diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'system')
| -rw-r--r-- | system/musl/APKBUILD | 6 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | system/musl/CVE-2020-28928.patch | 112 |
2 files changed, 117 insertions, 1 deletions
diff --git a/system/musl/APKBUILD b/system/musl/APKBUILD index 8517b148b..735541e51 100644 --- a/system/musl/APKBUILD +++ b/system/musl/APKBUILD @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ # Maintainer: A. Wilcox <awilfox@adelielinux.org> pkgname=musl pkgver=1.2.0 -pkgrel=1 +pkgrel=2 pkgdesc="System library (libc) implementation" url="https://www.musl-libc.org/" arch="all" @@ -27,6 +27,7 @@ source="https://musl.libc.org/releases/$pkgname-$pkgver.tar.gz handle-aux-at_base.patch fgetspent_r.patch threads_minus_1.patch + CVE-2020-28928.patch ldconfig getent.c @@ -38,6 +39,8 @@ source="https://musl.libc.org/releases/$pkgname-$pkgver.tar.gz # - CVE-2016-8859 # 1.1.23-r2: # - CVE-2019-14697 +# 1.2.0-r2: +# - CVE-2020-28928 build() { [ "$BOOTSTRAP" = "nocc" ] && return 0 @@ -123,6 +126,7 @@ f01ab92b9d385c15369c0bb7d95e1bc06a009c8851e363517d0ba1bae3fc2647af69fc2f363b5d96 6a7ff16d95b5d1be77e0a0fbb245491817db192176496a57b22ab037637d97a185ea0b0d19da687da66c2a2f5578e4343d230f399d49fe377d8f008410974238 handle-aux-at_base.patch ded41235148930f8cf781538f7d63ecb0c65ea4e8ce792565f3649ee2523592a76b2a166785f0b145fc79f5852fd1fb1729a7a09110b3b8f85cba3912e790807 fgetspent_r.patch 68830961e297d9a499f3b609be84848ad5d3326a1af56e9e54a40ecd972c48da11532c51da572d45e0df3574d63191e7ae0d3a1b84a029365f8d00691de96952 threads_minus_1.patch +343ac5e5365cf98a5d5b7bc192c671733fdba27f06b83484f1ac7647154228745415f62dd676029de538460f8b35e0a70ca453a0f8b73226ed1c420099b1cf90 CVE-2020-28928.patch cb71d29a87f334c75ecbc911becde7be825ab30d8f39fa6d64cb53812a7c9abaf91d9804c72540e5be3ddd3c84cfe7fd9632274309005cb8bcdf9a9b09b4b923 ldconfig 378d70e65bcc65bb4e1415354cecfa54b0c1146dfb24474b69e418cdbf7ad730472cd09f6f103e1c99ba6c324c9560bccdf287f5889bbc3ef0bdf0e08da47413 getent.c 9d42d66fb1facce2b85dad919be5be819ee290bd26ca2db00982b2f8e055a0196290a008711cbe2b18ec9eee8d2270e3b3a4692c5a1b807013baa5c2b70a2bbf iconv.c" diff --git a/system/musl/CVE-2020-28928.patch b/system/musl/CVE-2020-28928.patch new file mode 100644 index 000000000..cc668e149 --- /dev/null +++ b/system/musl/CVE-2020-28928.patch @@ -0,0 +1,112 @@ +From 3ab2a4e02682df1382955071919d8aa3c3ec40d4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Rich Felker <dalias@aerifal.cx> +Date: Thu, 19 Nov 2020 17:12:43 -0500 +Subject: [PATCH] rewrite wcsnrtombs to fix buffer overflow and other bugs + +the original wcsnrtombs implementation, which has been largely +untouched since 0.5.0, attempted to build input-length-limiting +conversion on top of wcsrtombs, which only limits output length. as +best I recall, this choice was made out of a mix of disdain over +having yet another variant function to implement (added in POSIX 2008; +not standard C) and preference not to switch things around and +implement the wcsrtombs in terms of the more general new function, +probably over namespace issues. the strategy employed was to impose +output limits that would ensure the input limit wasn't exceeded, then +finish up the tail character-at-a-time. unfortunately, none of that +worked correctly. + +first, the logic in the wcsrtombs loop was wrong in that it could +easily get stuck making no forward progress, by imposing an output +limit too small to convert even one character. + +the character-at-a-time loop that followed was even worse. it made no +effort to ensure that the converted multibyte character would fit in +the remaining output space, only that there was a nonzero amount of +output space remaining. it also employed an incorrect interpretation +of wcrtomb's interface contract for converting the null character, +thereby failing to act on end of input, and remaining space accounting +was subject to unsigned wrap-around. together these errors allow +unbounded overflow of the destination buffer, controlled by input +length limit and input wchar_t string contents. + +given the extent to which this function was broken, it's plausible +that most applications that would have been rendered exploitable were +sufficiently broken not to be usable in the first place. however, it's +also plausible that common (especially ASCII-only) inputs succeeded in +the wcsrtombs loop, which mostly worked, while leaving the wildly +erroneous code in the second loop exposed to particular non-ASCII +inputs. + +CVE-2020-28928 has been assigned for this issue. +--- + src/multibyte/wcsnrtombs.c | 46 ++++++++++++++++---------------------- + 1 file changed, 19 insertions(+), 27 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/src/multibyte/wcsnrtombs.c b/src/multibyte/wcsnrtombs.c +index 676932b5..95e25e70 100644 +--- a/src/multibyte/wcsnrtombs.c ++++ b/src/multibyte/wcsnrtombs.c +@@ -1,41 +1,33 @@ + #include <wchar.h> ++#include <limits.h> ++#include <string.h> + + size_t wcsnrtombs(char *restrict dst, const wchar_t **restrict wcs, size_t wn, size_t n, mbstate_t *restrict st) + { +- size_t l, cnt=0, n2; +- char *s, buf[256]; + const wchar_t *ws = *wcs; +- const wchar_t *tmp_ws; +- +- if (!dst) s = buf, n = sizeof buf; +- else s = dst; +- +- while ( ws && n && ( (n2=wn)>=n || n2>32 ) ) { +- if (n2>=n) n2=n; +- tmp_ws = ws; +- l = wcsrtombs(s, &ws, n2, 0); +- if (!(l+1)) { +- cnt = l; +- n = 0; ++ size_t cnt = 0; ++ if (!dst) n=0; ++ while (ws && wn) { ++ char tmp[MB_LEN_MAX]; ++ size_t l = wcrtomb(n<MB_LEN_MAX ? tmp : dst, *ws, 0); ++ if (l==-1) { ++ cnt = -1; + break; + } +- if (s != buf) { +- s += l; ++ if (dst) { ++ if (n<MB_LEN_MAX) { ++ if (l>n) break; ++ memcpy(dst, tmp, l); ++ } ++ dst += l; + n -= l; + } +- wn = ws ? wn - (ws - tmp_ws) : 0; +- cnt += l; +- } +- if (ws) while (n && wn) { +- l = wcrtomb(s, *ws, 0); +- if ((l+1)<=1) { +- if (!l) ws = 0; +- else cnt = l; ++ if (!*ws) { ++ ws = 0; + break; + } +- ws++; wn--; +- /* safe - this loop runs fewer than sizeof(buf) times */ +- s+=l; n-=l; ++ ws++; ++ wn--; + cnt += l; + } + if (dst) *wcs = ws; +-- +2.25.4 + |