diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'bin/pax/file_subs.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | bin/pax/file_subs.c | 1156 |
1 files changed, 1156 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/bin/pax/file_subs.c b/bin/pax/file_subs.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..cd421d0 --- /dev/null +++ b/bin/pax/file_subs.c @@ -0,0 +1,1156 @@ +/* $NetBSD: file_subs.c,v 1.63 2013/07/29 17:46:36 christos Exp $ */ + +/*- + * Copyright (c) 1992 Keith Muller. + * Copyright (c) 1992, 1993 + * The Regents of the University of California. All rights reserved. + * + * This code is derived from software contributed to Berkeley by + * Keith Muller of the University of California, San Diego. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#if HAVE_NBTOOL_CONFIG_H +#include "nbtool_config.h" +#endif + +#include <sys/cdefs.h> +#if !defined(lint) +#if 0 +static char sccsid[] = "@(#)file_subs.c 8.1 (Berkeley) 5/31/93"; +#else +__RCSID("$NetBSD: file_subs.c,v 1.63 2013/07/29 17:46:36 christos Exp $"); +#endif +#endif /* not lint */ + +#include <sys/types.h> +#include <sys/time.h> +#include <sys/stat.h> +#include <unistd.h> +#include <sys/param.h> +#include <fcntl.h> +#include <string.h> +#include <stdio.h> +#include <ctype.h> +#include <errno.h> +#include <sys/uio.h> +#include <stdlib.h> +#include "pax.h" +#include "extern.h" +#include "options.h" + +char *xtmp_name; + +static int +mk_link(char *,struct stat *,char *, int); + +static int warn_broken; + +/* + * routines that deal with file operations such as: creating, removing; + * and setting access modes, uid/gid and times of files + */ +#define SET_BITS (S_ISUID | S_ISGID) +#define FILE_BITS (S_IRWXU | S_IRWXG | S_IRWXO) +#define A_BITS (FILE_BITS | SET_BITS | S_ISVTX) + +/* + * The S_ISVTX (sticky bit) can be set by non-superuser on directories + * but not other kinds of files. + */ +#define FILEBITS(dir) ((dir) ? (FILE_BITS | S_ISVTX) : FILE_BITS) +#define SETBITS(dir) ((dir) ? SET_BITS : (SET_BITS | S_ISVTX)) + +static mode_t +apply_umask(mode_t mode) +{ + static mode_t cached_umask; + static int cached_umask_valid; + + if (!cached_umask_valid) { + cached_umask = umask(0); + umask(cached_umask); + cached_umask_valid = 1; + } + + return mode & ~cached_umask; +} + +/* + * file_creat() + * Create and open a file. + * Return: + * file descriptor or -1 for failure + */ + +int +file_creat(ARCHD *arcn, int write_to_hardlink) +{ + int fd = -1; + int oerrno; + + /* + * Some horribly busted tar implementations, have directory nodes + * that end in a /, but they mark as files. Compensate for that + * by not creating a directory node at this point, but a file node, + * and not creating the temp file. + */ + if (arcn->nlen != 0 && arcn->name[arcn->nlen - 1] == '/') { + if (!warn_broken) { + tty_warn(0, "Archive was created with a broken tar;" + " file `%s' is a directory, but marked as plain.", + arcn->name); + warn_broken = 1; + } + return -1; + } + + /* + * In "cpio" archives it's usually the last record of a set of + * hardlinks which includes the contents of the file. We cannot + * use a tempory file in that case because we couldn't link it + * with the existing other hardlinks after restoring the contents + * to it. And it's also useless to create the hardlink under a + * temporary name because the other hardlinks would have partial + * contents while restoring. + */ + if (write_to_hardlink) + return (open(arcn->name, O_TRUNC | O_EXCL | O_RDWR, 0)); + + /* + * Create a temporary file name so that the file doesn't have partial + * contents while restoring. + */ + arcn->tmp_name = malloc(arcn->nlen + 8); + if (arcn->tmp_name == NULL) { + syswarn(1, errno, "Cannot malloc %d bytes", arcn->nlen + 8); + return -1; + } + if (xtmp_name != NULL) + abort(); + xtmp_name = arcn->tmp_name; + + for (;;) { + /* + * try to create the temporary file we use to restore the + * contents info. if this fails, keep checking all the nodes + * in the path until chk_path() finds that it cannot fix + * anything further. if that happens we just give up. + */ + (void)snprintf(arcn->tmp_name, arcn->nlen + 8, "%s.XXXXXX", + arcn->name); + fd = mkstemp(arcn->tmp_name); + if (fd >= 0) + break; + oerrno = errno; + if (nodirs || chk_path(arcn->name,arcn->sb.st_uid,arcn->sb.st_gid) < 0) { + (void)fflush(listf); + syswarn(1, oerrno, "Cannot create %s", arcn->tmp_name); + xtmp_name = NULL; + free(arcn->tmp_name); + arcn->tmp_name = NULL; + return -1; + } + } + return fd; +} + +/* + * file_close() + * Close file descriptor to a file just created by pax. Sets modes, + * ownership and times as required. + * Return: + * 0 for success, -1 for failure + */ + +void +file_close(ARCHD *arcn, int fd) +{ + char *tmp_name; + int res; + + if (fd < 0) + return; + + tmp_name = (arcn->tmp_name != NULL) ? arcn->tmp_name : arcn->name; + + if (close(fd) < 0) + syswarn(0, errno, "Cannot close file descriptor on %s", + tmp_name); + + /* + * set owner/groups first as this may strip off mode bits we want + * then set file permission modes. Then set file access and + * modification times. + */ + if (pids) + res = set_ids(tmp_name, arcn->sb.st_uid, arcn->sb.st_gid); + else + res = 0; + + /* + * IMPORTANT SECURITY NOTE: + * if not preserving mode or we cannot set uid/gid, then PROHIBIT + * set uid/gid bits but restore the file modes (since mkstemp doesn't). + */ + if (!pmode || res) + arcn->sb.st_mode &= ~SETBITS(0); + if (pmode) + set_pmode(tmp_name, arcn->sb.st_mode); + else + set_pmode(tmp_name, + apply_umask((arcn->sb.st_mode & FILEBITS(0)))); + if (patime || pmtime) + set_ftime(tmp_name, arcn->sb.st_mtime, + arcn->sb.st_atime, 0, 0); + + /* Did we write directly to the target file? */ + if (arcn->tmp_name == NULL) + return; + + /* + * Finally, now the temp file is fully instantiated rename it to + * the desired file name. + */ + if (rename(tmp_name, arcn->name) < 0) { + syswarn(0, errno, "Cannot rename %s to %s", + tmp_name, arcn->name); + (void)unlink(tmp_name); + } + +#if HAVE_STRUCT_STAT_ST_FLAGS + if (pfflags && arcn->type != PAX_SLK) + set_chflags(arcn->name, arcn->sb.st_flags); +#endif + + free(arcn->tmp_name); + arcn->tmp_name = NULL; + xtmp_name = NULL; +} + +/* + * lnk_creat() + * Create a hard link to arcn->ln_name from arcn->name. arcn->ln_name + * must exist; + * Return: + * 0 if ok, -1 otherwise + */ + +int +lnk_creat(ARCHD *arcn, int *payload) +{ + struct stat sb; + + /* + * Check if this hardlink carries the "payload". In "cpio" archives + * it's usually the last record of a set of hardlinks which includes + * the contents of the file. + * + */ + *payload = S_ISREG(arcn->sb.st_mode) && + (arcn->sb.st_size > 0) && (arcn->sb.st_size <= arcn->skip); + + /* + * We may be running as root, so we have to be sure that link target + * is not a directory, so we lstat and check. XXX: This is still racy. + */ + if (lstat(arcn->ln_name, &sb) != -1 && S_ISDIR(sb.st_mode)) { + tty_warn(1, "A hard link to the directory %s is not allowed", + arcn->ln_name); + return -1; + } + + return mk_link(arcn->ln_name, &sb, arcn->name, 0); +} + +/* + * cross_lnk() + * Create a hard link to arcn->org_name from arcn->name. Only used in copy + * with the -l flag. No warning or error if this does not succeed (we will + * then just create the file) + * Return: + * 1 