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-rw-r--r--system/ca-certificates/APKBUILD9
-rw-r--r--system/sudo/APKBUILD23
-rw-r--r--user/dbus/APKBUILD12
-rw-r--r--user/freetds/APKBUILD8
-rw-r--r--user/gnutls/APKBUILD17
-rw-r--r--user/gnutls/disable-certtool-test.patch33
-rw-r--r--user/libexif/APKBUILD29
-rw-r--r--user/libexif/CVE-2016-6328.patch60
-rw-r--r--user/libexif/CVE-2017-7544.patch30
-rw-r--r--user/libexif/CVE-2018-20030.patch115
-rw-r--r--user/libexif/CVE-2019-9278.patch85
-rw-r--r--user/libexif/CVE-2020-0198.patch58
-rw-r--r--user/libjpeg-turbo/APKBUILD19
-rw-r--r--user/libjpeg-turbo/CVE-2020-13790.patch35
-rw-r--r--user/nghttp2/APKBUILD9
-rw-r--r--user/openldap/APKBUILD9
-rw-r--r--user/py3-pyyaml/APKBUILD9
17 files changed, 223 insertions, 337 deletions
diff --git a/system/ca-certificates/APKBUILD b/system/ca-certificates/APKBUILD
index 0785ec441..5e75d13d8 100644
--- a/system/ca-certificates/APKBUILD
+++ b/system/ca-certificates/APKBUILD
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
# Maintainer: A. Wilcox <awilfox@adelielinux.org>
pkgname=ca-certificates
-pkgver=20190131
-pkgrel=1
+pkgver=20200603
+pkgrel=0
pkgdesc="CA root certificates"
url="https://www.mozilla.org/en-US/about/governance/policies/security-group/certs/"
arch="all"
@@ -13,12 +13,11 @@ makedepends_host="openssl-dev"
subpackages="$pkgname-doc"
triggers="ca-certificates.trigger=/usr/share/ca-certificates:/usr/local/share/ca-certificates:/etc/ssl/certs:/etc/ca-certificates/update.d"
install="$pkgname.post-deinstall"
-source="https://distfiles.adelielinux.org/source/$pkgname-$pkgver.tar.xz
+source="https://dev.sick.bike/dist/$pkgname-$pkgver.tar.gz
certhash
"
build() {
- export CFLAGS="$CFLAGS -DSYMLINK_MAX=PATH_MAX"
make
}
@@ -43,5 +42,5 @@ package() {
install -D -m755 "$srcdir"/certhash "$pkgdir"/etc/ca-certificates/update.d/certhash
}
-sha512sums="aec43296636887a8ebefc08abe60c123b67002eb8cf450662b5ff8fcbd2ea10d3d24d17080b5924b13aed9a52b91ba55e93d306e27ed3196ca67cbbe30146328 ca-certificates-20190131.tar.xz
+sha512sums="0125600481666979e0b736572aca7d0e3c4bf01169bc67638ef7bdd4fc97a0ebbb70798df7275eac92dfc2d03b16de3f0adc8ad382fc9e2fb4d8223c923b2eef ca-certificates-20200603.tar.gz
1efe48235f150052da6b872d2ebff174359825ab3bd66086c9d7f4c18dcd8aa8953c634dbf1aa8416d30d5623babf589660a25cf6e3a4cdcce707c14cc2f348a certhash"
diff --git a/system/sudo/APKBUILD b/system/sudo/APKBUILD
index 3bad54e5e..00acefd4f 100644
--- a/system/sudo/APKBUILD
+++ b/system/sudo/APKBUILD
@@ -3,13 +3,13 @@
# Contributor: Natanael Copa <ncopa@alpinelinux.org>
# Maintainer: Horst Burkhardt <horst@adelielinux.org>
pkgname=sudo
-pkgver=1.8.28
+pkgver=1.9.0
if [ "${pkgver%_*}" != "$pkgver" ]; then
_realver=${pkgver%_*}${pkgver#*_}
else
_realver=$pkgver
fi
-pkgrel=1
+pkgrel=0
pkgdesc="Give certain users the ability to run some commands as root"
url="https://www.sudo.ws/sudo/"
arch="all"
@@ -26,12 +26,22 @@ source="https://www.sudo.ws/dist/sudo-${_realver}.tar.gz
SIGUNUSED.patch
"
builddir="$srcdir"/$pkgname-$_realver
+somask="audit_json.so
+ group_file.so
+ libsudo_noexec.so
+ libsudo_util.so.0
+ sample_approval.so
+ sudoers.so
+ system_group.so
+ "
# secfixes:
# 1.8.20_p2-r0:
# - CVE-2017-1000368
-# 1.8.28:
+# 1.8.28-r0:
# - CVE-2019-14287
+# 1.9.0-r0:
+# - CVE-2019-19232
build() {
./configure \
@@ -46,7 +56,10 @@ build() {
--without-skey \
--with-passprompt="[sudo] Password for %p: " \
--with-insults=disabled \
- --with-all-insults
+ --with-all-insults \
+ --enable-python=no \
+ --disable-log-server \
+ --disable-log-client
# Workaround until SIGUNUSED.patch is not needed anymore
rm lib/util/mksiglist.h lib/util/mksigname.h
@@ -67,7 +80,7 @@ package() {
rm -rf "$pkgdir"/var/run
}
-sha512sums="09e589cdfd18d7c43b0859a0e11c008b3cb995ae4f8c89c717c5242db9e5696361eb574ebe74a0b5316afffb3a8037f7a7f3c249176e8ed9caffeb4cd860ddc7 sudo-1.8.28.tar.gz
+sha512sums="f2a191ea5fc65865718b110d4aca187cb5e2cd55c9c891fab32f21401e56f825f34c373e346c55c64fa49cec4d802efb63ccebf3d4a4e31d9a433077daf013b1 sudo-1.9.0.tar.gz
f0f462f40502da2194310fe4a72ec1a16ba40f95a821ba9aa6aabaa423d28c4ab26b684afa7fb81c2407cf60de9327bdab01de51b878c5d4de49b0d62645f53c fix-cross-compile.patch
dcc03abdd672c934f90dfd3683b3f81a8d39cfff91307d2dbd20a31a852022ab605d034c4fe11860ba99b78d391a9812fca1d6e052620b8ff2c42e4f0c7a1a62 musl-fix-headers.patch
2733c220ccbdaf61a32d8c72a5bc0209673733014f0d71b568f1523b71416e9d1754dd8c95bc6cd99aa7f935ed6e93c5f19b1a1dbb7dfc2daf9917fd37f96e78 SIGUNUSED.patch"
diff --git a/user/dbus/APKBUILD b/user/dbus/APKBUILD
index d9a305186..4ff57480f 100644
--- a/user/dbus/APKBUILD
+++ b/user/dbus/APKBUILD
@@ -1,9 +1,9 @@
# Maintainer: A. Wilcox <awilfox@adelielinux.org>
pkgname=dbus
