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-rw-r--r--system/unzip/10-unzip-handle-pkware-verify.patch21
-rw-r--r--system/unzip/20-unzip-uidgid-fix.patch29
-rw-r--r--system/unzip/APKBUILD43
-rw-r--r--system/unzip/unzip-6.0-heap-overflow-infloop.patch104
4 files changed, 197 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/system/unzip/10-unzip-handle-pkware-verify.patch b/system/unzip/10-unzip-handle-pkware-verify.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..b373ce07d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/system/unzip/10-unzip-handle-pkware-verify.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
+From: Steven Schweda
+Subject: Handle the PKWare verification bit of internal attributes
+Bug-Debian: http://bugs.debian.org/630078
+X-Debian-version: 6.0-5
+
+--- a/process.c
++++ b/process.c
+@@ -1729,6 +1729,13 @@
+ else if (uO.L_flag > 1) /* let -LL force lower case for all names */
+ G.pInfo->lcflag = 1;
+
++ /* Handle the PKWare verification bit, bit 2 (0x0004) of internal
++ attributes. If this is set, then a verification checksum is in the
++ first 3 bytes of the external attributes. In this case all we can use
++ for setting file attributes is the last external attributes byte. */
++ if (G.crec.internal_file_attributes & 0x0004)
++ G.crec.external_file_attributes &= (ulg)0xff;
++
+ /* do Amigas (AMIGA_) also have volume labels? */
+ if (IS_VOLID(G.crec.external_file_attributes) &&
+ (G.pInfo->hostnum == FS_FAT_ || G.pInfo->hostnum == FS_HPFS_ ||
diff --git a/system/unzip/20-unzip-uidgid-fix.patch b/system/unzip/20-unzip-uidgid-fix.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..3a308990e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/system/unzip/20-unzip-uidgid-fix.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
+From: sms
+Subject: Restore uid and gid information when requested
+Bug-Debian: http://bugs.debian.org/689212
+X-Debian-version: 6.0-8
+
+--- a/process.c
++++ b/process.c
+@@ -2904,7 +2904,7 @@
+ #ifdef IZ_HAVE_UXUIDGID
+ if (eb_len >= EB_UX3_MINLEN
+ && z_uidgid != NULL
+- && (*((EB_HEADSIZE + 0) + ef_buf) == 1)
++ && (*((EB_HEADSIZE + 0) + ef_buf) == 1))
+ /* only know about version 1 */
+ {
+ uch uid_size;
+@@ -2916,10 +2916,10 @@
+ flags &= ~0x0ff; /* ignore any previous UNIX field */
+
+ if ( read_ux3_value((EB_HEADSIZE + 2) + ef_buf,
+- uid_size, z_uidgid[0])
++ uid_size, &z_uidgid[0])
+ &&
+ read_ux3_value((EB_HEADSIZE + uid_size + 3) + ef_buf,
+- gid_size, z_uidgid[1]) )
++ gid_size, &z_uidgid[1]) )
+ {
+ flags |= EB_UX2_VALID; /* signal success */
+ }
diff --git a/system/unzip/APKBUILD b/system/unzip/APKBUILD
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..07e303361
--- /dev/null
+++ b/system/unzip/APKBUILD
@@ -0,0 +1,43 @@
+# Contributor: Sören Tempel <soeren+alpine@soeren-tempel.net>
+# Maintainer: Timo Teräs <timo.teras@iki.fi>
+pkgname=unzip
+pkgver=6.0
+_pkgver=${pkgver//./}
+pkgrel=2
+pkgdesc="Extract PKZIP-compatible .zip files"
+url="http://www.info-zip.org/UnZip.html"
+arch="all"
+license="custom"
+subpackages="$pkgname-doc"
+options="!check"
+# normally ftp://ftp.info-zip.org/pub/infozip/src/$pkgname$_pkgver.zip
+source="https://dev.alpinelinux.org/archive/unzip/$pkgname$_pkgver.tgz
+ 10-unzip-handle-pkware-verify.patch
+ 20-unzip-uidgid-fix.patch
+ unzip-6.0-heap-overflow-infloop.patch
+ "
+builddir="$srcdir/$pkgname$_pkgver"
+
+build() {
+ cd "$builddir"
+
+ make -f unix/Makefile \
+ CC="${CHOST}-gcc" \
+ LOCAL_ZIP="${CFLAGS} ${CPPFLAGS}" \
+ prefix=/usr generic
+}
+
+package() {
+ cd "$builddir"
+
+ make -f unix/Makefile \
+ MANDIR=${pkgdir}/usr/share/man/man1/ \
+ prefix=${pkgdir}/usr install
+ install -Dm644 LICENSE \
+ "$pkgdir"/usr/share/licenses/$pkgname/LICENSE
+}
+
+sha512sums="0694e403ebc57b37218e00ec1a406cae5cc9c5b52b6798e0d4590840b6cdbf9ddc0d9471f67af783e960f8fa2e620394d51384257dca23d06bcd90224a80ce5d unzip60.tgz