if copy() should try to create this file node + * 0 if cross_lnk() ok, -1 for fatal flaw (like linking to self). + */ + +int +cross_lnk(ARCHD *arcn) +{ + /* + * try to make a link to original file (-l flag in copy mode). make + * sure we do not try to link to directories in case we are running as + * root (and it might succeed). + */ + if (arcn->type == PAX_DIR) + return 1; + return mk_link(arcn->org_name, &(arcn->sb), arcn->name, 1); +} + +/* + * chk_same() + * In copy mode if we are not trying to make hard links between the src + * and destinations, make sure we are not going to overwrite ourselves by + * accident. This slows things down a little, but we have to protect all + * those people who make typing errors. + * Return: + * 1 the target does not exist, go ahead and copy + * 0 skip it file exists (-k) or may be the same as source file + */ + +int +chk_same(ARCHD *arcn) +{ + struct stat sb; + + /* + * if file does not exist, return. if file exists and -k, skip it + * quietly + */ + if (lstat(arcn->name, &sb) < 0) + return 1; + if (kflag) + return 0; + + /* + * better make sure the user does not have src == dest by mistake + */ + if ((arcn->sb.st_dev == sb.st_dev) && (arcn->sb.st_ino == sb.st_ino)) { + tty_warn(1, "Unable to copy %s, file would overwrite itself", + arcn->name); + return 0; + } + return 1; +} + +/* + * mk_link() + * try to make a hard link between two files. if ign set, we do not + * complain. + * Return: + * 0 if successful (or we are done with this file but no error, such as + * finding the from file exists and the user has set -k). + * 1 when ign was set to indicates we could not make the link but we + * should try to copy/extract the file as that might work (and is an + * allowed option). -1 an error occurred. + */ + +static int +mk_link(char *to, struct stat *to_sb, char *from, int ign) +{ + struct stat sb; + int oerrno; + + /* + * if from file exists, it has to be unlinked to make the link. If the + * file exists and -k is set, skip it quietly + */ + if (lstat(from, &sb) == 0) { + if (kflag) + return 0; + + /* + * make sure it is not the same file, protect the user + */ + if ((to_sb->st_dev==sb.st_dev)&&(to_sb->st_ino == sb.st_ino)) { + tty_warn(1, "Cannot link file %s to itself", to); + return -1; + } + + /* + * try to get rid of the file, based on the type + */ + if (S_ISDIR(sb.st_mode) && strcmp(from, ".") != 0) { + if (rmdir(from) < 0) { + syswarn(1, errno, "Cannot remove %s", from); + return -1; + } + } else if (unlink(from) < 0) { + if (!ign) { + syswarn(1, errno, "Cannot remove %s", from); + return -1; + } + return 1; + } + } + + /* + * from file is gone (or did not exist), try to make the hard link. + * if it fails, check the path and try it again (if chk_path() says to + * try again) + */ + for (;;) { + if (link(to, from) == 0) + break; + oerrno = errno; + if (chk_path(from, to_sb->st_uid, to_sb->st_gid) == 0) + continue; + if (!ign) { + syswarn(1, oerrno, "Cannot link to %s from %s", to, + from); + return -1; + } + return 1; + } + + /* + * all right the link was made + */ + return 0; +} + +/* + * node_creat() + * create an entry in the file system (other than a file or hard link). + * If successful, sets uid/gid modes and times as required. + * Return: + * 0 if ok, -1 otherwise + */ + +int +node_creat(ARCHD *arcn) +{ + int res; + int ign = 0; + int oerrno; + int pass = 0; + mode_t file_mode; + struct stat sb; + char target[MAXPATHLEN]; + char *nm = arcn->name; + int len; + + /* + * create node based on type, if that fails try to unlink the node and + * try again. finally check the path and try again. As noted in the + * file and link creation routines, this