-pkgver=1.12.16
-pkgrel=1
+pkgver=1.12.18
+pkgrel=0
pkgdesc="IPC/message bus system, allowing user applications to communicate"
-url="http://www.freedesktop.org/wiki/Software/dbus/"
+url="https://www.freedesktop.org/wiki/Software/dbus/"
pkggroups="messagebus"
pkgusers="messagebus"
arch="all"
@@ -23,7 +23,9 @@ source="http://dbus.freedesktop.org/releases/dbus/dbus-$pkgver.tar.gz
# secfixes:
# 1.12.16-r0:
-# - CVE-2019-12749
+# - CVE-2019-12749
+# 1.12.18-r0:
+# - CVE-2020-12049
build() {
./configure \
@@ -65,5 +67,5 @@ x11() {
mv "$pkgdir"/usr/bin/dbus-launch "$subpkgdir"/usr/bin/
}
-sha512sums="27ae805170e9515a8bb0fba5f29d414edc70e3b6b28b7b65bbea47035b8eafa9ac4820cdc92645be6035f6748f8aa45679e1ffc84ba74a64859a3056d318b9bb dbus-1.12.16.tar.gz
+sha512sums="817674e86a5d4cbfa705a79ca5197176311e47505c5da02334c2811f63b55014b582a12bce53bc73a08a3ad5061f210ba0d1e5f3bbf7697c81ca70c22a76fc13 dbus-1.12.18.tar.gz
df74e7d6a4f76f777d356e94bd23422b17656aa51a5b2d3c655fcabb32c84f2f06b9f5cd8827920d51842f89e8c0d968a6e723315e4bf216e55711fcda9b0ee9 dbus.initd"
diff --git a/user/freetds/APKBUILD b/user/freetds/APKBUILD
index 3687b3cdc..0dd8562cf 100644
--- a/user/freetds/APKBUILD
+++ b/user/freetds/APKBUILD
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
# Contributor: Michael Mason <ms13sp@gmail.com>
# Maintainer: A. Wilcox <awilfox@adelielinux.org>
pkgname=freetds
-pkgver=1.1.6
+pkgver=1.1.40
pkgrel=0
pkgdesc="Library for accessing Sybase and MS SQL Server databases"
url="https://www.freetds.org/"
@@ -13,6 +13,10 @@ subpackages="$pkgname-doc $pkgname-dev"
source="ftp://ftp.freetds.org/pub/freetds/stable/$pkgname-$pkgver.tar.gz
fix-includes.patch"
+# secfixes:
+# 1.1.40-r0:
+# - CVE-2019-13508
+
build() {
./configure \
--build=$CBUILD \
@@ -36,5 +40,5 @@ package() {
make -j1 DESTDIR="$pkgdir" install
}
-sha512sums="fcd3ed52ffbf482535d8d343b2d45c999875d2bfcbf13ef72a15f4440c791ff138b839798bad05593428c0839981e667133473f7d76570e0de3ebf9e474ea632 freetds-1.1.6.tar.gz
+sha512sums="03f6d1e7f57f69068771e1706bbe4a3131e82b00f0191c988ec7d25f571d07caba9ef61598dc381eace1b1e88bc74af8f8506bd79236f9be15a56419a3e5c4c0 freetds-1.1.40.tar.gz
d75d1aab6687586697f3e430db1e82f21208f10076b45996542eea682e36cbbbb344f479a9336fcfd294b5b87d7acb2ec5fb8ddd1914e990e23dd5e7ae93a0b6 fix-includes.patch"
diff --git a/user/gnutls/APKBUILD b/user/gnutls/APKBUILD
index 616793f57..e75b1d552 100644
--- a/user/gnutls/APKBUILD
+++ b/user/gnutls/APKBUILD
@@ -2,12 +2,11 @@
# Contributor: Michael Mason <ms13sp@gmail.com>
# Maintainer:
pkgname=gnutls
-pkgver=3.6.11.1
+pkgver=3.6.14
pkgrel=0
pkgdesc="A TLS protocol implementation"
-url="http://www.gnutls.org/"
+url="https://www.gnutls.org/"
arch="all"
-options="!check" # https://gitlab.com/gnutls/gnutls/issues/560
license="LGPL-2.1+"
makedepends="libtasn1-dev libunistring-dev nettle-dev p11-kit-dev texinfo
unbound-dev cmd:which zlib-dev"
@@ -23,11 +22,16 @@ case $pkgver in
;;
esac
source="https://www.gnupg.org/ftp/gcrypt/gnutls/v${_v}/$pkgname-$pkgver.tar.xz
- gnulib-tests-dont-require-gpg-passphrase.patch"
+ gnulib-tests-dont-require-gpg-passphrase.patch
+ disable-certtool-test.patch
+ "
# secfixes:
# 3.5.13-r0:
# - CVE-2017-7507
+# 3.6.14-r0:
+# - CVE-2020-11501
+# - CVE-2020-13777
build() {
LIBS="-lgmp" ./configure \
@@ -79,5 +83,6 @@ xx() {
mv "$pkgdir"/usr/lib/lib*xx.so.* "$subpkgdir"/usr/lib/
}
-sha512sums="55fbbf0ebc824fbc91ccd08d1708452c5b1c12af75e332f29414540eb2f81337fa605a693ce9f34319a927e9d71177e6e7ffea5c6747792d341fb740f68c9489 gnutls-3.6.11.1.tar.xz
-abc24ee59cc67805fe953535b0bae33080fc8b0bf788304377f6d10ec8c162c4cf203a69c98a4ba3483b4c60ed7a204433cc7db9b8190eddb0d68f6fb6dad52d gnulib-tests-dont-require-gpg-passphrase.patch"
+sha512sums="b2d427b5542a4679117c011dffa8efb0e0bffa3ce9cebc319f8998d03f80f4168d08f9fda35df18dbeaaada59e479d325a6c1c77d5ca7f8ce221b44e42bfe604 gnutls-3.6.14.tar.xz
+abc24ee59cc67805fe953535b0bae33080fc8b0bf788304377f6d10ec8c162c4cf203a69c98a4ba3483b4c60ed7a204433cc7db9b8190eddb0d68f6fb6dad52d gnulib-tests-dont-require-gpg-passphrase.patch
+25400be364c1f27b88451002a471cbf841b9738dd93c42dcbeaf7644c3deea6afc85300b40d5ae32d29dc4d441237e8b311f3e07f0af2fb4788701ee4e240c0f disable-certtool-test.patch"
diff --git a/user/gnutls/disable-certtool-test.patch b/user/gnutls/disable-certtool-test.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..2ae16a38e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/user/gnutls/disable-certtool-test.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
+If GNUTLS_PIN is not available in the environment, the test will fail
+because it cannot ask for the password:
+
+Generating a self signed certificate...
