSource); diff --git a/user/okular/APKBUILD b/user/okular/APKBUILD index f77196bae..4e9567438 100644 --- a/user/okular/APKBUILD +++ b/user/okular/APKBUILD @@ -2,7 +2,7 @@ # Maintainer: A. Wilcox <awilfox@adelielinux.org> pkgname=okular pkgver=19.12.3 -pkgrel=0 +pkgrel=1 pkgdesc="Universal document reader developed by KDE" url="https://okular.kde.org/" arch="all" @@ -18,8 +18,13 @@ makedepends="cmake extra-cmake-modules qt5-qtbase-dev qt5-qtsvg-dev kconfig-dev subpackages="$pkgname-doc $pkgname-lang" source="https://download.kde.org/stable/release-service/$pkgver/src/okular-$pkgver.tar.xz es-doc-fix.patch + CVE-2020-9359.patch " +# secfixes: +# 19.12.3-r1: +# - CVE-2020-9359 + build() { if [ "$CBUILD" != "$CHOST" ]; then CMAKE_CROSSOPTS="-DCMAKE_SYSTEM_NAME=Linux -DCMAKE_HOST_SYSTEM_NAME=Linux" @@ -45,4 +50,5 @@ package() { } sha512sums="ccc3c357fefe04691bba7bc803321789c3a1fdad4cfc610e9c425b2373efd94340fa2ceb2e357569ad14f1c0c69ef0db8079d9bc082a6d5708ccbfb3b65d8b3d okular-19.12.3.tar.xz -de32eabda7ee84c4d894b02c56c7d66d8e2332688c726ad95e1b61c1e730035081ff7721275c7b7a9884aabc268ee0115d9ab8e5f52ae8838e1c09c471c81932 es-doc-fix.patch" +de32eabda7ee84c4d894b02c56c7d66d8e2332688c726ad95e1b61c1e730035081ff7721275c7b7a9884aabc268ee0115d9ab8e5f52ae8838e1c09c471c81932 es-doc-fix.patch +02b27bd206006dbbafbe74e60665ad5159ef6ea32b8bf1526b9c655c046cb6de08630f28d64c9935e73d5707a30d0835f2ab8cd4521740e5236cefc3d3057d29 CVE-2020-9359.patch" diff --git a/user/okular/CVE-2020-9359.patch b/user/okular/CVE-2020-9359.patch new file mode 100644 index 000000000..34ff3e2ce --- /dev/null +++ b/user/okular/CVE-2020-9359.patch @@ -0,0 +1,27 @@ +From 6a93a033b4f9248b3cd4d04689b8391df754e244 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Albert Astals Cid <aacid@kde.org> +Date: Tue, 10 Mar 2020 23:07:24 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH] Document::processAction: If the url points to a binary, don't + run it + +--- + core/document.cpp | 3 ++- + 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) + +diff --git a/core/document.cpp b/core/document.cpp +index 3215a1abc..0aa5b6980 100644 +--- a/core/document.cpp ++++ b/core/document.cpp +@@ -4388,7 +4388,8 @@ void Document::processAction( const Action * action ) + { + const QUrl realUrl = KIO::upUrl(d->m_url).resolved(url); + // KRun autodeletes +- new KRun( realUrl, d->m_widget ); ++ KRun *r = new KRun( realUrl, d->m_widget ); ++ r->setRunExecutables(false); + } + } + } break; +-- +2.25.2 + diff --git a/user/py3-pillow/APKBUILD b/user/py3-pillow/APKBUILD index 8012a6fe2..bb4878256 100644 --- a/user/py3-pillow/APKBUILD +++ b/user/py3-pillow/APKBUILD @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ pkgname=py3-pillow _pkgname=Pillow _p="${_pkgname#?}" _p="${_pkgname%"$_p"}" -pkgver=6.2.1 +pkgver=6.2.2 pkgrel=0 pkgdesc="A Python Imaging Library" url="https://pypi.org/project/Pillow" @@ -20,6 +20,14 @@ source="$pkgname-$pkgver.tar.gz::https://files.pythonhosted.org/packages/source/ https://dev.sick.bike/dist/$pkgname-scripts-$_scripts_rev.tar.gz" builddir="$srcdir/$_pkgname-$pkgver" +# secfixes: pillow +# 6.2.2-r0: +# - CVE-2019-19911 +# - CVE-2020-5310 +# - CVE-2020-5311 +# - CVE-2020-5312 +# - CVE-2020-5313 + unpack() { default_unpack mv pillow-scripts-*/Scripts "$builddir/Scripts" @@ -49,5 +57,5 @@ doc() { install -Dm644 "$builddir"/LICENSE "$subpkgdir/usr/share/licenses/$pkgname/LICENSE" } -sha512sums="757bfdab2ba418195e96e696d2d111de3b38b6bafe4f6f94012f024f59c9bc8542fdab54f643eaf7b2867a9214db806e72eecbdd636bfceb55b47d3164f643ec py3-pillow-6.2.1.tar.gz +sha512sums="517c971d4fb23a47466a7e8326c8c29291f7832d4521001c1898d6223ea25d4b0a8b7c8f7e78dd706f421229a8261b558b9fbdc43e47a0a2a7b2b4bbc1a21eff py3-pillow-6.2.2.tar.gz c01e83a7cef6653a33f60acbcbc737f0d40ff0dbc792ce0b2ce52f21092d3071845830fa0f64b27a1c5e679c53df57e0ec2e89867ee717f938d4e6f19db77790 py3-pillow-scripts-b24479c.tar.gz" diff --git a/user/py3-twisted/APKBUILD b/user/py3-twisted/APKBUILD index 37f2b0976..408081052 100644 --- a/user/py3-twisted/APKBUILD +++ b/user/py3-twisted/APKBUILD @@ -4,18 +4,31 @@ pkgname=py3-twisted _pkgname=Twisted _p="${_pkgname#?}" _p="${_pkgname%"$_p"}" -pkgver=19.7.0 +pkgver=19.10.0 pkgrel=0 pkgdesc="Asynchronous networking framework written in Python" url="https://twistedmatrix.com/" arch="all" +# FIXME: constantly, automat, hyperlink, and PyHamcrest +# also need to be packaged and added to depends= +options="net" license="MIT" -depends="python3 py3-incremental" +depends="python3 py3-attrs py3-incremental py3-zope-interface" makedepends="python3-dev" subpackages="" -source="https://files.pythonhosted.org/packages/source/$_p/$_pkgname/$_pkgname-$pkgver.tar.bz2" +source="https://files.pythonhosted.org/packages/source/$_p/$_pkgname/$_pkgname-$pkgver.tar.bz2 + CVE-2020-10108-and-2020-10109.patch + " builddir="$srcdir/Twisted-$pkgver" +# secfixes: twisted +# 19.10.0-r0: +# - CVE-2019-9512 +# - CVE-2019-9514 +# - CVE-2019-9515 +# - CVE-2020-10108 +# - CVE-2020-10109 + build() { python3 setup.py build } @@ -28,4 +41,5 @@ package() { python3 setup.py install --prefix=/usr --root="$pkgdir" } -sha512sums="46588008f0be63f9ec8cfb88bb81f4268e59e8dead8256c36144b521eb3e58726f4d8c9016b7157365b26929e39a3fa6ff2cc2a9f83e8cfa7f1acc43d31297c4 Twisted-19.7.0.tar.bz2" +sha512sums="de8d7fd0b2081cebeff68b060c8469377011648bc563a94a993d3530fb007ed42c3a54925c9a10c465ee7a3065cc9108ace12d10d358223fab13494becb9ac4b Twisted-19.10.0.tar.bz2 +dcc22af0a72bce5cca3c9f5ee739b17f14275ac8e776c658743746239c793ad9585fb0333203945912fd4994bd001b7244905562c4389304a707a2a4430faa40 CVE-2020-10108-and-2020-10109.patch" diff --git a/user/py3-twisted/CVE-2020-10108-and-2020-10109.patch