method seems to exhibit the + * best performance in general use workloads. + */ + file_mode = arcn->sb.st_mode & FILEBITS(arcn->type == PAX_DIR); + + for (;;) { + switch (arcn->type) { + case PAX_DIR: + /* + * If -h (or -L) was given in tar-mode, follow the + * potential symlink chain before trying to create the + * directory. + */ + if (strcmp(NM_TAR, argv0) == 0 && Lflag) { + while (lstat(nm, &sb) == 0 && + S_ISLNK(sb.st_mode)) { + len = readlink(nm, target, + sizeof target - 1); + if (len == -1) { + syswarn(0, errno, + "cannot follow symlink %s " + "in chain for %s", + nm, arcn->name); + res = -1; + goto badlink; + } + target[len] = '\0'; + nm = target; + } + } + res = domkdir(nm, file_mode); +badlink: + if (ign) + res = 0; + break; + case PAX_CHR: + file_mode |= S_IFCHR; + res = mknod(nm, file_mode, arcn->sb.st_rdev); + break; + case PAX_BLK: + file_mode |= S_IFBLK; + res = mknod(nm, file_mode, arcn->sb.st_rdev); + break; + case PAX_FIF: + res = mkfifo(nm, file_mode); + break; + case PAX_SCK: + /* + * Skip sockets, operation has no meaning under BSD + */ + tty_warn(0, + "%s skipped. Sockets cannot be copied or extracted", + nm); + return (-1); + case PAX_SLK: + res = symlink(arcn->ln_name, nm); + break; + case PAX_CTG: + case PAX_HLK: + case PAX_HRG: + case PAX_REG: + default: + /* + * we should never get here + */ + tty_warn(0, "%s has an unknown file type, skipping", + nm); + return (-1); + } + + /* + * if we were able to create the node break out of the loop, + * otherwise try to unlink the node and try again. if that + * fails check the full path and try a final time. + */ + if (res == 0) + break; + + /* + * we failed to make the node + */ + oerrno = errno; + switch (pass++) { + case 0: + if ((ign = unlnk_exist(nm, arcn->type)) < 0) + return (-1); + continue; + + case 1: + if (nodirs || + chk_path(nm, arcn->sb.st_uid, + arcn->sb.st_gid) < 0) { + syswarn(1, oerrno, "Cannot create %s", nm); + return (-1); + } + continue; + } + + /* + * it must be a file that exists but we can't create or + * remove, but we must avoid the infinite loop. + */ + break; + } + + /* + * we were able to create the node. set uid/gid, modes and times + */ + if (pids) + res = set_ids(nm, arcn->sb.st_uid, arcn->sb.st_gid); + else + res = 0; + + /* + * IMPORTANT SECURITY NOTE: + * if not preserving mode or we cannot set uid/gid, then PROHIBIT any + * set uid/gid bits + */ + if (!pmode || res) + arcn->sb.st_mode &= ~SETBITS(arcn->type == PAX_DIR); + if (pmode) + set_pmode(arcn->name, arcn->sb.st_mode); + + if (arcn->type == PAX_DIR && strcmp(NM_CPIO, argv0) != 0) { + /* + * Dirs must be processed again at end of extract to set times + * and modes to agree with those stored in the archive. However + * to allow extract to continue, we may have to also set owner + * rights. This allows nodes in the archive that are children + * of this directory to be extracted without failure. Both time + * and modes will be fixed after the entire archive is read and + * before pax exits. + */ + if (access(nm, R_OK | W_OK | X_OK) < 0) { + if (lstat(nm, &sb) < 0) { + syswarn(0, errno,"Cannot access %s (stat)", + arcn->name); + set_pmode(nm,file_mode | S_IRWXU); + } else { + /* + * We have to add rights to the dir, so we make + * sure to restore the mode. The mode must be + * restored AS CREATED and not as stored if + * pmode is not set. + */ + set_pmode(nm, ((sb.st_mode & + FILEBITS(arcn->type == PAX_DIR)) | + S_IRWXU)); + if (!pmode) + arcn->sb.st_mode = sb.st_mode; + } + + /* + * we have to force the mode to what was set here, + * since we changed it from the default as created. + */ + add_dir(nm, arcn->nlen, &(arcn->sb), 1); + } else if (pmode || patime || pmtime) + add_dir(nm, arcn->nlen, &(arcn->sb), 0); + } + + if (patime || pmtime) + set_ftime(arcn->name, arcn->sb.st_mtime, + arcn->sb.st_atime, 0, (arcn->type == PAX_SLK) ? 