+No PIN given.
+note: when operating in batch mode, set the GNUTLS_PIN or GNUTLS_SO_PIN environment variables
+cert generation failed
+FAIL certtool (exit status: 1)
+
+The comment above this line says "some CI runners need GNUTLS_PIN
+(GNUTLS_PIN=${PASS})" (i.e. GNUTLS_PIN=1234). When this is passed
+instead, the test fails again because "No password was asked" (it greps
+for "Enter password" in the output, but this won't happen because
+GNUTLS_PIN is set).
+
+The folks at Nix believe this is an incompatibility due to musl's
+getpass not falling back to stdin/stderr if it cannot connect to a tty,
+as glibc does.
+
+https://gitlab.com/gnutls/gnutls/-/issues/945
+
+--- gnutls-3.6.13/tests/cert-tests/certtool 2020-01-01 14:10:19.000000000 -0600
++++ gnutls-3.6.13/tests/cert-tests/certtool 2020-06-02 20:36:20.380039844 -0500
+@@ -20,6 +20,9 @@
+
+ #set -e
+
++echo 'this test is not compatible with musl'
++exit 77
++
+ srcdir="${srcdir:-.}"
+ CERTTOOL="${CERTTOOL:-../../src/certtool${EXEEXT}}"
+ DIFF="${DIFF:-diff -b -B}"
diff --git a/user/libexif/APKBUILD b/user/libexif/APKBUILD
index 06e1e832a..320b87492 100644
--- a/user/libexif/APKBUILD
+++ b/user/libexif/APKBUILD
@@ -1,19 +1,17 @@
# Maintainer:
pkgname=libexif
-pkgver=0.6.21
-pkgrel=4
+pkgver=0.6.22
+_pkgver=$(printf '%s' "$pkgver" | tr . _)
+pkgrel=0
pkgdesc="Library to parse EXIF metadata"
-url="https://sourceforge.net/projects/libexif"
+url="https://libexif.github.io/"
arch="all"
license="LGPL-2.0+"
subpackages="$pkgname-dev $pkgname-doc $pkgname-lang"
depends=""
makedepends=""
-source="https://downloads.sourceforge.net/$pkgname/$pkgname-$pkgver.tar.bz2
- CVE-2016-6328.patch
- CVE-2017-7544.patch
- CVE-2018-20030.patch
- CVE-2019-9278.patch
+source="https://github.com/libexif/libexif/releases/download/libexif-$_pkgver-release/libexif-$pkgver.tar.xz
+ CVE-2020-0198.patch
"
# secfixes:
@@ -23,6 +21,14 @@ source="https://downloads.sourceforge.net/$pkgname/$pkgname-$pkgver.tar.bz2
# 0.6.21-r4:
# - CVE-2016-6328
# - CVE-2019-9278
+# 0.6.22-r0:
+# - CVE-2020-0093
+# - CVE-2020-0182
+# - CVE-2020-0198
+# - CVE-2020-12767
+# - CVE-2020-13112
+# - CVE-2020-13113
+# - CVE-2020-13114
prepare() {
default_prepare
@@ -45,8 +51,5 @@ package() {
make DESTDIR="$pkgdir" install
}
-sha512sums="4e0fe2abe85d1c95b41cb3abe1f6333dc3a9eb69dba106a674a78d74a4d5b9c5a19647118fa1cc2d72b98a29853394f1519eda9e2889eb28d3be26b21c7cfc35 libexif-0.6.21.tar.bz2
-c0d4c74207993efc373615ef2c797d720162a2ee6fd7ad026edf2ced4198d9b1165b88790c2af3194f6bb7c2de88d4672c041c2cff8a82c8914700633332b8c5 CVE-2016-6328.patch
-d529c6c5bd26dc21c0946702574184e1f61c2bfd4fb95b41e314f486a0dd55571963ff2cad566d2fb0804de3c0799bcd956c15a3dc10a520ce207728edad4e2d CVE-2017-7544.patch
-0d6123bd275ace338ad9cebb31a2e714de0141b91860f07394b281686a5393566c3f4159679d4ba689ae7ea69ae2e412b158c3deb451c40c210b5817f6888bbc CVE-2018-20030.patch
-c30c03fefea94d175b94c9f0c4d60cbb3aa0ad78b0d29008975fbbb15c17f2907a16fd50970e5fa18d533d0ce291a5ee9b62934210cb40b0f463693460607738 CVE-2019-9278.patch"
+sha512sums="0a9e7bf0258ed98a794b667d45e8fc65299101a2a2d2e39c358715b20b003beff258782f0736cd5b53978428a2f878a989f303bee249a978850a065f33c534af libexif-0.6.22.tar.xz
+7df084f9acdc09bd05fadfb66332956d8587fcaac9d693000f47fadeba17b3c49eafa402d1e2c9b7d394e697feccd1f760bab8b64378deaea1777c5a3b90c3b2 CVE-2020-0198.patch"
diff --git a/user/libexif/CVE-2016-6328.patch b/user/libexif/CVE-2016-6328.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 0568f27d2..000000000
--- a/user/libexif/CVE-2016-6328.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,60 +0,0 @@
-From 41bd04234b104312f54d25822f68738ba8d7133d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Marcus Meissner <marcus@jet.franken.de>
-Date: Tue, 25 Jul 2017 23:44:44 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH] fixes some (not all) buffer overreads during decoding pentax
- makernote entries.
