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-rw-r--r--user/sox/CVE-2017-18189.patch33
1 files changed, 33 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/user/sox/CVE-2017-18189.patch b/user/sox/CVE-2017-18189.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..aa3791d01
--- /dev/null
+++ b/user/sox/CVE-2017-18189.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
+From 09d7388c8ad5701ed9c59d1d600ff6154b066397 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Mans Rullgard <mans@mansr.com>
+Date: Thu, 9 Nov 2017 11:45:10 +0000
+Subject: [PATCH] xa: validate channel count (CVE-2017-18189)
+
+A corrupt header specifying zero channels would send read_channels()
+into an infinite loop. Prevent this by sanity checking the channel
+count in open_read(). Also add an upper bound to prevent overflow
+in multiplication.
+---
+ src/xa.c | 6 ++++++
+ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/src/xa.c b/src/xa.c
+index 81a76772..9fc086ec 100644
+--- a/src/xa.c
++++ b/src/xa.c
+@@ -143,6 +143,12 @@ static int startread(sox_format_t * ft)
+ lsx_report("User options overriding rate read in .xa header");
+ }
+
++ if (ft->signal.channels == 0 || ft->signal.channels > UINT16_MAX) {
++ lsx_fail_errno(ft, SOX_EFMT, "invalid channel count %d",
++ ft->signal.channels);
++ return SOX_EOF;
++ }
++
+ /* Check for supported formats */
+ if (ft->encoding.bits_per_sample != 16) {
+ lsx_fail_errno(ft, SOX_EFMT, "%d-bit sample resolution not supported.",
+--
+2.25.0
+