diff options
| -rw-r--r-- | system/xz/APKBUILD | 6 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | system/xz/CVE-2022-1271-xzgrep-ZDI-CAN-16587.patch | 94 |
2 files changed, 98 insertions, 2 deletions
diff --git a/system/xz/APKBUILD b/system/xz/APKBUILD index 68fefcf80..7b8861fca 100644 --- a/system/xz/APKBUILD +++ b/system/xz/APKBUILD @@ -2,7 +2,7 @@ # Maintainer: Dan Theisen <djt@hxx.in> pkgname=xz pkgver=5.2.5 -pkgrel=0 +pkgrel=1 pkgdesc="Library and command line tools for XZ and LZMA compressed files" url="https://tukaani.org/xz/" arch="all" @@ -12,6 +12,7 @@ makedepends="" subpackages="$pkgname-doc $pkgname-dev $pkgname-lang $pkgname-libs" source="https://tukaani.org/xz/xz-$pkgver.tar.gz dont-use-libdir-for-pkgconfig.patch + CVE-2022-1271-xzgrep-ZDI-CAN-16587.patch " build() { @@ -46,4 +47,5 @@ package() { } sha512sums="7443674247deda2935220fbc4dfc7665e5bb5a260be8ad858c8bd7d7b9f0f868f04ea45e62eb17c0a5e6a2de7c7500ad2d201e2d668c48ca29bd9eea5a73a3ce xz-5.2.5.tar.gz -9310ae2568dd6ac474e3cb9895e1339ca2dbe8834f856edbb7d2264c0019bde4bbd94aa1edd34e5c8d0aed1f35a1877b0e053ed08a270835ea81e59c7be5edb3 dont-use-libdir-for-pkgconfig.patch" +9310ae2568dd6ac474e3cb9895e1339ca2dbe8834f856edbb7d2264c0019bde4bbd94aa1edd34e5c8d0aed1f35a1877b0e053ed08a270835ea81e59c7be5edb3 dont-use-libdir-for-pkgconfig.patch +52b16268e333399444f433a11ccf3a9b020a6914ed23fc8e082128fec596011d7c6863d47414d4c0f245d20ebed4b3a50b422599b4b88d66f6c6eb2e74b9a939 CVE-2022-1271-xzgrep-ZDI-CAN-16587.patch" diff --git a/system/xz/CVE-2022-1271-xzgrep-ZDI-CAN-16587.patch b/system/xz/CVE-2022-1271-xzgrep-ZDI-CAN-16587.patch new file mode 100644 index 000000000..406ded590 --- /dev/null +++ b/system/xz/CVE-2022-1271-xzgrep-ZDI-CAN-16587.patch @@ -0,0 +1,94 @@ +From 69d1b3fc29677af8ade8dc15dba83f0589cb63d6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Lasse Collin <lasse.collin@tukaani.org> +Date: Tue, 29 Mar 2022 19:19:12 +0300 +Subject: [PATCH] xzgrep: Fix escaping of malicious filenames (ZDI-CAN-16587). + +Malicious filenames can make xzgrep to write to arbitrary files +or (with a GNU sed extension) lead to arbitrary code execution. + +xzgrep from XZ Utils versions up to and including 5.2.5 are +affected. 5.3.1alpha and 5.3.2alpha are affected as well. +This patch works for all of them. + +This bug was inherited from gzip's zgrep. gzip 1.12 includes +a fix for zgrep. + +The issue with the old sed script is that with multiple newlines, +the N-command will read the second line of input, then the +s-commands will be skipped because it's not the end of the +file yet, then a new sed cycle starts and the pattern space +is printed and emptied. So only the last line or two get escaped. + +One way to fix this would be to read all lines into the pattern +space first. However, the included fix is even simpler: All lines +except the last line get a backslash appended at the end. To ensure +that shell command substitution doesn't eat a possible trailing +newline, a colon is appended to the filename before escaping. +The colon is later used to separate the filename from the grep +output so it is fine to add it here instead of a few lines later. + +The old code also wasn't POSIX compliant as it used \n in the +replacement section of the s-command. Using \<newline> is the +POSIX compatible method. + +LC_ALL=C was added to the two critical sed commands. POSIX sed +manual recommends it when using sed to manipulate pathnames +because in other locales invalid multibyte sequences might +cause issues with some sed implementations. In case of GNU sed, +these particular sed scripts wouldn't have such problems but some +other scripts could have, see: + + info '(sed)Locale Considerations' + +This vulnerability was discovered by: +cleemy desu wayo working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative + +Thanks to Jim Meyering and Paul Eggert discussing the different +ways to fix this and for coordinating the patch release schedule +with gzip. +--- + src/scripts/xzgrep.in | 20 ++++++++++++-------- + 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/src/scripts/xzgrep.in b/src/scripts/xzgrep.in +index b180936..e5186ba 100644 +--- a/src/scripts/xzgrep.in ++++ b/src/scripts/xzgrep.in +@@ -180,22 +180,26 @@ for i; do + { test $# -eq 1 || test $no_filename -eq 1; }; then + eval "$grep" + else ++ # Append a colon so that the last character will never be a newline ++ # which would otherwise get lost in shell command substitution. ++ i="$i:" ++ ++ # Escape & \ | and newlines only if such characters are present ++ # (speed optimization). + case $i in + (*' + '* | *'&'* | *'\'* | *'|'*) +- i=$(printf '%s\n' "$i" | +- sed ' +- $!N +- $s/[&\|]/\\&/g +- $s/\n/\\n/g +- ');; ++ i=$(printf '%s\n' "$i" | LC_ALL=C sed 's/[&\|]/\\&/g; $!s/$/\\/');; + esac +- sed_script="s|^|$i:|" ++ ++ # $i already ends with a colon so don't add it here. ++ sed_script="s|^|$i|" + + # Fail if grep or sed fails. + r=$( + exec 4>&1 +- (eval "$grep" 4>&-; echo $? >&4) 3>&- | sed "$sed_script" >&3 4>&- ++ (eval "$grep" 4>&-; echo $? >&4) 3>&- | ++ LC_ALL=C sed "$sed_script" >&3 4>&- + ) || r=2 + exit $r + fi >&3 5>&- +-- +2.35.1 + |