-
-This should fix:
-https://sourceforge.net/p/libexif/bugs/125/ CVE-2016-6328
----
- libexif/pentax/mnote-pentax-entry.c | 16 +++++++++++++---
- 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/libexif/pentax/mnote-pentax-entry.c b/libexif/pentax/mnote-pentax-entry.c
-index d03d159..ea0429a 100644
---- a/libexif/pentax/mnote-pentax-entry.c
-+++ b/libexif/pentax/mnote-pentax-entry.c
-@@ -425,24 +425,34 @@ mnote_pentax_entry_get_value (MnotePentaxEntry *entry,
- case EXIF_FORMAT_SHORT:
- {
- const unsigned char *data = entry->data;
-- size_t k, len = strlen(val);
-+ size_t k, len = strlen(val), sizeleft;
-+
-+ sizeleft = entry->size;
- for(k=0; k<entry->components; k++) {
-+ if (sizeleft < 2)
-+ break;
- vs = exif_get_short (data, entry->order);
- snprintf (val+len, maxlen-len, "%i ", vs);
- len = strlen(val);
- data += 2;
-+ sizeleft -= 2;
- }
- }
- break;
- case EXIF_FORMAT_LONG:
- {
- const unsigned char *data = entry->data;
-- size_t k, len = strlen(val);
-+ size_t k, len = strlen(val), sizeleft;
-+
-+ sizeleft = entry->size;
- for(k=0; k<entry->components; k++) {
-+ if (sizeleft < 4)
-+ break;
- vl = exif_get_long (data, entry->order);
- snprintf (val+len, maxlen-len, "%li", (long int) vl);
- len = strlen(val);
- data += 4;
-+ sizeleft -= 4;
- }
- }
- break;
-@@ -455,5 +465,5 @@ mnote_pentax_entry_get_value (MnotePentaxEntry *entry,
- break;
- }
-
-- return (val);
-+ return val;
- }
diff --git a/user/libexif/CVE-2017-7544.patch b/user/libexif/CVE-2017-7544.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 534817417..000000000
--- a/user/libexif/CVE-2017-7544.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,30 +0,0 @@
-From c39acd1692023b26290778a02a9232c873f9d71a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Marcus Meissner <marcus@jet.franken.de>
-Date: Tue, 25 Jul 2017 23:38:56 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH] On saving makernotes, make sure the makernote container tags
- has a type with 1 byte components.
-
-Fixes (at least):
- https://sourceforge.net/p/libexif/bugs/130
- https://sourceforge.net/p/libexif/bugs/129
----
- libexif/exif-data.c | 6 ++++++
- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
-
-diff --git a/libexif/exif-data.c b/libexif/exif-data.c
-index 67df4db..91f4c33 100644
---- a/libexif/exif-data.c
-+++ b/libexif/exif-data.c
-@@ -255,6 +255,12 @@ exif_data_save_data_entry (ExifData *data, ExifEntry *e,
- exif_mnote_data_set_offset (data->priv->md, *ds - 6);
- exif_mnote_data_save (data->priv->md, &e->data, &e->size);
- e->components = e->size;
-+ if (exif_format_get_size (e->format) != 1) {
-+ /* e->format is taken from input code,
-+ * but we need to make sure it is a 1 byte
-+ * entity due to the multiplication below. */
-+ e->format = EXIF_FORMAT_UNDEFINED;
-+ }
- }
- }
-
diff --git a/user/libexif/CVE-2018-20030.patch b/user/libexif/CVE-2018-20030.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 837d003d7..000000000
--- a/user/libexif/CVE-2018-20030.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,115 +0,0 @@
-Edited slightly to backport to stable
-
-From 6aa11df549114ebda520dde4cdaea2f9357b2c89 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Dan Fandrich <dan@coneharvesters.com>
-Date: Fri, 12 Oct 2018 16:01:45 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH] Improve deep recursion detection in
- exif_data_load_data_content.
-
-The existing detection was still vulnerable to pathological cases
-causing DoS by wasting CPU. The new algorithm takes the number of tags
-into account to make it harder to abuse by cases using shallow recursion
-but with a very large number of tags. This improves on commit 5d28011c
-which wasn't sufficient to counter this kind of case.
-
-The limitation in the previous fix was discovered by Laurent Delosieres,
-Secunia Research at Flexera (Secunia Advisory SA84652) and is assigned
-the identifier CVE-2018-20030.
----
- libexif/exif-data.c | 45 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------
-
-diff --git a/libexif/exif-data.c b/libexif/exif-data.c
-index e35403d..a6f9c94 100644
---- a/libexif/exif-data.c
-+++ b/libexif/exif-data.c
-@@ -35,6 +35,7 @@
- #include <libexif/olympus/exif-mnote-data-olympus.h>
- #include <libexif/pentax/exif-mnote-data-pentax.h>
-
-+#include <math.h>
- #include <stdlib.h>
- #include <stdio.h>
- #include <string.h>
-@@ -350,6 +351,20 @@ if (data->ifd[(i)]->count) { \
- break; \
- }
-
-+/*! Calculate the recursion cost added by one level of IFD loading.
