1 files changed, 0 insertions, 112 deletions
diff --git a/system/musl/CVE-2020-28928.patch b/system/musl/CVE-2020-28928.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index cc668e149..000000000
--- a/system/musl/CVE-2020-28928.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,112 +0,0 @@
-From 3ab2a4e02682df1382955071919d8aa3c3ec40d4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Rich Felker <dalias@aerifal.cx>
-Date: Thu, 19 Nov 2020 17:12:43 -0500
-Subject: [PATCH] rewrite wcsnrtombs to fix buffer overflow and other bugs
-
-the original wcsnrtombs implementation, which has been largely
-untouched since 0.5.0, attempted to build input-length-limiting
-conversion on top of wcsrtombs, which only limits output length. as
-best I recall, this choice was made out of a mix of disdain over
-having yet another variant function to implement (added in POSIX 2008;
-not standard C) and preference not to switch things around and
-implement the wcsrtombs in terms of the more general new function,
-probably over namespace issues. the strategy employed was to impose
-output limits that would ensure the input limit wasn't exceeded, then
-finish up the tail character-at-a-time. unfortunately, none of that
-worked correctly.
-
-first, the logic in the wcsrtombs loop was wrong in that it could
-easily get stuck making no forward progress, by imposing an output
-limit too small to convert even one character.
-
-the character-at-a-time loop that followed was even worse. it made no
-effort to ensure that the converted multibyte character would fit in
-the remaining output space, only that there was a nonzero amount of
-output space remaining. it also employed an incorrect interpretation
-of wcrtomb's interface contract for converting the null character,
-thereby failing to act on end of input, and remaining space accounting
-was subject to unsigned wrap-around. together these errors allow
-unbounded overflow of the destination buffer, controlled by input
-length limit and input wchar_t string contents.
-
-given the extent to which this function was broken, it's plausible
-that most applications that would have been rendered exploitable were
-sufficiently broken not to be usable in the first place. however, it's
-also plausible that common (especially ASCII-only) inputs succeeded in
-the wcsrtombs loop, which mostly worked, while leaving the wildly
-erroneous code in the second loop exposed to particular non-ASCII
-inputs.
-
-CVE-2020-28928 has been assigned for this issue.
----
- src/multibyte/wcsnrtombs.c | 46 ++++++++++++++++----------------------
- 1 file changed, 19 insertions(+), 27 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/src/multibyte/wcsnrtombs.c b/src/multibyte/wcsnrtombs.c
-index 676932b5..95e25e70 100644
---- a/src/multibyte/wcsnrtombs.c
-+++ b/src/multibyte/wcsnrtombs.c
-@@ -1,41 +1,33 @@
- #include <wchar.h>
-+#include <limits.h>
-+#include <string.h>
- 
- size_t wcsnrtombs(char *restrict dst, const wchar_t **restrict wcs, size_t wn, size_t n, mbstate_t *restrict st)
- {
--	size_t l, cnt=0, n2;
--	char *s, buf[256];
- 	const wchar_t *ws = *wcs;
--	const wchar_t *tmp_ws;
--
--	if (!dst) s = buf, n = sizeof buf;
--	else s = dst;
--
--	while ( ws && n && ( (n2=wn)>=n || n2>32 ) ) {
--		if (n2>=n) n2=n;
--		tmp_ws = ws;
--		l = wcsrtombs(s, &ws, n2, 0);
--		if (!(l+1)) {
--			cnt = l;
--			n = 0;
-+	size_t cnt = 0;
-+	if (!dst) n=0;
-+	while (ws && wn) {
-+		char tmp[MB_LEN_MAX];
-+		size_t l = wcrtomb(n<MB_LEN_MAX ? tmp : dst, *ws, 0);
-+		if (l==-1) {
-+			cnt = -1;
- 			break;
- 		}
--		if (s != buf) {
--			s += l;
-+		if (dst) {
-+			if (n<MB_LEN_MAX) {
-+				if (l>n) break;
-+				memcpy(dst, tmp, l);
-+			}
-+			dst += l;
- 			n -= l;
- 		}
--		wn = ws ? wn - (ws - tmp_ws) : 0;
--		cnt += l;
--	}
--	if (ws) while (n && wn) {
--		l = wcrtomb(s, *ws, 0);
--		if ((l+1)<=1) {
--			if (!l) ws = 0;
--			else cnt = l;
-+		if (!*ws) {
-+			ws = 0;
- 			break;
- 		}
--		ws++; wn--;
--		/* safe - this loop runs fewer than sizeof(buf) times */
--		s+=l; n-=l;
-+		ws++;
-+		wn--;
- 		cnt += l;
- 	}
- 	if (dst) *wcs = ws;
--- 
-2.25.4
-