+9d2914f22fb0075a2b6f72825c235f46eafd8d47b6fb6fcc8303fc69336e256b15923c002d2615bb6af733344c2315e4a8504d77bae301e10c11d4736faa2c81 10-unzip-handle-pkware-verify.patch
+57699582e9056af0817dcb67f8db67e6a1ff8208c137fbebcf559429e5f12b471b75d7e1ef938e5bbb5416074a51ac7342e4ce8057f4bbdcb0bf079b8d7832af 20-unzip-uidgid-fix.patch
+b1e3fac6a787828efaaef8ec7cc52e1573aea27a6f29830af37ec4ba8bcd2a6488c953ab10eee0561c78e82c7401833ef172bebee793405d93632ce788756301 unzip-6.0-heap-overflow-infloop.patch"
diff --git a/system/unzip/unzip-6.0-heap-overflow-infloop.patch b/system/unzip/unzip-6.0-heap-overflow-infloop.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..160c512f9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/system/unzip/unzip-6.0-heap-overflow-infloop.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,104 @@
+From bdd4a0cecd745cb4825e4508b5bdf2579731086a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Petr Stodulka <pstodulk@redhat.com>
+Date: Mon, 14 Sep 2015 18:23:17 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 1/3] upstream fix for heap overflow
+
+https://bugzilla.redhat.com/attachment.cgi?id=1073002
+---
+ crypt.c | 12 +++++++++++-
+ 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/crypt.c b/crypt.c
+index 784e411..a8975f2 100644
+--- a/crypt.c
++++ b/crypt.c
+@@ -465,7 +465,17 @@ int decrypt(__G__ passwrd)
+ GLOBAL(pInfo->encrypted) = FALSE;
+ defer_leftover_input(__G);
+ for (n = 0; n < RAND_HEAD_LEN; n++) {
+- b = NEXTBYTE;
++ /* 2012-11-23 SMS. (OUSPG report.)
++ * Quit early if compressed size < HEAD_LEN. The resulting
++ * error message ("unable to get password") could be improved,
++ * but it's better than trying to read nonexistent data, and
++ * then continuing with a negative G.csize. (See
++ * fileio.c:readbyte()).
++ */
++ if ((b = NEXTBYTE) == (ush)EOF)
++ {
++ return PK_ERR;
++ }
+ h[n] = (uch)b;
+ Trace((stdout, " (%02x)", h[n]));
+ }
+--
+2.4.6
+
+
+From 4b48844661ff9569f2ecf582a387d46a5775b5d8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Kamil Dudka <kdudka@redhat.com>
+Date: Mon, 14 Sep 2015 18:24:56 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 2/3] fix infinite loop when extracting empty bzip2 data
+
+Bug: https://sourceforge.net/p/infozip/patches/23/
+---
+ extract.c | 6 ++++++
+ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/extract.c b/extract.c
+index 7134bfe..29db027 100644
+--- a/extract.c
++++ b/extract.c
+@@ -2733,6 +2733,12 @@ __GDEF
+ int repeated_buf_err;
+ bz_stream bstrm;
+
++ if (G.incnt <= 0 && G.csize <= 0L) {
++ /* avoid an infinite loop */
++ Trace((stderr, "UZbunzip2() got empty input\n"));
++ return 2;
++ }
++
+ #if (defined(DLL) && !defined(NO_SLIDE_REDIR))
+ if (G.redirect_slide)
+ wsize = G.redirect_size, redirSlide = G.redirect_buffer;
+--
+2.4.6
+
+
+From bd150334fb4084f5555a6be26b015a0671cb5b74 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Kamil Dudka <kdudka@redhat.com>
+Date: Tue, 22 Sep 2015 18:52:23 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 3/3] extract: prevent unsigned overflow on invalid input
+
+Suggested-by: Stefan Cornelius
+---
+ extract.c | 11 ++++++++++-
+ 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/extract.c b/extract.c
+index 29db027..b9ae667 100644
+--- a/extract.c
++++ b/extract.c
+@@ -1257,8 +1257,17 @@ static int extract_or_test_entrylist(__G__ numchunk,
+ if (G.lrec.compression_method == STORED) {
+ zusz_t csiz_decrypted = G.lrec.csize;
+
+- if (G.pInfo->encrypted)
++ if (G.pInfo->encrypted) {
++ if (csiz_decrypted <= 12) {
++ /* handle the error now to prevent unsigned overflow */
++ Info(slide, 0x401, ((char *)slide,
++ LoadFarStringSmall(ErrUnzipNoFile),
++ LoadFarString(InvalidComprData),
++ LoadFarStringSmall2(Inflate)));
++ return PK_ERR;
++ }
+ csiz_decrypted -= 12;
++ }
+ if (G.lrec.ucsize != csiz_decrypted) {
+ Info(slide, 0x401, ((char *)slide,
+ LoadFarStringSmall2(WrnStorUCSizCSizDiff),
+--
+2.5.2
+