-+ *
-+ * The work performed is related to the cost in the exponential relation
-+ * work=1.1**cost
-+ */
-+static unsigned int
-+level_cost(unsigned int n)
-+{
-+ static const double log_1_1 = 0.09531017980432493;
-+
-+ /* Adding 0.1 protects against the case where n==1 */
-+ return ceil(log(n + 0.1)/log_1_1);
-+}
-+
- /*! Load data for an IFD.
- *
- * \param[in,out] data #ExifData
-@@ -357,13 +372,13 @@ if (data->ifd[(i)]->count) { \
- * \param[in] d pointer to buffer containing raw IFD data
- * \param[in] ds size of raw data in buffer at \c d
- * \param[in] offset offset into buffer at \c d at which IFD starts
-- * \param[in] recursion_depth number of times this function has been
-- * recursively called without returning
-+ * \param[in] recursion_cost factor indicating how expensive this recursive
-+ * call could be
- */
- static void
- exif_data_load_data_content (ExifData *data, ExifIfd ifd,
- const unsigned char *d,
-- unsigned int ds, unsigned int offset, unsigned int recursion_depth)
-+ unsigned int ds, unsigned int offset, unsigned int recursion_cost)
- {
- ExifLong o, thumbnail_offset = 0, thumbnail_length = 0;
- ExifShort n;
-@@ -378,9 +393,20 @@ exif_data_load_data_content (ExifData *data, ExifIfd ifd,
- if ((((int)ifd) < 0) || ( ((int)ifd) >= EXIF_IFD_COUNT))
- return;
-
-- if (recursion_depth > 30) {
-+ if (recursion_cost > 170) {
-+ /*
-+ * recursion_cost is a logarithmic-scale indicator of how expensive this
-+ * recursive call might end up being. It is an indicator of the depth of
-+ * recursion as well as the potential for worst-case future recursive
-+ * calls. Since it's difficult to tell ahead of time how often recursion
-+ * will occur, this assumes the worst by assuming every tag could end up
-+ * causing recursion.
-+ * The value of 170 was chosen to limit typical EXIF structures to a
-+ * recursive depth of about 6, but pathological ones (those with very
-+ * many tags) to only 2.
-+ */
- exif_log (data->priv->log, EXIF_LOG_CODE_CORRUPT_DATA, "ExifData",
-- "Deep recursion detected!");
-+ "Deep/expensive recursion detected!");
- return;
- }
-
-@@ -422,15 +448,18 @@ exif_data_load_data_content (ExifData *data, ExifIfd ifd,
- switch (tag) {
- case EXIF_TAG_EXIF_IFD_POINTER:
- CHECK_REC (EXIF_IFD_EXIF);
-- exif_data_load_data_content (data, EXIF_IFD_EXIF, d, ds, o, recursion_depth + 1);
-+ exif_data_load_data_content (data, EXIF_IFD_EXIF, d, ds, o,
-+ recursion_cost + level_cost(n));
- break;
- case EXIF_TAG_GPS_INFO_IFD_POINTER:
- CHECK_REC (EXIF_IFD_GPS);
-- exif_data_load_data_content (data, EXIF_IFD_GPS, d, ds, o, recursion_depth + 1);
-+ exif_data_load_data_content (data, EXIF_IFD_GPS, d, ds, o,
-+ recursion_cost + level_cost(n));
- break;
- case EXIF_TAG_INTEROPERABILITY_IFD_POINTER:
- CHECK_REC (EXIF_IFD_INTEROPERABILITY);
-- exif_data_load_data_content (data, EXIF_IFD_INTEROPERABILITY, d, ds, o, recursion_depth + 1);
-+ exif_data_load_data_content (data, EXIF_IFD_INTEROPERABILITY, d, ds, o,
-+ recursion_cost + level_cost(n));
- break;
- case EXIF_TAG_JPEG_INTERCHANGE_FORMAT:
- thumbnail_offset = o;
diff --git a/user/libexif/CVE-2019-9278.patch b/user/libexif/CVE-2019-9278.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index bd15e8d13..000000000
--- a/user/libexif/CVE-2019-9278.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,85 +0,0 @@
-From 75aa73267fdb1e0ebfbc00369e7312bac43d0566 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Marcus Meissner <meissner@suse.de>
-Date: Sat, 18 Jan 2020 09:29:42 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH] fix CVE-2019-9278
-
-avoid the use of unsafe integer overflow checking constructs (unsigned integer operations cannot overflow, so "u1 + u2 > u1" can be optimized away)
-
-check for the actual sizes, which should also handle the overflows
-document other places google patched, but do not seem relevant due to other restrictions
-
-fixes https://github.com/libexif/libexif/issues/26
----
- libexif/exif-data.c | 28 ++++++++++++++++++----------
- 1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/libexif/exif-data.c b/libexif/exif-data.c
-index a6f9c94..6332cd1 100644
---- a/libexif/exif-data.c
-+++ b/libexif/exif-data.c
-@@ -192,9 +192,15 @@ exif_data_load_data_entry (ExifData *data, ExifEntry *entry,