1 : 0); + +#if HAVE_STRUCT_STAT_ST_FLAGS + if (pfflags && arcn->type != PAX_SLK) + set_chflags(arcn->name, arcn->sb.st_flags); +#endif + return 0; +} + +/* + * unlnk_exist() + * Remove node from file system with the specified name. We pass the type + * of the node that is going to replace it. When we try to create a + * directory and find that it already exists, we allow processing to + * continue as proper modes etc will always be set for it later on. + * Return: + * 0 is ok to proceed, no file with the specified name exists + * -1 we were unable to remove the node, or we should not remove it (-k) + * 1 we found a directory and we were going to create a directory. + */ + +int +unlnk_exist(char *name, int type) +{ + struct stat sb; + + /* + * the file does not exist, or -k we are done + */ + if (lstat(name, &sb) < 0) + return 0; + if (kflag) + return -1; + + if (S_ISDIR(sb.st_mode)) { + /* + * try to remove a directory, if it fails and we were going to + * create a directory anyway, tell the caller (return a 1). + * + * don't try to remove the directory if the name is "." + * otherwise later file/directory creation fails. + */ + if (strcmp(name, ".") == 0) + return 1; + if (rmdir(name) < 0) { + if (type == PAX_DIR) + return 1; + syswarn(1, errno, "Cannot remove directory %s", name); + return -1; + } + return 0; + } + + /* + * try to get rid of all non-directory type nodes + */ + if (unlink(name) < 0) { + (void)fflush(listf); + syswarn(1, errno, "Cannot unlink %s", name); + return -1; + } + return 0; +} + +/* + * chk_path() + * We were trying to create some kind of node in the file system and it + * failed. chk_path() makes sure the path up to the node exists and is + * writable. When we have to create a directory that is missing along the + * path somewhere, the directory we create will be set to the same + * uid/gid as the file has (when uid and gid are being preserved). + * NOTE: this routine is a real performance loss. It is only used as a + * last resort when trying to create entries in the file system. + * Return: + * -1 when it could find nothing it is allowed to fix. + * 0 otherwise + */ + +int +chk_path(char *name, uid_t st_uid, gid_t st_gid) +{ + char *spt = name; + struct stat sb; + int retval = -1; + + /* + * watch out for paths with nodes stored directly in / (e.g. /bozo) + */ + if (*spt == '/') + ++spt; + + for(;;) { + /* + * work forward from the first / and check each part of + * the path + */ + spt = strchr(spt, '/'); + if (spt == NULL) + break; + *spt = '\0'; + + /* + * if it exists we assume it is a directory, it is not within + * the spec (at least it seems to read that way) to alter the + * file system for nodes NOT EXPLICITLY stored on the archive. + * If that assumption is changed, you would test the node here + * and figure out how to get rid of it (probably like some + * recursive unlink()) or fix up the directory permissions if + * required (do an access()). + */ + if (lstat(name, &sb) == 0) { + *(spt++) = '/'; + continue; + } + + /* + * the path fails at this point, see if we can create the + * needed directory and continue on + */ + if (domkdir(name, S_IRWXU | S_IRWXG | S_IRWXO) == -1) { + *spt = '/'; + retval = -1; + break; + } + + /* + * we were able to create the directory. We will tell the + * caller that we found something to fix, and it is ok to try + * and create the node again. + */ + retval = 0; + if (pids) + (void)set_ids(name, st_uid, st_gid); + + /* + * make