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authorReid Rankin <reidrankin@gmail.com>2020-01-23 16:11:03 +0000
committerTimo Teräs <timo.teras@iki.fi>2020-01-24 09:28:00 +0200
commit093c4b80777ccaff95789ec9cafd630a321fcc36 (patch)
treec99f44ac1a282b4aa893fff07542f4385b62e2bf /src/package.c
parent1f9e56d8a4a0042816ea793c256101249541a8d1 (diff)
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Improve documentation of signature verification process
Diffstat (limited to 'src/package.c')
-rw-r--r--src/package.c26
1 files changed, 19 insertions, 7 deletions
diff --git a/src/package.c b/src/package.c
index 3b7c6bd..01ae3aa 100644
--- a/src/package.c
+++ b/src/package.c
@@ -474,9 +474,14 @@ void apk_sign_ctx_init(struct apk_sign_ctx *ctx, int action,
ctx->action = action;
switch (action) {
case APK_SIGN_VERIFY:
+ /* If we're only verifing, we're going to start with a
+ * signature section, which we don't need a hash of */
ctx->md = EVP_md_null();
break;
case APK_SIGN_VERIFY_IDENTITY:
+ /* If we're checking the package against a particular hash,
+ * we need to start with that hash, because there may not
+ * be a signature section to deduce it from */
ctx->md = EVP_sha1();
memcpy(&ctx->identity, identity, sizeof(ctx->identity));
break;
@@ -566,10 +571,10 @@ int apk_sign_ctx_process_file(struct apk_sign_ctx *ctx,
return 1;
}
- /* A signature file */
+ /* By this point, we must be handling a signature file */
ctx->num_signatures++;
- /* Found already a trusted key */
+ /* Already found a signature by a trusted key; no need to keep searching */
if ((ctx->action != APK_SIGN_VERIFY &&
ctx->action != APK_SIGN_VERIFY_AND_GENERATE) ||
ctx->signature.pkey != NULL)
@@ -645,6 +650,12 @@ int apk_sign_ctx_verify_tar(void *sctx, const struct apk_file_info *fi,
return 0;
}
+/* apk_sign_ctx_mpart_cb() handles hashing archives and checking signatures, but
+ it can't do it alone. apk_sign_ctx_process_file() must be in the loop to
+ actually select which signature is to be verified and load the corresponding
+ public key into the context object, and apk_sign_ctx_parse_pkginfo_line()
+ needs to be called when handling the .PKGINFO file to find any applicable
+ datahash and load it into the context for this function to check against. */
int apk_sign_ctx_mpart_cb(void *ctx, int part, apk_blob_t data)
{
struct apk_sign_ctx *sctx = (struct apk_sign_ctx *) ctx;
@@ -671,14 +682,12 @@ int apk_sign_ctx_mpart_cb(void *ctx, int part, apk_blob_t data)
part != APK_MPART_END)
goto update_digest;
- /* Drool in the remaining of the digest block now, we will finish
- * it on all cases */
+ /* Drool in the remainder of the digest block now, we will finish
+ * hashing it in all cases */
EVP_DigestUpdate(sctx->mdctx, data.ptr, data.len);
- /* End of control-block and checking control hash/signature or
- * end of data-block and checking its hash/signature */
if (sctx->has_data_checksum && !end_of_control) {
- /* End of control-block and check it's hash */
+ /* End of data-block with a checksum read from the control block */
EVP_DigestFinal_ex(sctx->mdctx, calculated, NULL);
if (EVP_MD_CTX_size(sctx->mdctx) == 0 ||
memcmp(calculated, sctx->data_checksum,
@@ -691,6 +700,9 @@ int apk_sign_ctx_mpart_cb(void *ctx, int part, apk_blob_t data)
return 0;
}
+ /* Either end of control block with a data checksum or end
+ * of the data block following a control block without a data
+ * checksum. In either case, we're checking a signature. */
r = check_signing_key_trust(sctx);
if (r < 0)
return r;