b/user/py3-twisted/CVE-2020-10108-and-2020-10109.patch new file mode 100644 index 000000000..9a58f5584 --- /dev/null +++ b/user/py3-twisted/CVE-2020-10108-and-2020-10109.patch @@ -0,0 +1,260 @@ +From 4a7d22e490bb8ff836892cc99a1f54b85ccb0281 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Mark Williams <mrw@enotuniq.org> +Date: Sun, 16 Feb 2020 19:00:10 -0800 +Subject: [PATCH] Fix several request smuggling attacks. + +1. Requests with multiple Content-Length headers were allowed (thanks +to Jake Miller from Bishop Fox and ZeddYu Lu) and now fail with a 400; + +2. Requests with a Content-Length header and a Transfer-Encoding +header honored the first header (thanks to Jake Miller from Bishop +Fox) and now fail with a 400; + +3. Requests whose Transfer-Encoding header had a value other than +"chunked" and "identity" (thanks to ZeddYu Lu) were allowed and now fail +with a 400. +--- + src/twisted/web/http.py | 64 +++++++--- + src/twisted/web/newsfragments/9770.bugfix | 1 + + src/twisted/web/test/test_http.py | 137 ++++++++++++++++++++++ + 3 files changed, 187 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-) + create mode 100644 src/twisted/web/newsfragments/9770.bugfix + +diff --git a/src/twisted/web/http.py b/src/twisted/web/http.py +index f0fb05b4d69..06d830fe30f 100644 +--- a/src/twisted/web/http.py ++++ b/src/twisted/web/http.py +@@ -2171,6 +2171,51 @@ def _finishRequestBody(self, data): + self.allContentReceived() + self._dataBuffer.append(data) + ++ def _maybeChooseTransferDecoder(self, header, data): ++ """ ++ If the provided header is C{content-length} or ++ C{transfer-encoding}, choose the appropriate decoder if any. ++ ++ Returns L{True} if the request can proceed and L{False} if not. ++ """ ++ ++ def fail(): ++ self._respondToBadRequestAndDisconnect() ++ self.length = None ++ ++ # Can this header determine the length? ++ if header == b'content-length': ++ try: ++ length = int(data) ++ except ValueError: ++ fail() ++ return False ++ newTransferDecoder = _IdentityTransferDecoder( ++ length, self.requests[-1].handleContentChunk, self._finishRequestBody) ++ elif header == b'transfer-encoding': ++ # XXX Rather poorly tested code block, apparently only exercised by ++ # test_chunkedEncoding ++ if data.lower() == b'chunked': ++ length = None ++ newTransferDecoder = _ChunkedTransferDecoder( ++ self.requests[-1].handleContentChunk, self._finishRequestBody) ++ elif data.lower() == b'identity': ++ return True ++ else: ++ fail() ++ return False ++ else: ++ # It's not a length related header, so exit ++ return True ++ ++ if self._transferDecoder is not None: ++ fail() ++ return False ++ else: ++ self.length = length ++ self._transferDecoder = newTransferDecoder ++ return True ++ + + def headerReceived(self, line): + """ +@@ -2196,21 +2241,10 @@ def headerReceived(self, line): + + header = header.lower() + data = data.strip() +- if header == b'content-length': +- try: +- self.length = int(data) +- except ValueError: +- self._respondToBadRequestAndDisconnect() +- self.length = None +- return False +- self._transferDecoder = _IdentityTransferDecoder( +- self.length, self.requests[-1].handleContentChunk, self._finishRequestBody) +- elif header == b'transfer-encoding' and data.lower() == b'chunked': +- # XXX Rather poorly tested code block, apparently only exercised by +- # test_chunkedEncoding +- self.length = None +- self._transferDecoder = _ChunkedTransferDecoder( +- self.requests[-1].handleContentChunk, self._finishRequestBody) ++ ++ if not self._maybeChooseTransferDecoder(header, data): ++ return False ++ + reqHeaders = self.requests[-1].requestHeaders + values = reqHeaders.getRawHeaders(header) + if values is not None: +diff --git a/src/twisted/web/newsfragments/9770.bugfix b/src/twisted/web/newsfragments/9770.bugfix +new file mode 100644 +index 00000000000..4f1be97de8a +--- /dev/null ++++ b/src/twisted/web/newsfragments/9770.bugfix +@@ -0,0 +1 @@ ++Fix several request smuggling attacks: requests with multiple Content-Length headers were allowed (thanks to Jake Miller from Bishop Fox and ZeddYu Lu) and now fail with a 400; requests with a Content-Length header and a Transfer-Encoding header honored the first header (thanks to Jake Miller from Bishop Fox) and now fail with a 400; requests whose Transfer-Encoding header had a value other than "chunked" and "identity" (thanks to ZeddYu Lu) were allowed and now fail a 400. +\ No newline at end of file +diff --git a/src/twisted/web/test/test_http.py b/src/twisted/web/test/test_http.py +index 0a0db09b750..578cb500cda 100644 +--- a/src/twisted/web/test/test_http.py ++++ b/src/twisted/web/test/test_http.py +@@ -2252,6 +2252,143 @@ def process(self): + self.flushLoggedErrors(AttributeError) + + ++ def assertDisconnectingBadRequest(self, request): ++ """ ++ Assert that the given request bytes fail with a 400 bad ++ request without calling L{Request.process}. ++ ++ @param request: A raw HTTP request ++ @type request: L{bytes} ++ """ ++ class FailedRequest(http.Request): ++ processed = False ++ def process(self): ++ FailedRequest.processed = True ++ ++ channel = self.runRequest(request, FailedRequest, success=False) ++ self.assertFalse(FailedRequest.processed, "Request.process called") ++ self.assertEqual( ++ channel.transport.value(), ++ b"HTTP/1.1 400 Bad Request\r\n\r\n") ++ self.assertTrue(channel.transport.disconnecting) ++ ++ ++ def test_duplicateContentLengths(self): ++ """ ++ A request which includes multiple C{content-length} headers ++ fails with a 400 response without calling L{Request.process}. ++ """ ++ self.assertRequestRejected([ ++ b'GET /a HTTP/1.1', ++ b'Content-Length: 56', ++ b'Content-Length: 0', ++ b'Host: host.invalid', ++ b'', ++ b'', ++ ]) ++ ++ ++ def test_duplicateContentLengthsWithPipelinedRequests(self): ++ """ ++ Two pipelined requests, the first of which includes multiple ++ C{content-length} headers, trigger a 400 response without ++ calling L{Request.process}. ++ """ ++ self.assertRequestRejected([ ++ b'GET /a HTTP/1.1', ++ b'Content-Length: 56', ++ b'Content-Length: 0', ++ b'Host: host.invalid', ++ b'', ++ b'', ++ b'GET /a HTTP/1.1', ++ b'Host: host.invalid', ++ b'', ++ b'', ++ ]) ++ ++ ++ def test_contentLengthAndTransferEncoding(self): ++ """ ++ A request that includes both C{content-length} and ++ C{transfer-encoding} headers fails with a 400 response without ++ calling L{Request.process}. ++ """ ++ self.assertRequestRejected([ ++ b'GET /a HTTP/1.1', ++ b'Transfer-Encoding: chunked', ++ b'Content-Length: 0', ++ b'Host: host.invalid', ++ b'', ++ b'', ++ ]) ++ ++ ++ def test_contentLengthAndTransferEncodingWithPipelinedRequests(self): ++ """ ++ Two pipelined requests, the first of which includes both ++ C{content-length} and C{transfer-encoding} headers, triggers a ++ 400 response without calling L{Request.process}. ++ """ ++ self.assertRequestRejected([ ++ b'GET /a HTTP/1.1', ++ b'Transfer-Encoding: chunked', ++ b'Content-Length: 0', ++ b'Host: host.invalid', ++ b'', ++ b'', ++ b'GET /a HTTP/1.1', ++ b'Host: host.invalid', ++ b'', ++ b'', ++ ]) ++ ++ ++ def test_unknownTransferEncoding(self): ++ """ ++ A request whose C{transfer-encoding} header includes a value ++ other than C{chunked} or C{identity} fails with a 400 response ++ without calling L{Request.process}. ++ """ ++ self.assertRequestRejected([ ++ b'GET /a HTTP/1.1', ++ b'Transfer-Encoding: unknown', ++ b'Host: host.invalid', ++ b'', ++ b'', ++ ]) ++ ++ ++ def test_transferEncodingIdentity(self): ++ """ ++ A request with a valid C{content-length} and a ++ C{transfer-encoding} whose value is C{identity} succeeds. ++ """ ++ body = [] ++ ++ class SuccessfulRequest(http.Request): ++ processed = False ++ def process(self): ++ body.append(self.content.read()) ++ self.setHeader(b'content-length', b'0') ++ self.finish() ++ ++ request = b'''\ ++GET / HTTP/1.1 ++Host: host.invalid ++Content-Length: 2 ++Transfer-Encoding: identity ++ ++ok ++''' ++ channel = self.runRequest(request, SuccessfulRequest, False) ++ self.assertEqual(body, [b'ok']) ++ self.assertEqual( ++ channel.transport.value(), ++ b'HTTP/1.1 200 OK\r\nContent-Length: 0\r\n\r\n', ++ ) ++ ++ + + class QueryArgumentsTests(unittest.TestCase): + def testParseqs(self): diff --git a/user/sox/APKBUILD b/user/sox/APKBUILD index 31a5d4b1e..8e9fe9934 100644 --- a/user/sox/APKBUILD +++ b/user/sox/APKBUILD @@ -2,7 +2,7 @@ # Maintainer: pkgname=sox pkgver=14.4.2 -pkgrel=1 +pkgrel=2 pkgdesc="Convert between various audio formats" url="http://sox.sourceforge.net/" arch="all" @@ -15,10 +15,38 @@ makedepends="alsa-lib-dev ffmpeg-dev file-dev flac-dev gsm-dev lame-dev depends="" subpackages="$pkgname-dev $pkgname-doc" source="https://downloads.sourceforge.net/sourceforge/$pkgname/$pkgname-$pkgver.tar.gz + CVE-2017-11332.patch + CVE-2017-11358.patch + CVE-2017-11359.patch + CVE-2017-15370.patch + CVE-2017-15371.patch + CVE-2017-15372.patch + CVE-2017-15642.patch + CVE-2017-18189.patch + CVE-2019-13590.patch + CVE-2019-8354.patch + CVE-2019-8355.patch + CVE-2019-8356.patch + CVE-2019-8357.patch disable-pipe-file-detection.patch - sox-dynamic.patch " +# secfixes: +# 14.4.2-r2: +# - CVE-2017-11332 +# - CVE-2017-11358 +# - CVE-2017-11359 +# - CVE-2017-15370 +# - CVE-2017-15371 +# - CVE-2017-15372 +# - CVE-2017-15642 +# - CVE-2017-18189 +# - CVE-2019-13590 +# - CVE-2019-8354 +# - CVE-2019-8355 +# - CVE-2019-8356 +# - CVE-2019-8357 + prepare() { default_prepare autoreconf -vif @@ -43,5 +71,17 @@ package() { } sha512sums="b5c6203f4f5577503a034fe5b3d6a033ee97fe4d171c533933e2b036118a43a14f97c9668433229708609ccf9ee16abdeca3fc7501aa0aafe06baacbba537eca sox-14.4.2.tar.gz -eb90574a7c174a32ac77aa09a2bb4ebbea407463517e55943e16efd8b7c52393c6b7a6b2778d696f708627271f4d2212221a85fc50d2500b32143139a37a957a disable-pipe-file-detection.patch -3950834db26faa0523006c6fd8e0769d080518f127d345c8ec9bf53e9db8a6bd67cd724f0f86492aaf9ce6ede2dfbde167049768f35c14ef3c2b96e7e00302b6 sox-dynamic.patch" +b4bded0b15a2243fbb404a33fccf45ad5634d6c6e0f60b49b967592f00ff9bc3657ebcfa42b18a5af804e7f04a700773bece5951739b8206b2c68c46c9ec4c7f CVE-2017-11332.patch +28ffd5eef149563a1cdfcd920a89a0e2247ddbf4ed10a76c4e34ee57e3a30ec3a98bacf53fe1675da1431dd40c30b13cae0b9a1e26153c1aad6144322b7d78b0 CVE-2017-11358.patch +2c95d85f94877bf1637d2c1297944a77a8854506cad35b1c0d632237133cd970da82cded817696b19acde25b0e570f4c86659cc362a910e4ea76a037e3e56214 CVE-2017-11359.patch +bcbfd0785751372cd959a7419d88af24bb041dd02d3d0cf2f0dab46b6f6b55f284c1d823d20e5a0eae15191f3ccb2eefa2026287fdfbecb064722b006970ee00 CVE-2017-15370.patch +b116887f52eb4b70de9dda5f14e581579c4c1755c39100d88c4b8645bf9e053cfe87de3346eb138edc45fd2c36f0e1755f91e09511d279fe6d4661099c578420 CVE-2017-15371.patch +f8a4d38cfad80a50b9c758b222d83f6b51d96f1491862680e1632eec2a5c2a7c6f968660307f0f403e0b7537f7da19a510945648bdef8f1302fd4683be869581 CVE-2017-15372.patch +259980ea6fe08a2481a478a4a21b11a7fc4390b1b53023009d85fb2185ee63c42d2762e024af20912e7277688fac98e4eaa66b4a4e79840517ff2481ad50327e CVE-2017-15642.patch +de510114a9fbbbabe62149f3c22ebd1fae65ed68e6ed0b818f367bbee806c9e04be6db0c8e64f4985b7bd95dd0cc643e1475767fda4e405931f25104b4a2e39f CVE-2017-18189.patch +eab27e22035bdbe00d0dc4117f98bf9c5dcad4513a27e0e8a83506b94fca8055bc6ce532d24306aa8434942bef111b3511daf260df56fafb7b4ac5ed2075e3f7 