diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'user/libexif')
-rw-r--r-- | user/libexif/APKBUILD | 33 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | user/libexif/CVE-2017-7544.patch | 30 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | user/libexif/CVE-2018-20030.patch | 115 |
3 files changed, 18 insertions, 160 deletions
diff --git a/user/libexif/APKBUILD b/user/libexif/APKBUILD index 71c9f7d06..802ed838c 100644 --- a/user/libexif/APKBUILD +++ b/user/libexif/APKBUILD @@ -1,27 +1,32 @@ -# Maintainer: +# Maintainer: Zach van Rijn <me@zv.io> pkgname=libexif -pkgver=0.6.21 -pkgrel=3 +pkgver=0.6.24 +_pkgver=$(printf '%s' "$pkgver" | tr . _) +pkgrel=0 pkgdesc="Library to parse EXIF metadata" -url="https://sourceforge.net/projects/libexif" +url="https://libexif.github.io/" arch="all" license="LGPL-2.0+" subpackages="$pkgname-dev $pkgname-doc $pkgname-lang" depends="" makedepends="" -source="https://downloads.sourceforge.net/$pkgname/$pkgname-$pkgver.tar.bz2 - CVE-2017-7544.patch - CVE-2018-20030.patch" +source="https://github.com/libexif/$pkgname/releases/download/v$pkgver/$pkgname-$pkgver.tar.bz2" # secfixes: # 0.6.21-r3: # - CVE-2017-7544 # - CVE-2018-20030 - -prepare() { - update_config_sub - default_prepare -} +# 0.6.21-r4: +# - CVE-2016-6328 +# - CVE-2019-9278 +# 0.6.22-r0: +# - CVE-2020-0093 +# - CVE-2020-0182 +# - CVE-2020-0198 +# - CVE-2020-12767 +# - CVE-2020-13112 +# - CVE-2020-13113 +# - CVE-2020-13114 build() { ./configure \ @@ -39,6 +44,4 @@ package() { make DESTDIR="$pkgdir" install } -sha512sums="4e0fe2abe85d1c95b41cb3abe1f6333dc3a9eb69dba106a674a78d74a4d5b9c5a19647118fa1cc2d72b98a29853394f1519eda9e2889eb28d3be26b21c7cfc35 libexif-0.6.21.tar.bz2 -d529c6c5bd26dc21c0946702574184e1f61c2bfd4fb95b41e314f486a0dd55571963ff2cad566d2fb0804de3c0799bcd956c15a3dc10a520ce207728edad4e2d CVE-2017-7544.patch -0d6123bd275ace338ad9cebb31a2e714de0141b91860f07394b281686a5393566c3f4159679d4ba689ae7ea69ae2e412b158c3deb451c40c210b5817f6888bbc CVE-2018-20030.patch" +sha512sums="35c9e7af2c3d44a638dc6bbe8f96962d41c0f3fe4a257494f7a73baefab9aba507477175289ccf9002a66cc16ca53d5d1f44d6fef9e014b27f687ecdc58f5111 libexif-0.6.24.tar.bz2" diff --git a/user/libexif/CVE-2017-7544.patch b/user/libexif/CVE-2017-7544.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 534817417..000000000 --- a/user/libexif/CVE-2017-7544.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,30 +0,0 @@ -From c39acd1692023b26290778a02a9232c873f9d71a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Marcus Meissner <marcus@jet.franken.de> -Date: Tue, 25 Jul 2017 23:38:56 +0200 -Subject: [PATCH] On saving makernotes, make sure the makernote container tags - has a type with 1 byte components. - -Fixes (at least): - https://sourceforge.net/p/libexif/bugs/130 - https://sourceforge.net/p/libexif/bugs/129 ---- - libexif/exif-data.c | 6 ++++++ - 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+) - -diff --git a/libexif/exif-data.c b/libexif/exif-data.c -index 67df4db..91f4c33 100644 ---- a/libexif/exif-data.c -+++ b/libexif/exif-data.c -@@ -255,6 +255,12 @@ exif_data_save_data_entry (ExifData *data, ExifEntry *e, - exif_mnote_data_set_offset (data->priv->md, *ds - 6); - exif_mnote_data_save (data->priv->md, &e->data, &e->size); - e->components = e->size; -+ if (exif_format_get_size (e->format) != 1) { -+ /* e->format is taken from input code, -+ * but we need to make sure it is a 1 byte -+ * entity due to the multiplication below. */ -+ e->format = EXIF_FORMAT_UNDEFINED; -+ } - } - } - diff --git a/user/libexif/CVE-2018-20030.patch b/user/libexif/CVE-2018-20030.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 837d003d7..000000000 --- a/user/libexif/CVE-2018-20030.