diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'user')
| -rw-r--r-- | user/libexif/APKBUILD | 26 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | user/libexif/CVE-2016-6328.patch | 60 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | user/libexif/CVE-2017-7544.patch | 30 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | user/libexif/CVE-2018-20030.patch | 115 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | user/libexif/CVE-2019-9278.patch | 85 |
5 files changed, 12 insertions, 304 deletions
diff --git a/user/libexif/APKBUILD b/user/libexif/APKBUILD index 06e1e832a..8dd3ff715 100644 --- a/user/libexif/APKBUILD +++ b/user/libexif/APKBUILD @@ -1,20 +1,16 @@ # Maintainer: pkgname=libexif -pkgver=0.6.21 -pkgrel=4 +pkgver=0.6.22 +_pkgver=$(printf '%s' "$pkgver" | tr . _) +pkgrel=0 pkgdesc="Library to parse EXIF metadata" -url="https://sourceforge.net/projects/libexif" +url="https://libexif.github.io/" arch="all" license="LGPL-2.0+" subpackages="$pkgname-dev $pkgname-doc $pkgname-lang" depends="" makedepends="" -source="https://downloads.sourceforge.net/$pkgname/$pkgname-$pkgver.tar.bz2 - CVE-2016-6328.patch - CVE-2017-7544.patch - CVE-2018-20030.patch - CVE-2019-9278.patch - " +source="https://github.com/libexif/libexif/releases/download/libexif-$_pkgver-release/libexif-$pkgver.tar.xz" # secfixes: # 0.6.21-r3: @@ -23,6 +19,12 @@ source="https://downloads.sourceforge.net/$pkgname/$pkgname-$pkgver.tar.bz2 # 0.6.21-r4: # - CVE-2016-6328 # - CVE-2019-9278 +# 0.6.22-r0: +# - CVE-2020-0093 +# - CVE-2020-12767 +# - CVE-2020-13112 +# - CVE-2020-13113 +# - CVE-2020-13114 prepare() { default_prepare @@ -45,8 +47,4 @@ package() { make DESTDIR="$pkgdir" install } -sha512sums="4e0fe2abe85d1c95b41cb3abe1f6333dc3a9eb69dba106a674a78d74a4d5b9c5a19647118fa1cc2d72b98a29853394f1519eda9e2889eb28d3be26b21c7cfc35 libexif-0.6.21.tar.bz2 -c0d4c74207993efc373615ef2c797d720162a2ee6fd7ad026edf2ced4198d9b1165b88790c2af3194f6bb7c2de88d4672c041c2cff8a82c8914700633332b8c5 CVE-2016-6328.patch -d529c6c5bd26dc21c0946702574184e1f61c2bfd4fb95b41e314f486a0dd55571963ff2cad566d2fb0804de3c0799bcd956c15a3dc10a520ce207728edad4e2d CVE-2017-7544.patch -0d6123bd275ace338ad9cebb31a2e714de0141b91860f07394b281686a5393566c3f4159679d4ba689ae7ea69ae2e412b158c3deb451c40c210b5817f6888bbc CVE-2018-20030.patch -c30c03fefea94d175b94c9f0c4d60cbb3aa0ad78b0d29008975fbbb15c17f2907a16fd50970e5fa18d533d0ce291a5ee9b62934210cb40b0f463693460607738 CVE-2019-9278.patch" +sha512sums="0a9e7bf0258ed98a794b667d45e8fc65299101a2a2d2e39c358715b20b003beff258782f0736cd5b53978428a2f878a989f303bee249a978850a065f33c534af libexif-0.6.22.tar.xz" diff --git a/user/libexif/CVE-2016-6328.patch b/user/libexif/CVE-2016-6328.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 0568f27d2..000000000 --- a/user/libexif/CVE-2016-6328.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,60 +0,0 @@ -From 41bd04234b104312f54d25822f68738ba8d7133d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Marcus Meissner <marcus@jet.franken.de> -Date: Tue, 25 Jul 2017 23:44:44 +0200 -Subject: [PATCH] fixes some (not all) buffer overreads during decoding pentax - makernote entries. - -This should fix: -https://sourceforge.net/p/libexif/bugs/125/ CVE-2016-6328 ---- - libexif/pentax/mnote-pentax-entry.c | 16 +++++++++++++--- - 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) - -diff --git a/libexif/pentax/mnote-pentax-entry.c b/libexif/pentax/mnote-pentax-entry.c -index d03d159..ea0429a 100644 ---- a/libexif/pentax/mnote-pentax-entry.c -+++ b/libexif/pentax/mnote-pentax-entry.c -@@ -425,24 +425,34 @@ mnote_pentax_entry_get_value (MnotePentaxEntry *entry, - case EXIF_FORMAT_SHORT: - { - const unsigned char *data = entry->data; -- size_t k, len = strlen(val); -+ size_t k, len = strlen(val), sizeleft; -+ -+ sizeleft = entry->size; - for(k=0; k<entry->components; k++) { -+ if (sizeleft < 2) -+ break; - vs = exif_get_short (data, entry->order); - snprintf (val+len, maxlen-len, "%i ", vs); - len = strlen(val); - data += 2; -+ sizeleft -= 2; - } - } - break; - case EXIF_FORMAT_LONG: - { - const unsigned char *data = entry->data; -- size_t k, len = strlen(val); -+ size_t k, len = strlen(val), sizeleft; -+ -+ sizeleft = entry->size; - for(k=0; k<entry->components; k++) { -+ if (sizeleft < 4) -+ break; - vl = exif_get_long (data, entry->order); - snprintf (val+len, maxlen-len, "%li", (long int) vl); - len = strlen(val); - data += 4; -+ sizeleft -= 4; - } - } - break; -@@ -455,5 +465,5 @@ mnote_pentax_entry_get_value (MnotePentaxEntry *entry, - break; - } - -- return (val); -+ return val; - } diff --git a/user/libexif/CVE-2017-7544.patch b/user/libexif/CVE-2017-7544.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 534817417..000000000 --- a/user/libexif/CVE-2017-7544.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,30 +0,0 @@ -From c39acd1692023b26290778a02a9232c873f9d71a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Marcus Meissner <marcus@jet.franken.de> -Date: Tue, 25 Jul 2017 23:38:56 +0200 -Subject: [PATCH] On saving makernotes, make sure the makernote container tags - has a type with 1 byte components. - -Fixes (at least): - https://sourceforge.net/p/libexif/bugs/130 - https://sourceforge.net/p/libexif/bugs/129 ---- - libexif/exif-data.c | 6 ++++++ - 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+) - -diff --git a/libexif/exif-data.c b/libexif/exif-data.c -index 67df4db..91f4c33 100644 ---- a/libexif/exif-data.c -+++ b/libexif/exif-data.c -@@ -255,6 +255,12 @@ exif_data_save_data_entry (ExifData *data, ExifEntry *e, - exif_mnote_data_set_offset (data->priv->md, *ds - 6); - exif_mnote_data_save (data->priv->md, &e->data, &e->size); - e->components = e->size; -+ if (exif_format_get_size (e->format) != 1) { -+ /* e->format is taken from input code, -+ * but we need to make sure it is a 1 byte -+ * entity due to the multiplication below. */ -+ e->format = EXIF_FORMAT_UNDEFINED; -+ } - } - } - diff --git a/user/libexif/CVE-2018-20030.patch b/user/libexif/CVE-2018-20030.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 837d003d7..000000000 --- a/user/libexif/CVE-2018-20030.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,115 +0,0 @@ -Edited slightly to backport to stable - -From 6aa11df549114ebda520dde4cdaea2f9357b2c89 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Dan Fandrich <dan@coneharvesters.com> -Date: Fri, 12 Oct 2018 16:01:45 +0200 -Subject: [PATCH] Improve deep recursion detection in - exif_data_load_data_content. - -The existing detection was still vulnerable to pathological cases -causing DoS by wasting CPU. The new algorithm takes the number of tags -into account to make it harder to abuse by cases using shallow recursion -but with a very large number of tags. This improves on commit 5d28011c -which wasn't sufficient to counter this kind of case. - -The limitation in the previous fix was discovered by Laurent Delosieres, -Secunia Research at Flexera (Secunia Advisory SA84652) and is assigned -the identifier CVE-2018-20030. ---- - libexif/exif-data.c | 45 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------- - -diff --git