CVE-2019-13590.patch +61342fad71dbe7f0ff10a7327eeed901c0defd5aafaace4ac755032ccf687d875856490c30f2af050823fd6ff1a1c7f503ae26670225eab916ab59fa857a8cb3 CVE-2019-8354.patch +3f05ab71680a67c9e8a4b33c70cb19a623f0925a2620ab007dc8d4a82caf5b73b50e3e5d40e242d6f65420d444b91e11bee09e4398e8079ca4af60bd34097593 CVE-2019-8355.patch +6eca5096c658a61939902a70d218b5662b663df84173d09d5b23f497bdcb81c04cd94d8debed2818079c342cec80ec29ff33d572611826bdbc12a5d465a20241 CVE-2019-8356.patch +82fbbf62a7124248ce74cf0daab0cd224a3da80e62923db58b8be31c4f145abe0e653f6968d0f6b862e5554d080d0f85b0bc0bcdb6dea34c130aa4ee9106d915 CVE-2019-8357.patch +eb90574a7c174a32ac77aa09a2bb4ebbea407463517e55943e16efd8b7c52393c6b7a6b2778d696f708627271f4d2212221a85fc50d2500b32143139a37a957a disable-pipe-file-detection.patch" diff --git a/user/sox/CVE-2017-11332.patch b/user/sox/CVE-2017-11332.patch new file mode 100644 index 000000000..511049d8e --- /dev/null +++ b/user/sox/CVE-2017-11332.patch @@ -0,0 +1,28 @@ +From 6e177c455fb554327ff8125b6e6dde1568610abe Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Mans Rullgard <mans@mansr.com> +Date: Sun, 5 Nov 2017 16:29:28 +0000 +Subject: [PATCH] wav: fix crash if channel count is zero (CVE-2017-11332) + +--- + src/wav.c | 5 +++++ + 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/src/wav.c b/src/wav.c +index 5202556c..71fd52ac 100644 +--- a/src/wav.c ++++ b/src/wav.c +@@ -712,6 +712,11 @@ static int startread(sox_format_t * ft) + else + lsx_report("User options overriding channels read in .wav header"); + ++ if (ft->signal.channels == 0) { ++ lsx_fail_errno(ft, SOX_EHDR, "Channel count is zero"); ++ return SOX_EOF; ++ } ++ + if (ft->signal.rate == 0 || ft->signal.rate == dwSamplesPerSecond) + ft->signal.rate = dwSamplesPerSecond; + else +-- +2.25.0 + diff --git a/user/sox/CVE-2017-11358.patch b/user/sox/CVE-2017-11358.patch new file mode 100644 index 000000000..4fadeda30 --- /dev/null +++ b/user/sox/CVE-2017-11358.patch @@ -0,0 +1,44 @@ +From e410d00c4821726accfbe1f825f2def6376e181f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Mans Rullgard <mans@mansr.com> +Date: Sun, 5 Nov 2017 16:43:35 +0000 +Subject: [PATCH] hcom: fix crash on input with corrupt dictionary + (CVE-2017-11358) + +--- + src/hcom.c | 13 +++++++++++++ + 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/src/hcom.c b/src/hcom.c +index e76820e9..be17d9d2 100644 +--- a/src/hcom.c ++++ b/src/hcom.c +@@ -73,6 +73,14 @@ typedef struct { + size_t pos; /* Where next byte goes */ + } priv_t; + ++static int dictvalid(int n, int size, int left, int right) ++{ ++ if (n > 0 && left < 0) ++ return 1; ++ ++ return (unsigned)left < size && (unsigned)right < size; ++} ++ + static int startread(sox_format_t * ft) + { + priv_t *p = (priv_t *) ft->priv; +@@ -150,6 +158,11 @@ static int startread(sox_format_t * ft) + lsx_debug("%d %d", + p->dictionary[i].dict_leftson, + p->dictionary[i].dict_rightson); ++ if (!dictvalid(i, dictsize, p->dictionary[i].dict_leftson, ++ p->dictionary[i].dict_rightson)) { ++ lsx_fail_errno(ft, SOX_EHDR, "Invalid dictionary"); ++ return SOX_EOF; ++ } + } + rc = lsx_skipbytes(ft, (size_t) 1); /* skip pad byte */ + if (rc) +-- +2.25.0 + diff --git a/user/sox/CVE-2017-11359.patch b/user/sox/CVE-2017-11359.patch new file mode 100644 index 000000000..cb96c4a71 --- /dev/null +++ b/user/sox/CVE-2017-11359.patch @@ -0,0 +1,30 @@ +From 7b3f30e13e4845bafc93215a372c6eb7dcf04118 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Mans Rullgard <mans@mansr.com> +Date: Sun, 5 Nov 2017 17:02:11 +0000 +Subject: [PATCH] wav: fix crash writing header when channel count >64k + (CVE-2017-11359) + +--- + src/wav.c | 6 ++++++ + 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/src/wav.c b/src/wav.c +index 71fd52ac..eca1cde5 100644 +--- a/src/wav.c ++++ b/src/wav.c +@@ -1379,6 +1379,12 @@ static int wavwritehdr(sox_format_t * ft, int second_header) + long blocksWritten = 0; + sox_bool isExtensible = sox_false; /* WAVE_FORMAT_EXTENSIBLE? */ + ++ if (ft->signal.channels > UINT16_MAX) { ++ lsx_fail_errno(ft, SOX_EOF, "Too many channels (%u)", ++ ft->signal.channels); ++ return SOX_EOF; ++ } ++ + dwSamplesPerSecond = ft->signal.rate; + wChannels = ft->signal.channels; + wBitsPerSample = ft->encoding.bits_per_sample; +-- +2.25.0 + diff --git a/user/sox/CVE-2017-15370.patch b/user/sox/CVE-2017-15370.patch new file mode 100644 index 000000000..9e6a7f7ee --- /dev/null +++ b/user/sox/CVE-2017-15370.patch @@ -0,0 +1,28 @@ +From e076a7ad504add6e8c3b8699e8587eef0e0d9bc3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Mans Rullgard <mans@mansr.com> +Date: Sun, 5 Nov 2017 16:21:23 +0000 +Subject: [PATCH] wav: ima_adpcm: fix buffer overflow on corrupt input + (CVE-2017-15370) + +Add the same check bad block size as was done for MS adpcm in commit +f39c574b ("More checks for invalid MS ADPCM blocks"). +--- + src/wav.c | 2 +- + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) + +diff --git a/src/wav.c b/src/wav.c +index eca1cde5..fad334cf 100644 +--- a/src/wav.c ++++ b/src/wav.c +@@ -127,7 +127,7 @@ static unsigned short ImaAdpcmReadBlock(sox_format_t * ft) + /* work with partial blocks. Specs say it should be null */ + /* padded but I guess this is better than trailing quiet. */ + samplesThisBlock = lsx_ima_samples_in((size_t)0, (size_t)ft->signal.channels, bytesRead, (size_t) 0); +- if (samplesThisBlock == 0) ++ if (samplesThisBlock == 0 || samplesThisBlock > wav->samplesPerBlock) + { + lsx_warn("Premature EOF on .wav input file"); + return 0; +-- +2.25.0 + diff --git a/user/sox/CVE-2017-15371.patch b/user/sox/CVE-2017-15371.patch new file mode 100644 index 000000000..7b38943f2 --- /dev/null +++ b/user/sox/CVE-2017-15371.patch @@ -0,0 +1,40 @@ +From 968c689ad2c4269a1a853434d99aa7ebf0c01354 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Mans Rullgard <mans@mansr.com> +Date: Sun, 5 Nov 2017 15:57:48 +0000 +Subject: [PATCH] flac: fix crash on corrupt metadata (CVE-2017-15371) + +--- + src/flac.c | 8 +++++--- + 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/src/flac.c b/src/flac.c +index 0d7829ec..07f45c1b 100644 +--- a/src/flac.c ++++ b/src/flac.c +@@ -119,9 +119,10 @@ static void decoder_metadata_callback(FLAC__StreamDecoder const * const flac, FL + p->total_samples = metadata->data.stream_info.total_samples; + } + else if (metadata->type == FLAC__METADATA_TYPE_VORBIS_COMMENT) { ++ const FLAC__StreamMetadata_VorbisComment *vc = &metadata->data.vorbis_comment; + size_t i; + +- if (metadata->data.vorbis_comment.num_comments == 0) ++ if (vc->num_comments == 0) + return; + + if (ft->oob.comments != NULL) { +@@ -129,8 +130,9 @@ static void decoder_metadata_callback(FLAC__StreamDecoder const * const flac, FL + return; + } + +- for (i = 0; i < metadata->data.vorbis_comment.num_comments; ++i) +- sox_append_comment(&ft->oob.comments, (char const *) metadata->data.vorbis_comment.comments[i].entry); ++ for (i = 0; i < vc->num_comments; ++i) ++ if (vc->comments[i].entry) ++ sox_append_comment(&ft->oob.comments, (char const *) vc->comments[i].entry); + } + } + +-- +2.25.0 + diff --git a/user/sox/CVE-2017-15372.patch b/user/sox/CVE-2017-15372.patch new file mode 100644 index 000000000..dd7fcff5d --- /dev/null +++ b/user/sox/CVE-2017-15372.patch @@ -0,0 +1,100 @@ +From 515b986139183326cc40c67c75f83edc60826a9e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Mans Rullgard <mans@mansr.com> +Date: Wed, 8 Nov 2017 00:27:46 +0000 +Subject: [PATCH] adpcm: fix stack overflow with >4 channels (CVE-2017-15372) + +--- + src/adpcm.c | 8 +++++++- + src/adpcm.h | 3 +++ + src/wav.c | 5 ++++- + 3 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/src/adpcm.c b/src/adpcm.c +index 2e13867e..f64b7d5c 100644 +--- a/src/adpcm.c ++++ b/src/adpcm.c +@@ -71,6 +71,11 @@ const short lsx_ms_adpcm_i_coef[7][2] = { + { 392,-232} + }; + ++extern void *lsx_ms_adpcm_alloc(unsigned chans) ++{ ++ return lsx_malloc(chans * sizeof(MsState_t)); ++} ++ + static inline sox_sample_t AdpcmDecode(sox_sample_t c, MsState_t *state, + sox_sample_t sample1, sox_sample_t sample2) + { +@@ -102,6 +107,7 @@ static inline sox_sample_t AdpcmDecode(sox_sample_t c, MsState_t *state, + + /* lsx_ms_adpcm_block_expand_i() outputs interleaved samples into one output buffer */ + const char *lsx_ms_adpcm_block_expand_i( ++ void *priv, + unsigned chans, /* total channels */ + int nCoef, + const short *coef, +@@ -113,7 +119,7 @@ const char *lsx_ms_adpcm_block_expand_i( + const unsigned char *ip; + unsigned ch; + const char *errmsg = NULL; +- MsState_t state[4]; /* One decompressor state for each channel */ ++ MsState_t *state = priv; /* One decompressor state for each channel */ + + /* Read the four-byte header for each channel */ + ip = ibuff; +diff --git a/src/adpcm.h b/src/adpcm.h +index af4d6f08..db5cc615 100644 +--- a/src/adpcm.h ++++ b/src/adpcm.h +@@ -29,8 +29,11 @@ + /* default coef sets */ + extern const short lsx_ms_adpcm_i_coef[7][2]; + ++extern void *lsx_ms_adpcm_alloc(unsigned chans); ++ + /* lsx_ms_adpcm_block_expand_i() outputs interleaved samples into one output buffer */ + extern const char *lsx_ms_adpcm_block_expand_i( ++ void *priv, + unsigned chans, /* total channels */ + int nCoef, + const short *coef, +diff --git a/src/wav.c b/src/wav.c +index fad334cf..066be6d7 100644 +--- a/src/wav.c ++++ b/src/wav.c +@@ -82,6 +82,7 @@ typedef struct { + /* following used by *ADPCM wav files */ + unsigned short nCoefs; /* ADPCM: number of coef sets */ + short *lsx_ms_adpcm_i_coefs; /* ADPCM: coef sets */ ++ void *ms_adpcm_data; /* Private data of adpcm decoder */ + unsigned char *packet; /* Temporary buffer for packets */ + short *samples; /* interleaved samples buffer */ + short *samplePtr; /* Pointer to current sample */ +@@ -175,7 +176,7 @@ static unsigned short AdpcmReadBlock(sox_format_t * ft) + } + } + +- errmsg = lsx_ms_adpcm_block_expand_i(ft->signal.channels, wav->nCoefs, wav->lsx_ms_adpcm_i_coefs, wav->packet, wav->samples, samplesThisBlock); ++ errmsg = lsx_ms_adpcm_block_expand_i(wav->ms_adpcm_data, ft->signal.channels, wav->nCoefs, wav->lsx_ms_adpcm_i_coefs, wav->packet, wav->samples, samplesThisBlock); + + if (errmsg) + lsx_warn("%s", errmsg); +@@ -791,6 +792,7 @@ static int startread(sox_format_t * ft) + + /* nCoefs, lsx_ms_adpcm_i_coefs used by adpcm.c */ + wav->lsx_ms_adpcm_i_coefs = lsx_malloc(wav->nCoefs * 2 * sizeof(short)); ++ wav->ms_adpcm_data = lsx_ms_adpcm_alloc(wChannels); + { + int i, errct=0; + for (i=0; len>=2 && i < 2*wav->nCoefs; i++) { +@@ -1216,6 +1218,7 @@ static int stopread(sox_format_t * ft) + free(wav->packet); + free(wav->samples); + free(wav->lsx_ms_adpcm_i_coefs); ++ free(wav->ms_adpcm_data); + free(wav->comment); + wav->comment = NULL; + +-- +2.25.0 + diff --git a/user/sox/CVE-2017-15642.patch b/user/sox/CVE-2017-15642.patch new file mode 100644 index 000000000..95beb4f6f --- /dev/null +++ b/user/sox/CVE-2017-15642.patch @@ -0,0 +1,34 @@ +From f56c0dbca8f5bd02ea88970c248c0d087386e807 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Mans Rullgard <mans@mansr.com> +Date: Mon, 20 Nov 2017 11:03:15 +0000 +Subject: [PATCH] aiff: fix crash on empty comment chunk (CVE-2017-15642) + +This fixes a use after free and double free if an empty comment +chunk follows a non-empty one. +--- + src/aiff.c | 2 +- + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) + +diff --git a/src/aiff.c b/src/aiff.c +index 240d2e1f..11ddb542 100644 +--- a/src/aiff.c ++++ b/src/aiff.c +@@ -62,7 +62,6 @@ int lsx_aiffstartread(sox_format_t * ft) + size_t ssndsize = 0; + char *annotation; + char *author; +- char *comment = NULL; + char *copyright; + char *nametext; + +@@ -270,6 +269,7 @@ int lsx_aiffstartread(sox_format_t * ft) + free(annotation); + } + else if (strncmp(buf, "COMT", (size_t)4) == 0) { ++ char *comment = NULL; + rc = commentChunk(&comment, "Comment:", ft); + if (rc) { + /* Fail already called in function */ +-- +2.25.0 + diff --git a/user/sox/CVE-2017-18189.patch b/user/sox/CVE-2017-18189.patch new file mode 100644 index 000000000..aa3791d01 --- /dev/null +++ b/user/sox/CVE-2017-18189.patch @@ -0,0 +1,33 @@ +From 09d7388c8ad5701ed9c59d1d600ff6154b066397 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Mans Rullgard <mans@mansr.com> +Date: Thu, 9 Nov 2017 11:45:10 +0000 +Subject: [PATCH] xa: validate channel count (CVE-2017-18189) + +A corrupt header specifying zero channels would send read_channels() +into an infinite loop. Prevent this by sanity checking the channel +count in open_read(). Also add an upper bound to prevent overflow +in multiplication. +--- + src/xa.c | 6 ++++++ + 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/src/xa.c b/src/xa.c +index 81a76772..9fc086ec 100644 +--- a/src/xa.c ++++ b/src/xa.c +@@ -143,6 +143,12 @@ static int startread(sox_format_t * ft) + lsx_report("User options overriding rate read in .xa header"); + } + ++ if (ft->signal.channels == 0 || ft->signal.channels > UINT16_MAX) { ++ lsx_fail_errno(ft, SOX_EFMT, "invalid channel count %d", ++ ft->signal.channels); ++ return SOX_EOF; ++ } ++ + /* Check for supported formats */ + if (ft->encoding.bits_per_sample != 16) { + lsx_fail_errno(ft, SOX_EFMT, "%d-bit sample resolution not supported.", +-- +2.25.0 + diff --git a/user/sox/CVE-2019-13590.patch b/user/sox/CVE-2019-13590.patch new file mode 100644 index 000000000..a09b11bae --- /dev/null +++ b/user/sox/CVE-2019-13590.patch @@ -0,0 +1,33 @@ +From 7b6a889217d62ed7e28188621403cc7542fd1f7e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Mans Rullgard <mans@mansr.com> +Date: Tue, 4 Feb 2020 12:55:18 +0000 +Subject: [PATCH] sox-fmt: validate comments_bytes before use (CVE-2019-13590) + [bug #325] + +Cap the comments size to 1 GB to avoid overflows in subsequent +arithmetic. + +The missing null check mentioned in the bug report is bogus since +lsx_calloc() returns a valid pointer or aborts. +--- + src/sox-fmt.c | 4 +++- + 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) + +diff --git a/src/sox-fmt.c b/src/sox-fmt.c +index aad965cd..11c88771 100644 +--- a/src/sox-fmt.c ++++ b/src/sox-fmt.c +@@ -46,7 +46,9 @@ static int startread(sox_format_t * ft) + lsx_readdw(ft, &comments_bytes)) + return SOX_EOF; + +- if (((headers_bytes + 4) & 7) || headers_bytes < FIXED_HDR + comments_bytes || ++ if (((headers_bytes + 4) & 7) || ++ comments_bytes > 0x40000000 || /* max 1 GB */ ++ headers_bytes < FIXED_HDR + comments_bytes || + (num_channels > 65535)) /* Reserve top 16 bits */ { + lsx_fail_errno(ft, SOX_EHDR, "invalid sox file format header"); + return SOX_EOF; +-- +2.25.0 + diff --git a/user/sox/CVE-2019-8354.patch b/user/sox/CVE-2019-8354.patch new file mode 100644 index 000000000..1fa0e669f --- /dev/null +++ b/user/sox/CVE-2019-8354.patch @@ -0,0 +1,28 @@ +From f70911261a84333b077c29908e1242f69d7439eb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Mans Rullgard <mans@mansr.com> +Date: Wed, 24 Apr 2019 14:57:34 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH] fix possible buffer size overflow in lsx_make_lpf() + (CVE-2019-8354) + +The multiplication in the size argument malloc() might overflow, +resulting in a small buffer being allocated. Use calloc() instead. +--- + src/effects_i_dsp.c | 2 +- + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) + +diff --git a/src/effects_i_dsp.c b/src/effects_i_dsp.c +index a979b501..e32dfa05 100644 +--- a/src/effects_i_dsp.c ++++ b/src/effects_i_dsp.c +@@ -357,7 +357,7 @@ double * lsx_make_lpf(int num_taps, double Fc, double beta, double rho, + double scale, sox_bool dc_norm) + { + int i, m = num_taps - 1; +- double * h = malloc(num_taps * sizeof(*h)), sum = 0; ++ double * h = calloc(num_taps, sizeof(*h)), sum = 0; + double mult = scale / lsx_bessel_I_0(beta), mult1 = 1 / (.5 * m + rho); + assert(Fc >= 0 && Fc <= 1); + lsx_debug("make_lpf(n=%i Fc=%.7g β=%g ρ=%g dc-norm=%i scale=%g)", num_taps, Fc, beta, rho, dc_norm, scale); +-- +2.25.0 + diff --git a/user/sox/CVE-2019-8355.patch b/user/sox/CVE-2019-8355.patch new file mode 100644 index 000000000..d4d8cb808 --- /dev/null +++ b/user/sox/CVE-2019-8355.patch @@ -0,0 +1,59 @@ +Backport of the following: + +From ec073861aa9c0f779a3741c456e4f97d59366ffb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Mans Rullgard <mans@mansr.com> +Date: Sun, 5 Nov 2017 15:40:16 +0000 +Subject: [PATCH] make: update exported symbol list [bug #266] + +From f8587e2d50dad72d40453ac1191c539ee9e50381 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Mans Rullgard <mans@mansr.com> +Date: Wed, 24 Apr 2019 17:39:45 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH] fix possible overflow in lsx_(re)valloc() size calculation + (CVE-2019-8355) + +--- a/src/Makefile.am ++++ b/src/Makefile.am +@@ -95,7 +95,7 @@ libsox_la_LIBADD += @GOMP_LIBS@ + + libsox_la_CFLAGS = @WARN_CFLAGS@ + libsox_la_LDFLAGS = @APP_LDFLAGS@ -version-info @SHLIB_VERSION@ \ +- -export-symbols-regex '^(sox_.*|lsx_(check_read_params|(close|open)_dllibrary|(debug(_more|_most)?