sure the user doesn't have some strange umask that + * causes this newly created directory to be unusable. We fix + * the modes and restore them back to the creation default at + * the end of pax + */ + if ((access(name, R_OK | W_OK | X_OK) < 0) && + (lstat(name, &sb) == 0)) { + set_pmode(name, ((sb.st_mode & FILEBITS(0)) | + S_IRWXU)); + add_dir(name, spt - name, &sb, 1); + } + *(spt++) = '/'; + continue; + } + /* + * We perform one final check here, because if someone else + * created the directory in parallel with us, we might return + * the wrong error code, even if the directory exists now. + */ + if (retval == -1 && stat(name, &sb) == 0 && S_ISDIR(sb.st_mode)) + retval = 0; + return retval; +} + +/* + * set_ftime() + * Set the access time and modification time for a named file. If frc + * is non-zero we force these times to be set even if the user did not + * request access and/or modification time preservation (this is also + * used by -t to reset access times). + * When ign is zero, only those times the user has asked for are set, the + * other ones are left alone. We do not assume the un-documented feature + * of many utimes() implementations that consider a 0 time value as a do + * not set request. + * + * Unfortunately, there are systems where lutimes() is present but does + * not work on some filesystem types, which cannot be detected at + * compile time. This requires passing down symlink knowledge into + * this function to obtain correct operation. Linux with XFS is one + * example of such a system. + */ + +void +set_ftime(char *fnm, time_t mtime, time_t atime, int frc, int slk) +{ + struct timeval tv[2]; + struct stat sb; + + tv[0].tv_sec = atime; + tv[0].tv_usec = 0; + tv[1].tv_sec = mtime; + tv[1].tv_usec = 0; + if (!frc && (!patime || !pmtime)) { + /* + * if we are not forcing, only set those times the user wants + * set. We get the current values of the times if we need them. + */ + if (lstat(fnm, &sb) == 0) { +#if BSD4_4 && !HAVE_NBTOOL_CONFIG_H + if (!patime) + TIMESPEC_TO_TIMEVAL(&tv[0], &sb.st_atimespec); + if (!pmtime) + TIMESPEC_TO_TIMEVAL(&tv[1], &sb.st_mtimespec); +#else + if (!patime) + tv[0].tv_sec = sb.st_atime; + if (!pmtime) + tv[1].tv_sec = sb.st_mtime; +#endif + } else + syswarn(0, errno, "Cannot obtain file stats %s", fnm); + } + + /* + * set the times + */ +#if HAVE_LUTIMES + if (lutimes(fnm, tv) == 0) + return; + if (errno != ENOSYS) /* XXX linux: lutimes is per-FS */ + goto bad; +#endif + if (slk) + return; + if (utimes(fnm, tv) == -1) + goto bad; + return; +bad: + syswarn(1, errno, "Access/modification time set failed on: %s", fnm); +} + +/* + * set_ids() + * set the uid and gid of a file system node + * Return: + * 0 when set, -1 on failure + */ + +int +set_ids(char *fnm, uid_t uid, gid_t gid) +{ + if (geteuid() == 0) + if (lchown(fnm, uid, gid)) { + (void)fflush(listf); + syswarn(1, errno, "Cannot set file uid/gid of %s", + fnm); + return -1; + } + return 0; +} + +/* + * set_pmode() + * Set file access mode + */ + +void +set_pmode(char *fnm, mode_t mode) +{ + mode &= A_BITS; + if (lchmod(fnm, mode)) { + (void)fflush(listf); + syswarn(1, errno, "Cannot set permissions on %s", fnm); + } + return; +} + +/* + * set_chflags() + * Set 4.4BSD file flags + */ +void +set_chflags(char *fnm, u_int32_t flags) +{ + +#if 0 + if (chflags(fnm, flags) < 0 && errno != EOPNOTSUPP) + syswarn(1, errno, "Cannot set file flags on %s", fnm); +#endif + return; +} + +/* + * file_write() + * Write/copy a file (during copy or archive extract). This routine knows + * how to copy files with lseek holes in it. (Which are read as file + * blocks containing all 0's but do not