a/libexif/exif-data.c b/libexif/exif-data.c -index e35403d..a6f9c94 100644 ---- a/libexif/exif-data.c -+++ b/libexif/exif-data.c -@@ -35,6 +35,7 @@ - #include <libexif/olympus/exif-mnote-data-olympus.h> - #include <libexif/pentax/exif-mnote-data-pentax.h> - -+#include <math.h> - #include <stdlib.h> - #include <stdio.h> - #include <string.h> -@@ -350,6 +351,20 @@ if (data->ifd[(i)]->count) { \ - break; \ - } - -+/*! Calculate the recursion cost added by one level of IFD loading. -+ * -+ * The work performed is related to the cost in the exponential relation -+ * work=1.1**cost -+ */ -+static unsigned int -+level_cost(unsigned int n) -+{ -+ static const double log_1_1 = 0.09531017980432493; -+ -+ /* Adding 0.1 protects against the case where n==1 */ -+ return ceil(log(n + 0.1)/log_1_1); -+} -+ - /*! Load data for an IFD. - * - * \param[in,out] data #ExifData -@@ -357,13 +372,13 @@ if (data->ifd[(i)]->count) { \ - * \param[in] d pointer to buffer containing raw IFD data - * \param[in] ds size of raw data in buffer at \c d - * \param[in] offset offset into buffer at \c d at which IFD starts -- * \param[in] recursion_depth number of times this function has been -- * recursively called without returning -+ * \param[in] recursion_cost factor indicating how expensive this recursive -+ * call could be - */ - static void - exif_data_load_data_content (ExifData *data, ExifIfd ifd, - const unsigned char *d, -- unsigned int ds, unsigned int offset, unsigned int recursion_depth) -+ unsigned int ds, unsigned int offset, unsigned int recursion_cost) - { - ExifLong o, thumbnail_offset = 0, thumbnail_length = 0; - ExifShort n; -@@ -378,9 +393,20 @@ exif_data_load_data_content (ExifData *data, ExifIfd ifd, - if ((((int)ifd) < 0) || ( ((int)ifd) >= EXIF_IFD_COUNT)) - return; - -- if (recursion_depth > 30) { -+ if (recursion_cost > 170) { -+ /* -+ * recursion_cost is a logarithmic-scale indicator of how expensive this -+ * recursive call might end up being. It is an indicator of the depth of -+ * recursion as well as the potential for worst-case future recursive -+ * calls. Since it's difficult to tell ahead of time how often recursion -+ * will occur, this assumes the worst by assuming every tag could end up -+ * causing recursion. -+ * The value of 170 was chosen to limit typical EXIF structures to a -+ * recursive depth of about 6, but pathological ones (those with very -+ * many tags) to only 2. -+ */ - exif_log (data->priv->log, EXIF_LOG_CODE_CORRUPT_DATA, "ExifData", -- "Deep recursion detected!"); -+ "Deep/expensive recursion detected!"); - return; - } - -@@ -422,15 +448,18 @@ exif_data_load_data_content (ExifData *data, ExifIfd ifd, - switch (tag) { - case EXIF_TAG_EXIF_IFD_POINTER: - CHECK_REC (EXIF_IFD_EXIF); -- exif_data_load_data_content (data, EXIF_IFD_EXIF, d, ds, o, recursion_depth + 1); -+ exif_data_load_data_content (data, EXIF_IFD_EXIF, d, ds, o, -+ recursion_cost + level_cost(n)); - break; - case EXIF_TAG_GPS_INFO_IFD_POINTER: - CHECK_REC (EXIF_IFD_GPS); -- exif_data_load_data_content (data, EXIF_IFD_GPS, d, ds, o, recursion_depth + 1); -+ exif_data_load_data_content (data, EXIF_IFD_GPS, d, ds, o, -+ recursion_cost + level_cost(n)); - break; - case EXIF_TAG_INTEROPERABILITY_IFD_POINTER: - CHECK_REC (EXIF_IFD_INTEROPERABILITY); -- exif_data_load_data_content (data, EXIF_IFD_INTEROPERABILITY, d, ds, o, recursion_depth + 1); -+ exif_data_load_data_content (data, EXIF_IFD_INTEROPERABILITY, d, ds, o, -+ recursion_cost + level_cost(n)); - break; - case EXIF_TAG_JPEG_INTERCHANGE_FORMAT: - thumbnail_offset = o; diff --git a/user/libexif/CVE-2019-9278.patch b/user/libexif/CVE-2019-9278.patch deleted file mode 100644 index bd15e8d13..000000000 --- a/user/libexif/CVE-2019-9278.