|fail|report|warn)_impl|eof|fail_errno|filelength|find_(enum_(text|value)|file_extension)|getopt(_init)?|lpc10_(create_(de|en)coder_state|(de|en)code)|raw(read|write)|read(_b_buf|buf|chars)|realloc|rewind|seeki|sigfigs3p?|strcasecmp|tell|unreadb|write(b|_b_buf|buf|s)))$$' ++ -export-symbols-regex '^(sox_.*|lsx_(([cm]|re)alloc.*|check_read_params|(close|open)_dllibrary|(debug(_more|_most)?|fail|report|warn)_impl|eof|error|fail_errno|filelength|find_(enum_(text|value)|file_extension)|flush|getopt(_init)?|lpc10_(create_(de|en)coder_state|(de|en)code)|raw(read|write)|read(_b_buf|buf|chars)|rewind|seeki|sigfigs3p?|strcasecmp|strdup|tell|unreadb|write(b|_b_buf|buf|s)))$$' + + if HAVE_WIN32_LTDL + libsox_la_SOURCES += win32-ltdl.c win32-ltdl.h +--- sox-14.4.2/src/xmalloc.c 2012-01-23 16:27:33.000000000 -0600 ++++ sox-14.4.2/src/xmalloc.c 2020-03-21 13:24:52.660007611 -0500 +@@ -41,3 +41,13 @@ void *lsx_realloc(void *ptr, size_t news + + return ptr; + } ++ ++void *lsx_realloc_array(void *p, size_t n, size_t size) ++{ ++ if (n > (size_t)-1 / size) { ++ lsx_fail("malloc size overflow"); ++ exit(2); ++ } ++ ++ return lsx_realloc(p, n * size); ++} +--- sox-14.4.2/src/xmalloc.h 2012-01-23 16:27:33.000000000 -0600 ++++ sox-14.4.2/src/xmalloc.h 2020-03-21 13:24:14.610007203 -0500 +@@ -23,12 +23,14 @@ + #include <stddef.h> + #include <string.h> + ++LSX_RETURN_VALID void *lsx_realloc_array(void *p, size_t n, size_t size); ++ + #define lsx_malloc(size) lsx_realloc(NULL, (size)) + #define lsx_calloc(n,s) (((n)*(s))? memset(lsx_malloc((n)*(s)),0,(n)*(s)) : NULL) + #define lsx_Calloc(v,n) v = lsx_calloc(n,sizeof(*(v))) + #define lsx_strdup(p) ((p)? strcpy((char *)lsx_malloc(strlen(p) + 1), p) : NULL) + #define lsx_memdup(p,s) ((p)? memcpy(lsx_malloc(s), p, s) : NULL) +-#define lsx_valloc(v,n) v = lsx_malloc((n)*sizeof(*(v))) +-#define lsx_revalloc(v,n) v = lsx_realloc(v, (n)*sizeof(*(v))) ++#define lsx_valloc(v,n) v = lsx_realloc_array(NULL, n, sizeof(*(v))) ++#define lsx_revalloc(v,n) v = lsx_realloc_array(v, n, sizeof(*(v))) + + #endif diff --git a/user/sox/CVE-2019-8356.patch b/user/sox/CVE-2019-8356.patch new file mode 100644 index 000000000..9375bc5ae --- /dev/null +++ b/user/sox/CVE-2019-8356.patch @@ -0,0 +1,92 @@ +From b7883ae1398499daaa926ae6621f088f0f531ed8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Mans Rullgard <mans@mansr.com> +Date: Wed, 24 Apr 2019 16:56:42 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH] fft4g: bail if size too large (CVE-2019-8356) + +Prevent overflowing of fixed-size buffers in bitrv2() and bitrv2conj() +if the transform size is too large. +--- + src/fft4g.c | 18 ++++++++++++++++++ + src/fft4g.h | 2 ++ + 2 files changed, 20 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/src/fft4g.c b/src/fft4g.c +index 38a8bcc0..88a2a7ec 100644 +--- a/src/fft4g.c ++++ b/src/fft4g.c +@@ -322,6 +322,9 @@ static void rftfsub(int n, double *a, int nc, double const *c); + + void cdft(int n, int isgn, double *a, int *ip, double *w) + { ++ if (n > FFT4G_MAX_SIZE) ++ return; ++ + if (n > (ip[0] << 2)) { + makewt(n >> 2, ip, w); + } +@@ -344,6 +347,9 @@ void rdft(int n, int isgn, double *a, int *ip, double *w) + int nw, nc; + double xi; + ++ if (n > FFT4G_MAX_SIZE) ++ return; ++ + nw = ip[0]; + if (n > (nw << 2)) { + nw = n >> 2; +@@ -384,6 +390,9 @@ void ddct(int n, int isgn, double *a, int *ip, double *w) + int j, nw, nc; + double xr; + ++ if (n > FFT4G_MAX_SIZE) ++ return; ++ + nw = ip[0]; + if (n > (nw << 2)) { + nw = n >> 2; +@@ -435,6 +444,9 @@ void ddst(int n, int isgn, double *a, int *ip, double *w) + int j, nw, nc; + double xr; + ++ if (n > FFT4G_MAX_SIZE) ++ return; ++ + nw = ip[0]; + if (n > (nw << 2)) { + nw = n >> 2; +@@ -486,6 +498,9 @@ void dfct(int n, double *a, double *t, int *ip, double *w) + int j, k, l, m, mh, nw, nc; + double xr, xi, yr, yi; + ++ if (n > FFT4G_MAX_SIZE) ++ return; ++ + nw = ip[0]; + if (n > (nw << 3)) { + nw = n >> 3; +@@ -576,6 +591,9 @@ void dfst(int n, double *a, double *t, int *ip, double *w) + int j, k, l, m, mh, nw, nc; + double xr, xi, yr, yi; + ++ if (n > FFT4G_MAX_SIZE) ++ return; ++ + nw = ip[0]; + if (n > (nw << 3)) { + nw = n >> 3; +diff --git a/src/fft4g.h b/src/fft4g.h +index 2b8051ca..95ee3413 100644 +--- a/src/fft4g.h ++++ b/src/fft4g.h +@@ -13,6 +13,8 @@ + * Inc., 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301 USA + */ + ++#define FFT4G_MAX_SIZE 262144 ++ + void lsx_cdft(int, int, double *, int *, double *); + void lsx_rdft(int, int, double *, int *, double *); + void lsx_ddct(int, int, double *, int *, double *); +-- +2.25.0 + diff --git a/user/sox/CVE-2019-8357.patch b/user/sox/CVE-2019-8357.patch new file mode 100644 index 000000000..ec2b04d30 --- /dev/null +++ b/user/sox/CVE-2019-8357.patch @@ -0,0 +1,28 @@ +From 2ce02fea7b350de9ddfbcf542ba4dd59a8ab255b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Mans Rullgard <mans@mansr.com> +Date: Wed, 24 Apr 2019 15:08:51 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH] fix possible null pointer deref in lsx_make_lpf() + (CVE-2019-8357) + +If the buffer allocation fails, return NULL. +--- + src/effects_i_dsp.c | 3 +++ + 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/src/effects_i_dsp.c b/src/effects_i_dsp.c +index e32dfa05..88b1b390 100644 +--- a/src/effects_i_dsp.c ++++ b/src/effects_i_dsp.c +@@ -362,6 +362,9 @@ double * lsx_make_lpf(int num_taps, double Fc, double beta, double rho, + assert(Fc >= 0 && Fc <= 1); + lsx_debug("make_lpf(n=%i Fc=%.7g β=%g ρ=%g dc-norm=%i scale=%g)", num_taps, Fc, beta, rho, dc_norm, scale); + ++ if (!h) ++ return NULL; ++ + for (i = 0; i <= m / 2; ++i) { + double z = i - .5 * m, x = z * M_PI, y = z * mult1; + h[i] = x? sin(Fc * x) / x : Fc; +-- +2.25.0 + diff --git a/user/sox/sox-dynamic.patch b/user/sox/sox-dynamic.