have any file blocks associated + * with the data). Typical examples of these are files created by dbm + * variants (.pag files). While the file size of these files are huge, the + * actual storage is quite small (the files are sparse). The problem is + * the holes read as all zeros so are probably stored on the archive that + * way (there is no way to determine if the file block is really a hole, + * we only know that a file block of all zero's can be a hole). + * At this writing, no major archive format knows how to archive files + * with holes. However, on extraction (or during copy, -rw) we have to + * deal with these files. Without detecting the holes, the files can + * consume a lot of file space if just written to disk. This replacement + * for write when passed the basic allocation size of a file system block, + * uses lseek whenever it detects the input data is all 0 within that + * file block. In more detail, the strategy is as follows: + * While the input is all zero keep doing an lseek. Keep track of when we + * pass over file block boundaries. Only write when we hit a non zero + * input. once we have written a file block, we continue to write it to + * the end (we stop looking at the input). When we reach the start of the + * next file block, start checking for zero blocks again. Working on file + * block boundaries significantly reduces the overhead when copying files + * that are NOT very sparse. This overhead (when compared to a write) is + * almost below the measurement resolution on many systems. Without it, + * files with holes cannot be safely copied. It does has a side effect as + * it can put holes into files that did not have them before, but that is + * not a problem since the file contents are unchanged (in fact it saves + * file space). (Except on paging files for diskless clients. But since we + * cannot determine one of those file from here, we ignore them). If this + * ever ends up on a system where CTG files are supported and the holes + * are not desired, just do a conditional test in those routines that + * call file_write() and have it call write() instead. BEFORE CLOSING THE + * FILE, make sure to call file_flush() when the last write finishes with + * an empty block. A lot of file systems will not create an lseek hole at + * the end. In this case we drop a single 0 at the end to force the + * trailing 0's in the file. + * ---Parameters--- + * rem: how many bytes left in this file system block + * isempt: have we written to the file block yet (is it empty) + * sz: basic file block allocation size + * cnt: number of bytes on this write + * str: buffer to write + * Return: + * number of bytes written, -1 on write (or lseek) error. + */ + +int +file_write(int fd, char *str, int cnt, int *rem, int *isempt, int sz, + char *name) +{ + char *pt; + char *end; + int wcnt; + char *st = str; + char **strp; + size_t *lenp; + + /* + * while we have data to process + */ + while (cnt) { + if (!*rem) { + /* + * We are now at the start of file system block again + * (or what we think one is...). start looking for + * empty blocks again + */ + *isempt = 1; + *rem = sz; + } + + /* + * only examine up to the end of the current file block or + * remaining characters to write, whatever is smaller + */ + wcnt = MIN(cnt, *rem); + cnt -= wcnt; + *rem -= wcnt; + if (*isempt) { + /* + * have not written to this block yet, so we keep + * looking for zero's + */ + pt = st; + end = st + wcnt; + + /* + * look for a zero filled buffer + */ + while ((pt < end) && (*pt == '\0')) + ++pt; + + if (pt == end) { + /* + * skip, buf is empty so far + */ + if (fd > -1 && + lseek(fd, (off_t)wcnt, SEEK_CUR) < 