- doff = offset + 8;
-
- /* Sanity checks */
-- if ((doff + s < doff) || (doff + s < s) || (doff + s > size)) {
-+ if (doff >= size) {
- exif_log (data->priv->log, EXIF_LOG_CODE_DEBUG, "ExifData",
-- "Tag data past end of buffer (%u > %u)", doff+s, size);
-+ "Tag starts past end of buffer (%u > %u)", doff, size);
-+ return 0;
-+ }
-+
-+ if (s > size - doff) {
-+ exif_log (data->priv->log, EXIF_LOG_CODE_DEBUG, "ExifData",
-+ "Tag data goes past end of buffer (%u > %u)", doff+s, size);
- return 0;
- }
-
-@@ -315,13 +321,14 @@ exif_data_load_data_thumbnail (ExifData *data, const unsigned char *d,
- unsigned int ds, ExifLong o, ExifLong s)
- {
- /* Sanity checks */
-- if ((o + s < o) || (o + s < s) || (o + s > ds) || (o > ds)) {
-- exif_log (data->priv->log, EXIF_LOG_CODE_DEBUG, "ExifData",
-- "Bogus thumbnail offset (%u) or size (%u).",
-- o, s);
-+ if (o >= ds) {
-+ exif_log (data->priv->log, EXIF_LOG_CODE_DEBUG, "ExifData", "Bogus thumbnail offset (%u).", o);
-+ return;
-+ }
-+ if (s > ds - o) {
-+ exif_log (data->priv->log, EXIF_LOG_CODE_DEBUG, "ExifData", "Bogus thumbnail size (%u), max would be %u.", s, ds-o);
- return;
- }
--
- if (data->data)
- exif_mem_free (data->priv->mem, data->data);
- if (!(data->data = exif_data_alloc (data, s))) {
-@@ -947,7 +954,7 @@ exif_data_load_data (ExifData *data, const unsigned char *d_orig,
- exif_log (data->priv->log, EXIF_LOG_CODE_DEBUG, "ExifData",
- "IFD 0 at %i.", (int) offset);
-
-- /* Sanity check the offset, being careful about overflow */
-+ /* ds is restricted to 16 bit above, so offset is restricted too, and offset+8 should not overflow. */
- if (offset > ds || offset + 6 + 2 > ds)
- return;
-
-@@ -956,6 +963,7 @@ exif_data_load_data (ExifData *data, const unsigned char *d_orig,
-
- /* IFD 1 offset */
- n = exif_get_short (d + 6 + offset, data->priv->order);
-+ /* offset < 2<<16, n is 16 bit at most, so this op will not overflow */
- if (offset + 6 + 2 + 12 * n + 4 > ds)
- return;
-
-@@ -964,8 +972,8 @@ exif_data_load_data (ExifData *data, const unsigned char *d_orig,
- exif_log (data->priv->log, EXIF_LOG_CODE_DEBUG, "ExifData",
- "IFD 1 at %i.", (int) offset);
-
-- /* Sanity check. */
-- if (offset > ds || offset + 6 > ds) {
-+ /* Sanity check. ds is ensured to be above 6 above, offset is 16bit */
-+ if (offset > ds - 6) {
- exif_log (data->priv->log, EXIF_LOG_CODE_CORRUPT_DATA,
- "ExifData", "Bogus offset of IFD1.");
- } else {
diff --git a/user/libexif/CVE-2020-0198.patch b/user/libexif/CVE-2020-0198.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..e0358c220
--- /dev/null
+++ b/user/libexif/CVE-2020-0198.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,58 @@
+From ce03ad7ef4e8aeefce79192bf5b6f69fae396f0c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Marcus Meissner <marcus@jet.franken.de>
+Date: Mon, 8 Jun 2020 17:27:06 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] fixed another unsigned integer overflow
+
+first fixed by google in android fork,
+https://android.googlesource.com/platform/external/libexif/+/1e187b62682ffab5003c702657d6d725b4278f16%5E%21/#F0
+
+(use a more generic overflow check method, also check second overflow instance.)
+
+https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2020-0198
+---
+ libexif/exif-data.c | 10 ++++++----
+ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/libexif/exif-data.c b/libexif/exif-data.c
+index 8b280d3..b495726 100644
+--- a/libexif/exif-data.c
++++ b/libexif/exif-data.c
+@@ -47,6 +47,8 @@
+ #undef JPEG_MARKER_APP1
+ #define JPEG_MARKER_APP1 0xe1
+
++#define CHECKOVERFLOW(offset,datasize,structsize) (( offset >= datasize) || (structsize > datasize) || (offset > datasize - structsize ))
++
+ static const unsigned char ExifHeader[] = {0x45, 0x78, 0x69, 0x66, 0x00, 0x00};
+
+ struct _ExifDataPrivate
+@@ -327,7 +329,7 @@ exif_data_load_data_thumbnail (ExifData *data, const unsigned char *d,
+ exif_log (data->priv->log, EXIF_LOG_CODE_DEBUG, "ExifData", "Bogus thumbnail offset (%u).", o);
+ return;
+ }
+- if (s > ds - o) {
++ if (CHECKOVERFLOW(o,ds,s)) {
+ exif_log (data->priv->log, EXIF_LOG_CODE_DEBUG, "ExifData", "Bogus thumbnail size (%u), max would be %u.", s, ds-o);
+ return;
+ }