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,85 +0,0 @@ -From 75aa73267fdb1e0ebfbc00369e7312bac43d0566 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Marcus Meissner <meissner@suse.de> -Date: Sat, 18 Jan 2020 09:29:42 +0100 -Subject: [PATCH] fix CVE-2019-9278 - -avoid the use of unsafe integer overflow checking constructs (unsigned integer operations cannot overflow, so "u1 + u2 > u1" can be optimized away) - -check for the actual sizes, which should also handle the overflows -document other places google patched, but do not seem relevant due to other restrictions - -fixes https://github.com/libexif/libexif/issues/26 ---- - libexif/exif-data.c | 28 ++++++++++++++++++---------- - 1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-) - -diff --git a/libexif/exif-data.c b/libexif/exif-data.c -index a6f9c94..6332cd1 100644 ---- a/libexif/exif-data.c -+++ b/libexif/exif-data.c -@@ -192,9 +192,15 @@ exif_data_load_data_entry (ExifData *data, ExifEntry *entry, - doff = offset + 8; - - /* Sanity checks */ -- if ((doff + s < doff) || (doff + s < s) || (doff + s > size)) { -+ if (doff >= size) { - exif_log (data->priv->log, EXIF_LOG_CODE_DEBUG, "ExifData", -- "Tag data past end of buffer (%u > %u)", doff+s, size); -+ "Tag starts past end of buffer (%u > %u)", doff, size); -+ return 0; -+ } -+ -+ if (s > size - doff) { -+ exif_log (data->priv->log, EXIF_LOG_CODE_DEBUG, "ExifData", -+ "Tag data goes past end of buffer (%u > %u)", doff+s, size); - return 0; - } - -@@ -315,13 +321,14 @@ exif_data_load_data_thumbnail (ExifData *data, const unsigned char *d, - unsigned int ds, ExifLong o, ExifLong s) - { - /* Sanity checks */ -- if ((o + s < o) || (o + s < s) || (o + s > ds) || (o > ds)) { -- exif_log (data->priv->log, EXIF_LOG_CODE_DEBUG, "ExifData", -- "Bogus thumbnail offset (%u) or size (%u).", -- o, s); -+ if (o >= ds) { -+ exif_log (data->priv->log, EXIF_LOG_CODE_DEBUG, "ExifData", "Bogus thumbnail offset (%u).", o); -+ return; -+ } -+ if (s > ds - o) { -+ exif_log (data->priv->log, EXIF_LOG_CODE_DEBUG, "ExifData", "Bogus thumbnail size (%u), max would be %u.", s, ds-o); - return; - } -- - if (data->data) - exif_mem_free (data->priv->mem, data->data); - if (!(data->data = exif_data_alloc (data, s))) { -@@ -947,7 +954,7 @@ exif_data_load_data (ExifData *data, const unsigned char *d_orig, - exif_log (data->priv->log, EXIF_LOG_CODE_DEBUG, "ExifData", - "IFD 0 at %i.", (int) offset); - -- /* Sanity check the offset, being careful about overflow */ -+ /* ds is restricted to 16 bit above, so offset is restricted too, and offset+8 should not overflow. */ - if (offset > ds || offset + 6 + 2 > ds) - return; - -@@ -956,6 +963,7 @@ exif_data_load_data (ExifData *data, const unsigned char *d_orig, - - /* IFD 1 offset */ - n = exif_get_short (d + 6 + offset, data->priv->order); -+ /* offset < 2<<16, n is 16 bit at most, so this op will not overflow */ - if (offset + 6 + 2 + 12 * n + 4 > ds) - return; - -@@ -964,8 +972,8 @@ exif_data_load_data (ExifData *data, const unsigned char *d_orig, - exif_log (data->priv->log, EXIF_LOG_CODE_DEBUG, "ExifData", - "IFD 1 at %i.", (int) offset); - -- /* Sanity check. */ -- if (offset > ds || offset + 6 > ds) { -+ /* Sanity check. ds is ensured to be above 6 above, offset is 16bit */ -+ if (offset > ds - 6) { - exif_log (data->priv->log, EXIF_LOG_CODE_CORRUPT_DATA, - "ExifData", "Bogus offset of IFD1."); - } else { |