0) { + syswarn(1, errno, "File seek on %s", + name); + return -1; + } + st = pt; + continue; + } + /* + * drat, the buf is not zero filled + */ + *isempt = 0; + } + + /* + * have non-zero data in this file system block, have to write + */ + switch (fd) { + case -PAX_GLF: + strp = &gnu_name_string; + lenp = &gnu_name_length; + break; + case -PAX_GLL: + strp = &gnu_link_string; + lenp = &gnu_link_length; + break; + default: + strp = NULL; + lenp = NULL; + break; + } + if (strp) { + char *nstr = *strp ? realloc(*strp, *lenp + wcnt + 1) : + malloc(wcnt + 1); + if (nstr == NULL) { + tty_warn(1, "Out of memory"); + return -1; + } + (void)strlcpy(&nstr[*lenp], st, wcnt + 1); + *strp = nstr; + *lenp += wcnt; + } else if (xwrite(fd, st, wcnt) != wcnt) { + syswarn(1, errno, "Failed write to file %s", name); + return -1; + } + st += wcnt; + } + return st - str; +} + +/* + * file_flush() + * when the last file block in a file is zero, many file systems will not + * let us create a hole at the end. To get the last block with zeros, we + * write the last BYTE with a zero (back up one byte and write a zero). + */ + +void +file_flush(int fd, char *fname, int isempt) +{ + static char blnk[] = "\0"; + + /* + * silly test, but make sure we are only called when the last block is + * filled with all zeros. + */ + if (!isempt) + return; + + /* + * move back one byte and write a zero + */ + if (lseek(fd, (off_t)-1, SEEK_CUR) < 0) { + syswarn(1, errno, "Failed seek on file %s", fname); + return; + } + + if (write_with_restart(fd, blnk, 1) < 0) + syswarn(1, errno, "Failed write to file %s", fname); + return; +} + +/* + * rdfile_close() + * close a file we have been reading (to copy or archive). If we have to + * reset access time (tflag) do so (the times are stored in arcn). + */ + +void +rdfile_close(ARCHD *arcn, int *fd) +{ + /* + * make sure the file is open + */ + if (*fd < 0) + return; + + (void)close(*fd); + *fd = -1; + if (!tflag) + return; + + /* + * user wants last access time reset + */ + set_ftime(arcn->org_name, arcn->sb.st_mtime, arcn->sb.st_atime, 1, 0); + return; +} + +/* + * set_crc() + * read a file to calculate its crc. This is a real drag. Archive formats + * that have this, end up reading the file twice (we have to write the + * header WITH the crc before writing the file contents. Oh well... + * Return: + * 0 if was able to calculate the crc, -1 otherwise + */ + +int +set_crc(ARCHD *arcn, int fd) +{ + int i; + int res; + off_t cpcnt = 0L; + u_long size; + unsigned long crc = 0L; + char tbuf[FILEBLK]; + struct stat sb; + + if (fd < 0) { + /* + * hmm, no fd, should never happen. well no crc then. + */ + arcn->crc = 0L; + return 0; + } + + if ((size = (u_long)arcn->sb.st_blksize) > (u_long)sizeof(tbuf)) + size = (u_long)sizeof(tbuf); + + /* + * read all the bytes we think that there are in the file. If the user + * is trying to archive an active file, forget this file. + */ + for(;;) { + if ((res = read(fd, tbuf, size)) <= 0) + break; + cpcnt += res; + for (i = 0; i < res; ++i) + crc += (tbuf[i] & 0xff); + } + + /* + * safety check. we want to avoid archiving files that are active as + * they can create inconsistent archive copies. + */ + if (cpcnt != arcn->sb.st_size) + tty_warn(1, "File changed size %s", arcn->org_name); + else if (fstat(fd, &sb) < 0) + syswarn(1, errno, "Failed stat on %s", arcn->org_name); + else if (arcn->sb.st_mtime != sb.st_mtime) + tty_warn(1, "File %s was modified during read", arcn->org_name); + else if (lseek(fd, (off_t)0L, SEEK_SET) < 0) + syswarn(1, errno, "File rewind failed on: %s", arcn->org_name); + else { + arcn->crc = crc; + return 0; + } + return -1; +} |