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 94ac6a282..000000000 --- a/user/sox/sox-dynamic.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,12 +0,0 @@ -diff -Naur sox-14.4.2-orig/src/Makefile.am sox-14.4.2/src/Makefile.am ---- sox-14.4.2-orig/src/Makefile.am 2015-04-08 17:11:09.555343005 -0400 -+++ sox-14.4.2/src/Makefile.am 2015-04-08 17:11:25.115317153 -0400 -@@ -95,7 +95,7 @@ - - libsox_la_CFLAGS = @WARN_CFLAGS@ - libsox_la_LDFLAGS = @APP_LDFLAGS@ -version-info @SHLIB_VERSION@ \ -- -export-symbols-regex '^(sox_.*|lsx_(check_read_params|(close|open)_dllibrary|(debug(_more|_most)?|fail|report|warn)_impl|eof|fail_errno|filelength|find_(enum_(text|value)|file_extension)|getopt(_init)?|lpc10_(create_(de|en)coder_state|(de|en)code)|raw(read|write)|read(_b_buf|buf|chars)|realloc|rewind|seeki|sigfigs3p?|strcasecmp|tell|unreadb|write(b|_b_buf|buf|s)))$$' -+ -export-symbols-regex '^(sox_.*|lsx_(error|flush|check_read_params|(close|open)_dllibrary|(debug(_more|_most)?|fail|report|warn)_impl|eof|fail_errno|filelength|find_(enum_(text|value)|file_extension)|getopt(_init)?|lpc10_(create_(de|en)coder_state|(de|en)code)|raw(read|write)|read(_b_buf|buf|chars)|realloc|rewind|seeki|sigfigs3p?|strcasecmp|tell|unreadb|write(b|_b_buf|buf|s)))$$' - - if HAVE_WIN32_LTDL - libsox_la_SOURCES += win32-ltdl.c win32-ltdl.h diff --git a/user/thunderbird/APKBUILD b/user/thunderbird/APKBUILD index 5cb1c2099..b50a1a7e8 100644 --- a/user/thunderbird/APKBUILD +++ b/user/thunderbird/APKBUILD @@ -1,6 +1,6 @@ # Maintainer: A. Wilcox <awilfox@adelielinux.org> pkgname=thunderbird -pkgver=68.5.0 +pkgver=68.6.0 pkgrel=0 pkgdesc="Email client from Mozilla" url="https://www.thunderbird.net/" @@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ depends="" # system-libs # actual deps makedepends=" - autoconf2.13 cargo cbindgen clang llvm8-dev node ncurses-dev + autoconf2.13 cargo cbindgen clang llvm8-dev node ncurses-dev perl rust cmd:which ncurses-dev openssl-dev @@ -55,6 +55,16 @@ somask="liblgpllibs.so _mozappdir=/usr/lib/thunderbird ldpath="$_mozappdir" +# secfixes: +# 68.6.0-r0: +# - CVE-2020-6805 +# - CVE-2020-6806 +# - CVE-2020-6807 +# - CVE-2020-6811 +# - CVE-2019-20503 +# - CVE-2020-6812 +# - CVE-2020-6814 + unpack() { default_unpack [ -z $SKIP_PYTHON ] || return 0 @@ -148,7 +158,7 @@ package() { ${pkgdir}/usr/share/applications/thunderbird.desktop } -sha512sums="bb58a398f24d89eac5b1816f9d16edadbe65cdac6542e1f6798424c7ea18eb2d4ca46bb03f54c8c365e67d1dec44d3dfb36fbe4f85afe9ad80fbcc1f2984084b thunderbird-68.5.0.source.tar.xz +sha512sums="3502cc42b594eebf3511219ae8e7fb8a13594534abfe7a40ec32e5a3f60343cfab7c652b161a5f33af46bd5e6f096e3abd4a407c8b307ce4693089b471a42c3e thunderbird-68.6.0.source.tar.xz 16e814e8dcffc707b595ca2919bd2fa3db0d15794c63d977364652c4a5b92e90e72b8c9e1cc83b5020398bd90a1b397dbdd7cb931c49f1aa4af6ef95414b43e0 Python-2.7.16.tar.xz 5519234df2934ac2f3d76c8cad7e4f0fe15cf83ea4beb32c6489d8b7839b3ebea88bdb342e0d2a9c1c7c95e9455d234b0a5aa0e73446fd8027b520f080a2bb5b mozconfig ace7492f4fb0523c7340fdc09c831906f74fddad93822aff367135538dacd3f56288b907f5a04f53f94c76e722ba0bab73e28d83ec12d3e672554712e6b08613 bad-google-code.patch diff --git a/user/wavpack/APKBUILD b/user/wavpack/APKBUILD index 45b2f7895..db868c74f 100644 --- a/user/wavpack/APKBUILD +++ b/user/wavpack/APKBUILD @@ -3,7 +3,7 @@ # Maintainer: pkgname=wavpack pkgver=5.2.0 -pkgrel=0 +pkgrel=1 pkgdesc="Audio compression format with lossless, lossy, and hybrid compression modes" url="http://www.wavpack.com/" arch="all" @@ -12,19 +12,30 @@ license="BSD-3-Clause" depends="" makedepends="" subpackages="$pkgname-dev $pkgname-doc" -source="http://www.wavpack.com/$pkgname-$pkgver.tar.bz2 - cve2018-19840.patch - " +source="http://www.wavpack.com/$pkgname-$pkgver.tar.bz2" # secfixes: +# 5.2.0-r0: +# - CVE-2018-6767 +# - CVE-2018-7253 +# - CVE-2018-7254 +# - CVE-2018-10536 +# - CVE-2018-10537 +# - CVE-2018-10538 +# - CVE-2018-10539 +# - CVE-2018-10540 +# - CVE-2019-11498 +# - CVE-2019-1010315 +# - CVE-2019-1010317 +# - CVE-2019-1010319 # 5.1.0-r4: -# - CVE-2018-19840 -# - CVE-2018-19840 +# - CVE-2018-19840 +# - CVE-2018-19841 # 5.1.0-r0: -# - CVE-2016-10169 -# - CVE-2016-10170 -# - CVE-2016-10171 -# - CVE-2016-10172 +# - CVE-2016-10169 +# - CVE-2016-10170 +# - CVE-2016-10171 +# - CVE-2016-10172 build() { _arch_opts="" diff --git a/user/wavpack/cve2018-19840.patch b/user/wavpack/cve2018-19840.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 2da022025..000000000 --- a/user/wavpack/cve2018-19840.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,25 +0,0 @@ -From 070ef6f138956d9ea9612e69586152339dbefe51 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: David Bryant <david@wavpack.com> -Date: Thu, 29 Nov 2018 21:00:42 -0800 -Subject: [PATCH] issue #53: error out on zero sample rate - ---- - src/pack_utils.c | 5 +++++ - 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+) - -diff --git a/src/pack_utils.c b/src/pack_utils.c -index 2253f0d..2a83497 100644 ---- a/src/pack_utils.c -+++ b/src/pack_utils.c -@@ -195,6 +195,11 @@ int WavpackSetConfiguration64 (WavpackContext *wpc, WavpackConfig *config, int64 - int num_chans = config->num_channels; - int i; - -+ if (!config->sample_rate) { -+ strcpy (wpc->error_message, "sample rate cannot be zero!"); -+ return FALSE; -+ } -+ - wpc->stream_version = (config->flags & CONFIG_COMPATIBLE_WRITE) ? CUR_STREAM_VERS : MAX_STREAM_VERS; - - if ((config->qmode & QMODE_DSD_AUDIO) && config->bytes_per_sample == 1 && config->bits_per_sample == 8) { |