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,115 +0,0 @@ -Edited slightly to backport to stable - -From 6aa11df549114ebda520dde4cdaea2f9357b2c89 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Dan Fandrich <dan@coneharvesters.com> -Date: Fri, 12 Oct 2018 16:01:45 +0200 -Subject: [PATCH] Improve deep recursion detection in - exif_data_load_data_content. - -The existing detection was still vulnerable to pathological cases -causing DoS by wasting CPU. The new algorithm takes the number of tags -into account to make it harder to abuse by cases using shallow recursion -but with a very large number of tags. This improves on commit 5d28011c -which wasn't sufficient to counter this kind of case. - -The limitation in the previous fix was discovered by Laurent Delosieres, -Secunia Research at Flexera (Secunia Advisory SA84652) and is assigned -the identifier CVE-2018-20030. ---- - libexif/exif-data.c | 45 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------- - -diff --git a/libexif/exif-data.c b/libexif/exif-data.c -index e35403d..a6f9c94 100644 ---- a/libexif/exif-data.c -+++ b/libexif/exif-data.c -@@ -35,6 +35,7 @@ - #include <libexif/olympus/exif-mnote-data-olympus.h> - #include <libexif/pentax/exif-mnote-data-pentax.h> - -+#include <math.h> - #include <stdlib.h> - #include <stdio.h> - #include <string.h> -@@ -350,6 +351,20 @@ if (data->ifd[(i)]->count) { \ - break; \ - } - -+/*! Calculate the recursion cost added by one level of IFD loading. -+ * -+ * The work performed is related to the cost in the exponential relation -+ * work=1.1**cost -+ */ -+static unsigned int -+level_cost(unsigned int n) -+{ -+ static const double log_1_1 = 0.09531017980432493; -+ -+ /* Adding 0.1 protects against the case where n==1 */ -+ return ceil(log(n + 0.1)/log_1_1); -+} -+ - /*! Load data for an IFD. - * - * \param[in,out] data #ExifData -@@ -357,13 +372,13 @@ if (data->ifd[(i)]->count) { \ - * \param[in] d pointer to buffer containing raw IFD data - * \param[in] ds size of raw data in buffer at \c d - * \param[in] offset offset into buffer at \c d at which IFD starts -- * \param[in] recursion_depth number of times this function has been -- * recursively called without returning -+ * \param[in] recursion_cost factor indicating how expensive this recursive -+ * call could be - */ - static void - exif_data_load_data_content (ExifData *data, ExifIfd ifd, - const unsigned char *d, -- unsigned int ds, unsigned int offset, unsigned int recursion_depth) -+ unsigned int ds, unsigned int offset, unsigned int recursion_cost) - { - ExifLong o, thumbnail_offset = 0, thumbnail_length = 0; - ExifShort n; -@@ -378,9 +393,20 @@ exif_data_load_data_content (ExifData *data, ExifIfd ifd, - if ((((int)ifd) < 0) || ( ((int)ifd) >= EXIF_IFD_COUNT)) - return; - -- if (recursion_depth > 30) { -+ if (recursion_cost > 170) { -+ /* -+ * recursion_cost is a logarithmic-scale indicator of how expensive this -+ * recursive call might end up being. It is an indicator of the depth of -+ * recursion as well as the potential for worst-case future recursive -+ * calls. Since it's difficult to tell ahead of time how often recursion -+ * will occur, this assumes the worst by assuming every tag could end up -+ * causing recursion. -+ * The value of 170 was chosen to limit typical EXIF structures to a -+ * recursive depth of about 6, but pathological ones (those with very -+ * many tags) to only 2. -+ */ - exif_log (data->priv->log, EXIF_LOG_CODE_CORRUPT_DATA, "ExifData", -- "Deep recursion detected!"); -+ "Deep/expensive recursion detected!"); - return; - } - -@@ -422,15 +448,18 @@ exif_data_load_data_content (ExifData *data, ExifIfd ifd, - switch (tag) { - case EXIF_TAG_EXIF_IFD_POINTER: - CHECK_REC (EXIF_IFD_EXIF); -- exif_data_load_data_content (data, EXIF_IFD_EXIF, d, ds, o, recursion_depth + 1); -+ exif_data_load_data_content (data, EXIF_IFD_EXIF, d, ds, o, -+ recursion_cost + level_cost(n)); - break; - case EXIF_TAG_GPS_INFO_IFD_POINTER: - CHECK_REC (EXIF_IFD_GPS); -- exif_data_load_data_content (data, EXIF_IFD_GPS, d, ds, o, recursion_depth + 1); -+ exif_data_load_data_content (data, EXIF_IFD_GPS, d, ds, o, -+ recursion_cost + level_cost(n)); - break; - case EXIF_TAG_INTEROPERABILITY_IFD_POINTER: - CHECK_REC (EXIF_IFD_INTEROPERABILITY); -- exif_data_load_data_content (data, EXIF_IFD_INTEROPERABILITY, d, ds, o, recursion_depth + 1); -+ exif_data_load_data_content (data, EXIF_IFD_INTEROPERABILITY, d, ds, o, -+ recursion_cost + level_cost(n)); - break; - case EXIF_TAG_JPEG_INTERCHANGE_FORMAT: - thumbnail_offset = o; |