+@@ -420,9 +422,9 @@ exif_data_load_data_content (ExifData *data, ExifIfd ifd,
+ }
+
+ /* Read the number of entries */
+- if ((offset + 2 < offset) || (offset + 2 < 2) || (offset + 2 > ds)) {
++ if (CHECKOVERFLOW(offset, ds, 2)) {
+ exif_log (data->priv->log, EXIF_LOG_CODE_CORRUPT_DATA, "ExifData",
+- "Tag data past end of buffer (%u > %u)", offset+2, ds);
++ "Tag data past end of buffer (%u+2 > %u)", offset, ds);
+ return;
+ }
+ n = exif_get_short (d + offset, data->priv->order);
+@@ -431,7 +433,7 @@ exif_data_load_data_content (ExifData *data, ExifIfd ifd,
+ offset += 2;
+
+ /* Check if we have enough data. */
+- if (offset + 12 * n > ds) {
++ if (CHECKOVERFLOW(offset, ds, 12*n)) {
+ n = (ds - offset) / 12;
+ exif_log (data->priv->log, EXIF_LOG_CODE_DEBUG, "ExifData",
+ "Short data; only loading %hu entries...", n);
diff --git a/user/libjpeg-turbo/APKBUILD b/user/libjpeg-turbo/APKBUILD
index ad4a4076a..cbecdd1a4 100644
--- a/user/libjpeg-turbo/APKBUILD
+++ b/user/libjpeg-turbo/APKBUILD
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
# Maintainer: A. Wilcox <awilfox@adelielinux.org>
pkgname=libjpeg-turbo
pkgver=2.0.4
-pkgrel=0
+pkgrel=1
pkgdesc="Accelerated JPEG compression and decompression library"
url="https://libjpeg-turbo.org/"
arch="all"
@@ -10,7 +10,9 @@ license="IJG AND BSD-3-Clause AND Zlib"
depends=""
makedepends="cmake"
subpackages="$pkgname-doc $pkgname-dev $pkgname-utils"
-source="https://downloads.sourceforge.net/libjpeg-turbo/libjpeg-turbo-$pkgver.tar.gz"
+source="https://downloads.sourceforge.net/libjpeg-turbo/libjpeg-turbo-$pkgver.tar.gz
+ CVE-2020-13790.patch
+ "
case "$CTARGET_ARCH" in
pmmx | x86 | x86_64) makedepends="$makedepends nasm" ;;
@@ -19,11 +21,20 @@ esac
# secfixes:
# 2.0.3-r0:
# - CVE-2019-2201
+# 2.0.4-r1:
+# - CVE-2020-13790
build() {
if [ "$CBUILD" != "$CHOST" ]; then
CMAKE_CROSSOPTS="-DCMAKE_SYSTEM_NAME=Linux -DCMAKE_HOST_SYSTEM_NAME=Linux"
fi
+
+ # https://github.com/libjpeg-turbo/libjpeg-turbo/issues/344
+ # https://github.com/libjpeg-turbo/libjpeg-turbo/issues/428
+ case "$CARCH" in
+ ppc) _floattest=64bit;;
+ esac
+
cmake \
-DCMAKE_INSTALL_PREFIX=/usr \
-DCMAKE_INSTALL_DEFAULT_LIBDIR=lib \
@@ -32,6 +43,7 @@ build() {
-DCMAKE_C_FLAGS="$CFLAGS" \
-DENABLE_STATIC=OFF \
-DWITH_JPEG8=ON \
+ ${_floattest:+-DFLOATTEST="$_floattest"} \
${CMAKE_CROSSOPTS} .
make
}
@@ -51,4 +63,5 @@ utils() {
mv "$pkgdir"/usr/bin "$subpkgdir"/usr/
}
-sha512sums="708c2e7418d9ed5abca313e2ff5a08f8176d79cad2127573cda6036583c201973db4cfb0eafc0fc8f57ecc7b000d2b4af95980de54de5a0aed45969e993a5bf9 libjpeg-turbo-2.0.4.tar.gz"
+sha512sums="708c2e7418d9ed5abca313e2ff5a08f8176d79cad2127573cda6036583c201973db4cfb0eafc0fc8f57ecc7b000d2b4af95980de54de5a0aed45969e993a5bf9 libjpeg-turbo-2.0.4.tar.gz
+83752558d0cf60508a9ccd55505b91f4faa22277537916629a045b2aaa0cb3649e2f90b0df26d389687dc4aba78bdf76e64fc5e5eb324a65026ec86cd95dbe6a CVE-2020-13790.patch"
diff --git a/user/libjpeg-turbo/CVE-2020-13790.patch b/user/libjpeg-turbo/CVE-2020-13790.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..aaeec0c9c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/user/libjpeg-turbo/CVE-2020-13790.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
+From 3de15e0c344d11d4b90f4a47136467053eb2d09a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: DRC <information@libjpeg-turbo.org>
+Date: Tue, 2 Jun 2020 14:15:37 -0500
+Subject: [PATCH] rdppm.c: Fix buf overrun caused by bad binary PPM
+
+This extends the fix in 1e81b0c3ea26f4ea8f56de05367469333de64a9f to
+include binary PPM files with maximum values < 255, thus preventing a
+malformed binary PPM input file with those specifications from
+triggering an overrun of the rescale array and potentially crashing
+cjpeg, TJBench, or any program that uses the tjLoadImage() function.
+
+Fixes #433
+
+diff --git a/rdppm.c b/rdppm.c
+index 87bc33090..a8507b902 100644
+--- a/rdppm.c
++++ b/rdppm.c
+@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@
+ * Copyright (C) 1991-1997, Thomas G. Lane.
+ * Modified 2009 by Bill Allombert, Guido Vollbeding.
+ * libjpeg-turbo Modifications:
+- * Copyright (C) 2015-2017, D. R. Commander.
++ * Copyright (C) 2015-2017, 2020, D. R. Commander.
+ * For conditions of distribution and use, see the accompanying README.ijg
+ * file.
+ *
+@@ -720,7 +720,7 @@ start_input_ppm(j_compress_ptr cinfo, cjpeg_source_ptr sinfo)
+ /* On 16-bit-int machines we have to be careful of maxval = 65535 */
+ source->rescale = (JSAMPLE *)
+ (*cinfo->mem->alloc_small) ((j_common_ptr)cinfo, JPOOL_IMAGE,
+- (size_t)(((long)maxval + 1L) *
++ (size_t)(((long)MAX(maxval, 255) + 1L) *
+ sizeof(JSAMPLE)));
+ half_maxval = maxval / 2;
+ for (val = 0; val <= (long)maxval; val++) {
diff --git a/user/nghttp2/APKBUILD b/user/nghttp2/APKBUILD
index 41dd0bc58..063bc9b0f 100644
--- a/user/nghttp2/APKBUILD
+++ b/user/nghttp2/APKBUILD
@@ -1,17 +1,22 @@
# Contributor: Natanael Copa <ncopa@alpinelinux.org>
# Maintainer:
pkgname=nghttp2
-pkgver=1.40.0
+pkgver=1.41.0
pkgrel=0
pkgdesc="Experimental HTTP/2 client, server and proxy"
url="https://nghttp2.org/"
arch="all"
+options="!check" # Requires cunit, which we don't currently ship
license="MIT"
depends=""
makedepends="c-ares-dev libev-dev libxml2-dev openssl-dev zlib-dev"
subpackages="$pkgname-dev $pkgname-doc $pkgname-libs"
source="https://github.com/tatsuhiro-t/$pkgname/releases/download/v$pkgver/nghttp2-$pkgver.tar.xz"
+# secfixes:
+# 1.41.0-r0:
+# - CVE-2020-11080
+
build() {
./configure \
--build=$CBUILD \
@@ -37,4 +42,4 @@ package() {
make DESTDIR="$pkgdir" install
}
-sha512sums="3f9b989c4bd9571b11bb9d59fe2dfd5596ba3962babfc836587d5047e780400a6cf46e43c602caa25ca83c03b84a1629953140d45223099b193df54a719745ce nghttp2-1.40.0.tar.xz"
+sha512sums="c92e8022ccc876fa311f21bc5bf5af75feff8232efb56a4b2ab198031e974d15b67c16c046188cc76552f75a1b2e7115925d6ce1e42d6f94ae482fe69727466d nghttp2-1.41.0.tar.xz"
diff --git a/user/openldap/APKBUILD b/user/openldap/APKBUILD
index 30f2059ff..1743a4e6d 100644
--- a/user/openldap/APKBUILD
+++ b/user/openldap/APKBUILD
@@ -1,6 +1,8 @@
# Maintainer: A. Wilcox <awilfox@adelielinux.org>
#
# secfixes:
+# 2.4.50-r0:
+# - CVE-2020-12243
# 2.4.48-r0:
# - CVE-2019-13057
# - CVE-2019-13565
@@ -11,7 +13,7 @@
# - CVE-2017-9287
#
pkgname=openldap
-pkgver=2.4.49
+pkgver=2.4.50
pkgrel=0
pkgdesc="LDAP Server"
url="https://www.openldap.org/"
@@ -29,7 +31,7 @@ subpackages="$pkgname-dev $pkgname-doc libldap $pkgname-openrc
pkgusers="ldap"
pkggroups="ldap"
install="$pkgname.pre-install $pkgname.post-install $pkgname.post-upgrade"
-source="ftp://ftp.$pkgname.org/pub/OpenLDAP/$pkgname-release/$pkgname-$pkgver.tgz
+source="https://www.$pkgname.org/software/download/OpenLDAP/$pkgname-release/$pkgname-$pkgver.tgz
openldap-2.4-ppolicy.patch
openldap-2.4.11-libldap_r.patch
fix-manpages.patch
@@ -60,7 +62,6 @@ done
prepare() {
default_prepare
- update_config_sub
sed -i '/^STRIP/s,-s,,g' build/top.mk
libtoolize --force && aclocal && autoconf
@@ -198,7 +199,7 @@ _submv() {
done
}
-sha512sums="99d1943d126b06e62865e31e5825fcff2cb15415f7f85ae4962fa0e7425bc3b58db5b9639150d7b09e3642c80257724c745e47c25ab4fcb1bba0ba771011dd49 openldap-2.4.49.tgz
+sha512sums="f528043ff9de36f7b65d8816c9a9c24f0ac400041b2969965178ee6eae62c92a11af33a0a883e4954e5fff98a0738a9f9aa2faf5b385d21974754e045aab31ae openldap-2.4.50.tgz
5d34d49eabe7cb66cf8284cc3bd9730fa23df4932df68549e242d250ee50d40c434ae074ebc720d5fbcd9d16587c9333c5598d30a5f1177caa61461ab7771f38 openldap-2.4-ppolicy.patch
44d97efb25d4f39ab10cd5571db43f3bfa7c617a5bb087085ae16c0298aca899b55c8742a502121ba743a73e6d77cd2056bc96cee63d6d0862dabc8fb5574357 openldap-2.4.11-libldap_r.patch
8c4244d316a05870dd1147b2ab7ddbcfd7626b5dce2f5a0e72f066dc635c2edb4f1ea3be88c6fec2d5ab016001be16bedef70f2ce0695c3cd96f69e1614ff177 fix-manpages.patch
diff --git a/user/py3-pyyaml/APKBUILD b/user/py3-pyyaml/APKBUILD
index e2ce44251..afbf6f336 100644
--- a/user/py3-pyyaml/APKBUILD
+++ b/user/py3-pyyaml/APKBUILD
@@ -2,11 +2,12 @@
# Maintainer:
pkgname=py3-pyyaml
_pkgname=pyyaml
-pkgver=5.1.2
+pkgver=5.3.1
pkgrel=0
pkgdesc="YAML parser and emitter for Python"
url="https://pyyaml.org/wiki/PyYAML"
arch="noarch"
+# Certified net clean
license="MIT"
depends="python3 yaml"
makedepends="python3-dev yaml yaml-dev"
@@ -14,6 +15,10 @@ subpackages=""
source="$pkgname-$pkgver.tar.gz::https://github.com/yaml/$_pkgname/archive/$pkgver.tar.gz"
builddir="$srcdir/$_pkgname-$pkgver"
+# secfixes:
+# 5.3.1-r0:
+# - CVE-2020-1747
+
build() {
# Seems like they need Cython to build the C extension now, so it falls back to pure Python.
# Once we ship Cython we can probably change this.
@@ -28,4 +33,4 @@ package() {
python3 setup.py install --prefix=/usr --root="$pkgdir"
}
-sha512sums="7bc3dceadcfd512ede67581625887d00822464f20d3b646904f4a73afce8cf3b9766829c6004b626c31757edf8e2eedc27e60d96bee13afa68d3296a8a7f33bb py3-pyyaml-5.1.2.tar.gz"
+sha512sums="27d97e8493c7660c7c0c471e20a8aa46c85431e4559a98bcbdafc2bd89a67fd04c6f2090e54ff6b206c868b33635ef8be68070a4c25d17a25c97fd5ad3549556 py3-pyyaml-5.3.1.tar.gz"